Did Dutch company pension fund decision-makers step up to the plate? A retrospective reconstruction of decision-making processes during a financial crisis situation within a number of Dutch company pension funds. by Slottje, Arie
University of Bradford eThesis 
This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access 
repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team 
© University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons 
Licence. 
DID DUTCH COMPANY PENSION FUND 
DECISION-MAKERS STEP UP  
TO THE PLATE? 
A retrospective reconstruction of decision-making processes during a financial 
crisis situation within a number of Dutch company pension funds. 
Arie SLOTTJE 
submitted for the degree 
of Doctor of Business Administration 
School of Management 
University of Bradford 
2012 
Name:        Arie SLOTTJE 
Title:          Did Dutch company pension fund decision-makers step up to the plate? 
Keywords: Dutch company pension funds, decision-making process, real life situation 
i
Abstract 
This study provides a view of the decision-making process of Dutch company 
pension funds. The success of this research was the exceptional granting of 
access to four cases. Lack of such access could very well be the reason why 
research of this nature has not been previously achieved. The financial health 
of pension funds, expressed by the coverage ratio, showed a decline in 2008. 
Research has shown that there is a relationship between decision-making 
processes and outcome. Were the processes appropriate to set up and 
maintain a sufficient coverage ratio?  
A tailor-made conceptual research model has been developed and used as an 
analysis aid to research the TO BE situation based on legal requirements and 
factional documents and the AS IS situation based on empirical data. The 
model made it feasible to shed light on the implementation of good pension 
fund governance principles and decision-making process, which is a 
contribution to the current gap in research.  
The research showed that there is a relationship between the implementation of 
pension fund governance principles and appropriate decision-making 
processes. It also showed that there is a relationship between an appropriate 
decision-making process and coverage ratio. Both conclusions are not 
statistically proven due to the lack of the statistical significance, but are 
qualitative analysed and confirmed in the conducted case studies. It is 
suggested to use the research model by supervisor or pension funds to 
establish the mismatch between the implementation of pension fund 
governance principles and decision-making processes to enhance the quality of 
decision-making processes and outcome. 
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  1 
1. Introduction and Background to the Research 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Research 
 
In 2007/2008 a financial crisis occurred (Benmelech and Dlugosz, 2009, 
Mishkin, 2009, Anonymous, 2009, Ryder and Chambers, 2009, Jones and 
Tsutsumi, 2009). Dutch pension funds suffered from huge investment losses. 
An example1 is ABP - the pension fund for employees in the government, public 
and education sector.  
The crash in equity prices, coupled with a dramatic decline of long-term interest 
rates used to discount liabilities, slashed pension funds’ funding ratios hereafter 
referred to as coverage ratios. In the Netherlands the coverage ratio is legally 
defined (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c) as the current 
market value of total assets divided by discounted pension liabilities. In the 
Netherlands the fall of the coverage ratio for the majority of pension funds 
required immediate attention and perhaps action by the pension funds, because  
the pension entitlements of millions of pension fund participants could be in 
danger. The coverage ratio is a number, which the supervisor uses to establish 
the financial health of the fund. The financial health of the pension institution 
depends on the promise made and the nature of the pension benefit. It also 
depends on the financial prospects of the pension fund over a certain time 
period. The central question regarding financial health can be stated as follows: 
To what extent is the pension fund able to live up to the communicated benefits, 
both now and in the future (Broeders et al., 2012)? In the Netherlands a 
reduction of the coverage ratio requires, also legally defined, (Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c) action (so-called  ‘herstelplannen’ 
or Recovery Plans) by the decision-makers, which can lead to turmoil among 
                                                
1 “One of the biggest funds in the world ABP said its coverage ratio had fallen by over a quarter. 
Their, some 2.1 million clients, lost 16 billion euros in the financial crisis. Its coverage ratio 
dropped from 126% to 92% in the fourth quarter 2008. The fund wrote off 22 billion euros (29 
billion U.S. dollars) because of the financial crisis” ANONYMOUS (2009) Dutch pension funds 
hard hit by financial crisis. Asia News Monitor.   
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1.1.1 Coverage Ratio as Agenda Topic for Board Meetings 
 
Pension fund boards need to be prudent and risk-aware. There are several 
reasons for these obligations. To start, these obligations are laid down in the 
Pension Act (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c). 
Secondly, taking into consideration that a fall of 1% in the interest rate causes 
an increase of around 15 % of the liabilities to occur (van Praag, 2009). The 
developments under review resulted in a decrease of the coverage ratio of an 
average of 121% in Q3 2008 to an average 92% in Q1 2009. In 2008 alone, the 
market value of total pension assets in the Netherlands dropped by more than 
17%. Together with the impact of lower discount rates, the crisis caused the 
coverage ratio to fall in 2008 by no less than 49 percentage points (de Dreu and 
Bikker, 2012).  
Thirdly, this financial crisis was the seventh in a row over the last 20-25 years. 
 
Number Year Name 
1 1987 Crash of the stock market. 
2 1994 The Mexican peso crisis. 
3 1994 Decline of the European bond market following a huge rally in 1993. 
4 1997 Asian currency exchange market. 
5 1998 The Russian rouble crisis, which led to the bankruptcy of the hedge fund 
LTMC. This caused an enormous shock on the financial markets. 
 
6 2002 The so-called Internet bubble crisis (bankruptcy of WorldCom and others) 
causing an extreme downturn of stock markets. 
 
7 2007  Banking crisis, which began with the bankruptcy of Northern Rock followed 
by huge depreciation of mortgages by Merrill Lynch, Citibank, UBS, Swiss 
Re, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Royal Bank of Scotland, UB S and the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  
 
Table 1-1: Financial crises 1987 – 2008. 
 
In the IOPS report (International Organisation of Pension Supervisors, 2006) it 
is documented that pension funds should have clearly documented procedures 
for decision-making, with processes for referring decisions up to the appropriate 
level of seniority, reviewing and documenting decisions. In a crisis situation it is 
possible that the process is repeated at a higher frequency or with different 
topics on the agenda, but the process should be clear and only adjusted 
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 when required by the situation. So, the question was: Did Dutch company 
pension fund decision-makers step up to the plate? Were they prudent and risk 
aware? Did the agenda of board meetings cover the topic of coverage ratio? 
Was the process of decision-making set up in such a way that the topic could 
come up in board meetings? Janis and Mann (1977) describe the decision 
making process in an environment of conflict, choice, and commitment and 
provide four basic questions which should be raised so decision-makers have a 
better chance of attaining their objectives. Those questions are: 
1. Are the risks serious if I/we don’t change? 
2. Are the risks serious if I/we do change? 
3. Is it realistic to hope in finding a better solution? 
4. Is there sufficient time to search and deliberate? 
 
1.1.2 Decision-Making Process 
 
Despite previous crises and actions taken, looking at Table 1-1, one could 
consider that something went wrong. Due to the turmoil many publications 
concerning the decline in coverage ratio appeared. Although they had one 
question in common - Where did it go wrong? - publications came up with a 
variety of  answers, including:  
1. Incompetence of the board (Frijns et al., 2010).  
2. Lack of risk management ('t Hart, 2009). 
3. Too much reliance on the use of models (Brouwer, 2009). 
4. Too positive assumptions (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2011b).  
5. Shortcomings in governance and outsourcing (De Nederlandsche Bank, 
2011b).  
Due to the variety of answers given in publications one could consider that 
boards of pension funds are insufficiently prepared to cope with crises. Perhaps 
the decline of the coverage ratio was a combination of the answers given 
above, although none of the publications even suggested this as a possibility. 
None of the publications either highlighted or investigated the decision-making 
process. An appropriate decision-making process could shed light on 
mismatches or indicate room for improvement to prevent ineffective decisions to
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be made. An appropriate decision-making process takes into account various 
kinds of information, technical data and knowledge, like: 
1. Details about the problem, which requires a decision. 
2. The stakeholders involved and their objectives and policies. 
3. The influences affecting the outcome like legal requirements. 
4. The do’s and don’ts of pension fund governance. 
The argument that decision-making processes matter rests on two assumptions 
(Dean and Sharfman, 1996). The first is that different processes lead to different 
choices. The second assumption is that choices relate to outcomes. Therefore, 
an appropriate decision-making process perhaps will not always lead to a 
desired outcome but it should be feasible to explained why the outcome is as it 
is. During the crisis the Government installed two committees with specific 
assignments. One committee was asked to investigate the investment policy 
and risk management of pension funds. This committee is known as Committee 
Frijns (Frijns et al., 2010). The other one was asked to investigate the future 
proofing of supplementary pension schemes. This committee is known as 
Committee Goudswaard (Goudswaard et al., 2010). Not one of the 
Governmental Committees or other bodies investigated either the decision-
making processes or procedures within Dutch pension funds. To arrive at an 
appropriate decision-making process a conceptual model will be developed. 
This conceptual research model will be used to analyze the decision-making 
process concerning the maintenance of the coverage ratio within a sample of 
Dutch company pension funds. The process shows how those decisions were 
established. The conceptual research model makes it feasible for other pension 
funds around the world to investigate their decision-making process because it 
is a generic model. However, the applicable questionnaires should be tailored 
to the applicable law and content of the factional documents. In section 2.2 a 
more in-depth review of decision-making is conducted.  For the purpose of this 
study, structured qualitative interviews with managers/directors and board 
members, as well as research questionnaires were used as a means of data 
collection. This usage of organizational leaders (board members and directors 
as “key respondents”) is relatively widespread in strategy research (Snow and 
Hrebiniak, 1980, Bowman and Ambrosini, 1997). 
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1.2 Research 
 
This section provides an overview of the gaps in the current literature, which is 
explored in greater detail in chapter two, and the resulting importance of this 
research to the field of decision-making. There is literature available in which 
decision-making of pension fund decision-makers is (partly) researched (O'Barr 
and Conley, 1992, Ambachtsheer et al., 1996, 1998b, 2005, 2006, 2007, Clark 
et al., 2006, Clark and Urwin, 2008). They all had a different perspective. 
Ambachtsheer et al. (1996, 1998b, 2005, 2006, 2007) conducted research and 
wrote many articles about pension funds and their governance based on their 
longitudinal research. Ambachtsheer et al. (1996) designed a survey that was 
answered by 50 senior pension fund executives in December 1994 during a 
symposium titled “Excellence in Pension Fund Management: What Is It?” Asked 
to estimate the ‘excellence shortfall’ in their organizations, the median response 
was a material 66 basis points. Asked to identify the sources of excellence 
shortfall, the respondents had the opportunity to select predefined causes. 
Three causes mentioned most frequently were the poor decision processes 
(98%), inadequate resources (48%), and lack of focus or mission clarity (42%). 
Clark et al. (2006) reported the results of an analysis of pension fund trustee 
competence in solving problems relevant to their investment responsibilities. 
They found the problem-solving capabilities of pension fund trustees in the U.K. 
“surprisingly heterogeneous” with potentially significant implications for pension 
fund governance. Clark and Urwin (2008) wrote about preferred styles for 
decision-making. Studies (Blake et al., 1999, Tonks, 2005) are available about 
investment decisions.  
 
1.2.1  Gaps in Existing Research 
 
There are two main gaps in the research and literature, which this study aims to 
address.  
1. The first gap is the lack of research into the manner in which pension funds 
arrive at appropriate decisions. 
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To establish whether a decision is appropriate or not calls for an assessment of 
its consequences. This poses several difficulties. As March (1994) noted, 
decision-makers lament what they can not do and do things they are not willing 
to talk about. Also, managers often act without recognizing the outcomes of 
their actions (Starbuck, 1983). Even when outcomes are observed, determining 
their consequences can be difficult because it can be hard to separate the good 
from the bad outcome (Nutt, 1998). For instance, outcomes that serve an 
individual’s interest may be seen as good; those that do not, as neutral or bad. 
That the process of decision-making is important and related to the success of a 
decision is shown in a study (Dean and Sharfman, 1996). They concluded that 
their results indicate that decision-making processes are indeed related to 
decision success. This underpins the results of Ambachtsheer et al. (1996) 
which showed the relation between excellence shortfall and poor decision-
making processes. Given the lack of information about the situation within 
Dutch company pension funds it is possible that they also may suffer from poor 
decision processes or lack of focus or mission clarity. Taking this into account 
there could be a relationship between governance (the principles or rules to 
which the behaviour must meet) and the empirical decision-making process. For 
example, there are no norms for either appropriate decision-making processes 
or for good governance; they are both principle and not rule based. In summary, 
there is much literature available, which stresses the importance of decision-
making processes, but no research or literature on the way pension funds might 
arrive at decisions.  
 
2. The second gap is the lack of research into decision-making processes 
specifically within Dutch pension funds. This gap can be seen as a derivative 
of the previous one. 
Here is a close relationship with the previous defined gap, however, focused on 
the situation in the Netherlands. There is literature available, commissioned 
mostly by the Dutch supervisor (Bikker and de Dreu, 2006, Rooij et al., 2007, 
Davis et al., 2007, Broeders and Chen, 2008, Heeringa, 2008, Dreu and Bikker, 
2009, Broeders and Chen, 2010, Haan and Jansen, 2011). The topics covered 
vary from pension regulation and the market value of pension liabilities 
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 (Broeders and Chen, 2008) to corporate culture and behaviour (Haan and 
Jansen, 2011). However, prior to this, no literature was available on decision- 
making processes in Dutch pension funds. So an in-depth understanding of 
these processes is lacking - both the more distant, abstract world of academia 
and the financial world in which these processes play out. Given the lack of 
similar empirical studies in Dutch company pension funds it will contribute to 
existing research. The paucity of empirical research to date leaves considerable 
knowledge gaps in pension fund decision-making processes. 
 
1.2.2 The Research Objective 
 
As justified in the previous sections, this study addresses the decision-making 
processes within Dutch company pension funds. The objective of this research 






The link between decision-making processes and adequacy has not yet, been 
so convincingly demonstrated and substantial discussion in the literature has 
focused on the question of whether managerial processes matter (Hitt and 
Tyler, 1991). The argument that they do rests on two assumptions (Dean and 
Sharfman, 1996). The first is that different processes lead to different choices. 
The second assumption is that choices relate to outcomes.  
Development of a decision-making process model for appropriate decision-
making within pension funds.  
















The possible relationships between the implementation of pension fund 
governance principles, appropriate decision-making processes and outcome 
bring the following propositions to be researched: 
 
Proposition P1: The implementation of pension fund governance principles 
leads to an appropriate decision-making process. 
 
Pension fund governance principles (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005) provide a 
framework for careful management, accountability, internal supervision, 
expertise, openness and communication. The aforementioned principles 
encompass the guidelines to which the board should comply and is an overview 
of do’s and don’ts. Implementing the principles leads to an appropriate decision-
making process. The process is the actual behaviour of the board and it should 
be a reflectiosn of the do’s and don’ts.  Ambachtsheer et al. (1998a) found that 
there is a correlation between good governance and pension fund excellence. 
In the IOPS report (2006) there is a suggestion for the supervisory authority that 
they should adhere to its own governance code and should be accountable.  
The suggestion is made that their governance code should outline internal 
controls, checks and balances, and effective processes for risk and 
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decision-making. To date, pension fund governance has not garnered the same 
kind of research attention as corporate governance. Yet, the process of 
decision-making and governance is important for pension funds. In a brochure 
(De Nederlandsche Bank, 2010b) about the supervision themes in 2010 the 
Dutch supervisor acknowledged2 this. 
 
Proposition P2: An appropriate decision-making process leads to a legally 
required minimum coverage ratio.  
 
P2 investigates the relationship between the appropriate decision-making 
process including the actual behaviour of the board and the outcome in terms of 
decision. 
 
1.2.4 The Research Problem 
 
Due to the small sample size of participating organizations in this study, it is 
impossible to calculate a Pearson’s correlation, which is statistically significant. 
However, when both propositions seem to be true after a qualitative analysis it 
underpins the results of Ambachtsheer et al.  (1998a) for the participating 
organizations and proof that the model is a tested aid to analyze the decision-
making processes. To achieve the objective of the study and to test the 








                                                
2 Translated by researcher: “It is very important that pension funds give a good interpretation of 
the requirements of pension fund governance. The DNB will hold the functioning of the 
governorship principles against the light by, among other things, giving attention to the 
preparation and production of decisions.”DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK (2010b) Thema's DNB 
toezicht 2010. Amsterdam, De Nederlandsche Bank. 
 
How was the decision-making process regarding the coverage ratio 
structured within the participating Dutch company pension funds during the 
period Q3 and Q4 2008 and in Q1 2009? 
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The research period is chosen because the significantly severe drop of the 
coverage ratio (see Figure 1-1) took place during that timeframe. Since the 
Dutch Central Bank in 2004, became responsible for the supervision of Dutch 
pension funds, such a relapse of coverage ratio has not taken place. An answer 
to the research question requires investigation into factors that are perceived to 
have an impact on the process and outcome. Those factors are part of the 
developed conceptual research model (see Chapter 3). The conceptual 
research model will serve as a standard for the study of the decision-making 
process. The aforementioned phases also shed light on the governance 
aspect of decision-making. The data is gathered from a sample of Dutch 
company pension funds, their board members and management.  
 
1.2.5 Contribution of the Research 
 
As mentioned one gap and one derivative gap in existing research can be 
addressed. It therefore intends to add to the non-existing research work carried 
out in pension funds. The resulting importance of this research can be viewed 
from the intended literature and managerial contributions of this research. Every 
pension fund participant would like to have income security when they retire. 
Therefore, pension funds boards are supposed to prudently take care of the 
invested assets to pay the pension entitlements. Because the board of pension 
funds is responsible for the financial well-being of the fund, they should 
maintain control of the financial situation of the funds (Pensioenfederatie, 2010, 
De Nederlandsche Bank and Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten, 2012). 
Were they in control? Despite previous crises and actions taken, based on 
knowledge and advancing insight looking at Figure 1-1, one could consider that 
something is not properly organized yet. This study will contribute to the lacking 
solution.  
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1.2.6 Intended Theoretical Contributions 
 
The intended theoretical contribution is to describe a new process model, based 
on literature research (Mintzberg et al., 1976, Simon, 1979, Dean and 
Sharfman, 1993, Rastegary and Landy, 1993, Langley et al., 1995, Reyna and 
Rivers, 2008), law, practice reflected in factional documents as a process model 
for pension funds’ decision-making, since this is not available at the moment. 
This model will be applied to several different cases. According to the studied 
literature (Kahneman et al., 1982, Thompson, 2004, Dror and Fraser-
Mackenzie, 2008) it is important that the measure of biases like commitment 
and trust draw attention to how things can go wrong. Therefore a small number 
of questions will be included in the questionnaire regarding this issue. It is not 
the intention to elaborate on it. O’Barr and Conley (1992) concluded based on 
observing behavior at nine major US pension funds over a two year period, that 
the aim of pension fund governance appeared to be focused more on 
responsibility deflection and blame management than on good governance and 
creating value for fund stakeholders. They found that strong personal 
relationships with consultants and investment managers seem to be a top 
priority for pension fund board members. Elements of commitment and trust are 
therefore included as part of the questionnaire. The model can help to identify 
any potential shortcomings in decision-making processes. 
 
1.2.7 Intended Managerial Contributions 
 
The managerial contributions encompass three levels:  
1st Level: Board of the participated company pension funds. It is anticipated that 
the case descriptions will give answers to questions which make it possible that 
the board will end up in an undesirable situation as a result of their directors’ 
liability. Due to the fact that the board of the company pension fund is jointly 
and severally liable for the consequences of the decisions, it is of great 
importance to the board that they can justify their decisions upfront and after the 
event.  
  13 
2nd Level: Information dissemination. Public dissemination of anonymous 
research information in the form of publications or presentations will only take  
place after written consent of the participating organizations. Before 
disseminating anonymous research information, the participating organization 
will receive a document and verbal explanation covering recommendations on 
how their situation attributed (possible found) shortcomings can be addressed. 
3rd Level: Supervisor. The supervisor will be contacted to discuss the outcome 
of the research. The purpose is to set up, in collaboration with the supervisor, a 
number of new research questions, the results of which will benefits the board 
of pension funds rather than only the supervisor.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
 
Figure 1-3 below is a graphical overview of the structure of the thesis. 




















Figure 1-3: Thesis structure. 
 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction and the background of the research. 
Chapter 2 discusses themes in the literature on decision-making. In Chapter 3 
the conceptual research model, and it’s grounding in the literature is explained. 
Chapter 4 extrapolates the research methodology to be used during the 
empirical research. Chapter 5 contain the results and findings of the research 
per case as well as cross-case comparison.  Chapter 6 discusses the 
conclusions and recommendations. The final chapter of the thesis provides a 
final reflection on the study. This chapter was added because after the research 
period a new financial crisis occurred, the sovereign debt crisis, again with 
Framing the Issue 
Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Research 














Findings based on 
empirical data 
Empiricism 
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implications for the coverage ratio of Dutch pensions funds. The chapter will 
therefore focus on the status of the developments up to 17 September 2012, 
the date of submission of the thesis.  
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This chapter reviews the themes, which are related to the research problem as 
stated in the previous chapter. Table 2-1 provides an overview of the core and 
peripheral literature that is discussed.  
 
Central to the research Peripheral to the research 
Theoretical underpinning. 
 
Linking phases of the decision-making process. 
 
Biases as an element in the 
process. 
 
Pension fund universe. 
 
Applicable legislation and 
supervision. 
 
Table 2-1: Overview of reviewed literature. 
 
This review is necessary for the development of the conceptual research model 
in Chapter 3. The intention is to identify elements that play a role in the 
decision-making of pension funds about the coverage ratio. Often decisions are 
developed in a somewhat chaotic manner, evolving from on-going 
confrontations among the preferences of the different participants. It is this 
playing out of these confrontations and interactions - under the various 
compensating and amplifying effects of the system - that constitutes what we 
call the decision-making process. Research at the individual level has linked 
cognitive processes to decision outcomes (e.g., (Bazerman, 1990). For 
example, decisions suffer if people use cognitive anchors (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974) or try to justify previous choices (Staw, 1981). Group 
decision-making processes also influence performance (Guzzo, 1986, 
Hackman, 1991). Janis (1982) demonstrated how processes such as 
rationalization threaten decision success. 
  17 
2.2 Theoretical Underpinning  
 
The theoretical underpinnings for this research will focus on the decision-
making theories and which to choose and the consequences of this choice for 
the development of the model. 
 
2.2.1 Different Views/Theories on Decision-Making 
 
In decision-making there are two major approaches. On the one hand there is 
the normative or prescriptive approach. The core is optimization, rational and 
complete information. On these assumptions theories and models are 
developed. Description focuses on how we make decisions and the underlying 
reasons for such behaviour. Prescription considers how we should make 
decisions with a view to improving the quality of decision-making, both in terms 
of process and outcome (Doyle Corner et al., 1994).  In the 1940s two important 
theories were developed. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) developed a 
theory of games and economic behavior known as the Game theory, a 
prescriptive theory. Simon (1947) developed the theory of the Bounded 
Rationality, which is a descriptive theory. Along this rational/irrational spectrum, 
some theorists believe that there is one best way to make decisions; others 
believe that the best way depends on the particular situation one faces. Making 
a decision implies that there are alternative choices to be considered. The 
objective is to choose that alternative which has the highest probability of 
success or effectiveness and therefore best fits the goals to be achieved. The 
distinction and the gap between prescription and description are important and 
reflect the different perspectives adopted by Psychology and Management 
Science research communities. Another perspective is to consider decision-
making as part of a process. The result of the process is a decision, which can 
be built on prescriptive or descriptive elements, or partly prescriptive and partly 
descriptive elements.  
  18 
2.2.2 Prescriptive or Normative Decision-Making Theories 
 
These theories assume an ideal decision maker who is fully informed, able to 
compute with perfect accuracy and fully rational. An example of a prescriptive 
theory is the Game theory as developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944).  Prescriptive theories see decision-making processes aiming towards 
the improvement of the quality of decision-making, both in terms of process and 
outcome (Doyle Corner et al., 1994).  The assumption of rationality provides a 
convenient theoretical core. The decision-making process of such a rational 
individual, group of individuals or organization has these characteristics: 
1. An identification and listing of all the alternatives. 
2. The determination of all the consequences resulting from each of the 
alternatives. 
3. The comparison of the accuracy and efficiency of each of the consequences 
into a  
4. Consistent preference ordering and  
5. A decision rule. 
These characteristics lead to what is called hyper-rational decision-making. The 
question is, is this theory realistic? Can decisions be made like this in real life? 
Due to the fact that in the area of research people and groups of people with 
different interests are involved, it is really doubtful whether this type of decision-
making occurs. It is feasible that it occurs in certain parts of the decision-making 
process, but not for the entire decision-making process. Many economic models 
assume that people are hyper-rational, and would never consciously choose to 
do anything that would disadvantage them. However, research by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1972) has shown that this was clearly not the case.  
 
2.2.3 Descriptive Decision-Making Theories 
 
In the descriptive approach an attempt is made to describe people’s real-life 
decision-making processes. Because decisions are not always made in a 
rational manner, descriptive theories see it as beneficial to describe what 
actually happens, and not just which decision should be made if the decision- 
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maker weighed the pros and cons rationally. The value of recording actual 
human behaviour, for example when people do not optimize their capabilities, is 
a basic assumption on which descriptive theories are based. Simon wrote many 
articles on the topic over the course of his life, mainly focusing on the issue of 
decision-making within the behaviour of what he termed “bounded rationality” 
(Simon, 1947). Bounded rationality is a term used to designate rational choice, 
which takes into account the cognitive limitations of both knowledge and 
cognitive capacity. The Garbage Can model (Cohen et al., 1972) disconnects 
problems, solutions and decision-makers. It was suggested that organizations 
tend to produce many “solutions” which are discarded due to a lack of 
appropriate problems. However, problems may eventually occur for which a 
search of the garbage might yield fitting solutions. Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman (1982) demonstrated in various experiments in distinct and 
replicable ways in how human judgment and decision-making differ from the 
rational choice theory. The results of the experiments led to the development of 
the Prospect Theory as an alternative. The Prospect Theory states that people 
make decisions based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than the 
final outcome, and that people evaluate these losses and gains using certain 
heuristics. The heuristics are mental short cuts, for instance using how readily 
or vividly something comes to mind as an indication of how often or how 
recently it was encountered. Daniel Kahneman (2003) proposes bounded 
rationality as a factor to overcome some of the limitations of the rational-agent 
models in economic literature. In Models of my Life Simon (1996) points out that 
many people are only partly rational, and are in fact emotional or irrational in the 
remaining part of their actions. This shift from the fully rational human being 
towards a living creature whose ultimate goal is to achieve satisfactory 
decisions is an enormous development in theory. The descriptive perspective, 
while rich in its description of real behaviour, is often context-dependent (in 
respect of both decision-making context and decision-maker cognition), thereby 
limiting its applicability for prescription beyond that context. Gigerenzer and 
Selten (2002) argued that most decision theorists who have discussed bounded 
rationality have not really followed Simon's ideas. Rather, they have either 
considered how people's decisions might be made sub-optimal by the 
limitations of human rationality, or have constructed elaborate optimizing 
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models of how people might cope with their inability to optimize. They instead 
proposed examination of simple alternatives to a full rationality analysis as a 
mechanism for decision-making. One should realize that many decisions are 
made without much conscious thought, such as impulse buying by consumers. 
The knowledge that the working capacity of the unconscious is approximately 
200,000 times as large as the conscious (Dijksterhuis, 2007) could provide new 
insight into decision-making processes. In decision-making there is always an 
underlying assumption. Are people striving for maximizing the optimal result or 
are they pleased with satisfying decisions? The cost of collecting the 
information to decide is often neglected (DeMiguel et al., 2007). DeMiguel posit 
that there is a sample threshold at which complex rules outperform simple ones 
is in excess of 3000 months. This is data covering approximately 250 years. 
Current research (Gigenrenzer and Brighton, 2009) has shown that people look 
more and more for heuristics simple decision rules. Those simple decision rules 
speed up the process of finding a satisfactory solution; mental short cuts are 
used to ease the cognitive load of decision-making. Those simple rules are: rule 
of thumb, an educated guess or common sense. That simplicity can lead to 
better decisions is shown by research (McCammon and Hägeli, 2007, Snook et 
al., 2005). 
 
2.2.4 Decision-Making Process Theories 
 
When studying practical examples of the process of decision-making, it 
becomes clear that the process consists of a number of phases. The result of 
this process is a decision. As decision-makers have to make decisions about 
how and when to decide, Rubenstein (1998) proposed modelling the process by 
explicitly specifying decision-making procedures. Today, given the complexity 
and rapidly changing nature of social, cultural, and business environment, 
experts recognize that managers do not make all of their decisions using time-
consuming logical and rational decision-making processes, but rather make 
many of their most important decisions instantly and intuitively. Intuitive decision 
making (Gilovich et al., 2002) works best when managers allow themselves to 
instantly recognize cues as patterns, which in turn allow them to act based on 
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their past experience. In short, action is based on intuition and intuition is based 
on instantly recognizing and evaluating prior experiences. According to Simon 
(1947), managers make choices based on simplified rather than real situations. 
This ‘subjective rationality’ narrows and alters the objective facts. The literature 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976, Dutton and Jackson, 1987) shows that managers tend 
to classify issues into a limited number of categories such as crisis, opportunity, 
uncertainty, and pressure. The classification affects both subsequent 
information processing and the motivations of the decision-makers. Looking at 
the articles considering the decline of the coverage ratio all the authors 
classified the difficulties differently. Plagued by uncertainties people would not 
take irreversible decisions (Janis and Mann, 1977). A study by Papadakis and 
Lioukas (1996) claimed that crisis situations seem to affect the decision-making 
process differently than pressure situations. Crisis situations trigger internal 
political activities during the decision-making process.  Decisions posing 
pressure seem to be subjected to the formal rules. Based on that relationship it 
is feasible that by presenting issues as clear and non-threatening, management 
may succeed in eliminating political debates and problem-solving dissension 
among participants. Many efforts in the field of decision-making attempt to 
describe the process as a sequence of steps or phases (Mintzberg et al., 1976, 
Fredrickson, 1985). Decision-makers always act based on inadequate and 
incomplete knowledge (Brunsson, 1982, Adler and Gundersen, 2008). 
Decision-making is the process of sufficiently reducing uncertainty and doubt 
about alternatives to allow a reasonable choice to be made from among them. 
To this end the process can consist of prescriptive and descriptive elements. 
This definition stresses the information-gathering function of decision-making. It 
should be noted here that uncertainty is reduced rather than eliminated. Very 
few decisions are made with absolute certainty because complete knowledge 
about all the alternatives is seldom possible. Thus, every decision involves a 
certain amount of risk. If there is no uncertainty, you do not have to make a 
decision. A critical factor that decision theorists sometimes neglect to 
emphasize is that in spite of the way the process is presented on paper, 
decision-making is a nonlinear, recursive process. That is, most decisions are 
made by moving back and forth between the choice of criteria (the 
characteristics we want our choice to meet) and the identification of alternatives
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(the possibilities we can choose from). The alternatives available influence the 
criteria we apply to them, and similarly the criteria we establish influence the 
alternatives we will consider. Another important theorist in the area of decision-
making theories is Lindblom (1959). He created the theory of Muddling through. 
His work is a mixture of descriptive and process elements. The process 
approach takes into account the conflict of interests and the number of different 
stakeholders. All these elements can become important because in Dutch 
company pension funds a number of different stakeholders are involved (see 
Appendix A.) procedures can be described and human beings are involved.  
With this in mind, the conceptual research model (see Chapter 3) was 
developed, adopting the process approach, which encompass all these 
elements. 
 
2.2.5 Linking the Phases of Decision-Making 
 
In most of the process models at least three basic (groups of) activities are 
distinguished: problem identification, generation of alternative solutions, and 
evaluations of alternatives (Noorderhaven, 1995). This brings us to his 
conceptual model in Figure 2-1. 


















Figure 2-1: A conceptual model of organizational decision-making (Source: Noorderhaven 1995). 
 
Not all situations will trigger an elaborate process as presented in Figure 2-1. In 
general, a decision is the product of an interaction between an individual’s 
preferences and those of others. In many cases the final decision will not be the 
responsibility of or influenced by single individuals. It could involve what is 
called entities such as an elected or appointed body, cabinet officials, a board 
of directors, a personnel department, a trade union (Roy, 1996). It is feasible 
that in reality, the comprehensive process of decision-making could be 
developed in a somewhat chaotic manner, evolving from on-going 
confrontations among the preferences of the different participants. It is this 
playing out of confrontations and interactions, under the various compensating 
and amplifying effects of the system that make up what we call the decision-
making process. For the development of the conceptual model the phase of 
availability of information is added. This is done because this is required by 








Evaluating Options Generating Options 
Formulation Recognition 
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The decision making process is dependent on a variety of factors, which may 
influence the making of the decision. Biases are one of these factors, which are 
elaborately discussed by a body of literature (Langer, 1975, Langer and Roth, 
1975, Kahneman et al., 1982, Hogarth, 1987, Thompson, 2004, Dror and 
Fraser-Mackenzie, 2008). When biases creep into the decision-making process, 
the result is not the most optimal decision. Biases like selective search for 
evidence, wishful thinking, choice-supportive biases, or the illusion of control  
influence the decision-making process tremendously.  Experiments of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1984) show that the biases that they identified are at 
least partially the result of problem solving with the use of mental short cuts, i.e. 
using how readily or vividly something comes to mind as an indication of how 
often or how recently it was encountered. Dror (2005) pointed out that biases 
and distortions arise from a long and thoroughly studied list of cognitive and 
psychological phenomena (Hogarth, 1980, Nisbett and Ross, 1980, Kahneman 
et al., 1982, Evans, 1989, Gilovich et al., 2002). These well-established 
cognitive and psychological phenomena cause people to lose objectivity. Some 
of these phenomena are confirmation bias, cognitive dissonance, self-fulfilling 
prophecies, motivated reasoning, and escalation of commitment. These can all 
influence a person’s ability to recognize problems (Drummond, 1996, Keil et al., 
2007, Chulkov, 2007). Therefore, after choosing the process approach for 
developing the conceptual research model, biases need to be taken into 
account. In the context of this thesis, the following biases have been selected:  
1. Time constraints.  
Time constraints can provide pressure, which can influence the results and 
outcome of the process. This element is taken into account because there was 
an enormous time pressure involved. The coverage ratio declined very rapidly. 
Perhaps a swift reaction was necessary.  
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2. The illusion of control.  
The illusion of control will be taken into account because the preliminary 
interviews conducted with board member of company pension funds, indicated 
that various external advisors often surround the boards. It would be logical that 
they would have warned the Board when something went wrong. 
3. Problem recognition.  
Problem recognition is of importance because when a situation is not seen as a 
problem no activities to solve the problem will be started. To agree about the 
problem solving activities a decision is necessary.  
 
2.3.1.1 Time Constraints 
 
Time constraints can put enormous pressure on the decision-making process  
and the outcome (Rastegary and Landy, 1993). The pension fund planned to 
achieve a certain return based on how the strategic investment portfolio is 
composed. In planning decisions there are always time constraints. Flyvbjerg 
(2009) states, that planning decisions that are influenced by ‘planning fallacy’ 
(optimism) and ‘strategic misrepresentation’ (lying) always face an overshoot of 
time and money. As time pressure increases, our ability to examine and 
compare choice alternatives is challenged, and the decision-making process is 
modified. These changes include ignoring some choice alternatives altogether, 
information selectivity, change of threshold for responding and more. Time 
pressures can increase biasing effects (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983, Freund et 
al., 1985), perhaps because information selectivity is higher and decision 
criteria thresholds are lower (Dror et al., 1999). The study by Papadakis and 
Lioukas (1996) claimed that crisis situations seem to affect the decision-making 
process differently than pressure situations. Decisions posing pressure seem to 
be subjected to the formal rules. In this context it is important to establish 
whether the formal rules have an emergency procedure, which comes in place 
as soon as the situation is regarded as a time pressure situation. 
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2.3.1.2 Illusion of Control 
 
The illusion of control is the tendency for people to overestimate their ability to 
control events. The effect was named by Langer (1975). The effect has been 
replicated in many different contexts (Plous, 1993). The illusion of control is 
more common in familiar situations, and in situations where the decision-maker 
knows the desired outcome (Thompson, 1999). The illusion is strengthened by 
stressful and competitive situations, including financial trading (Fenton-
O'Creevy et al., 2003). The illusion of control was demonstrated in three 
different ways - laboratory experiments, observed behaviour in familiar games 
of chance such as lotteries and self-reports of real world behaviour. 
 
2.3.1.3 Problem Recognition  
 
Problem recognition as such is not a bias. However, it is known that problem 
identification, which is an early stage of the decision-making process, is mainly 
influenced by people’s cognitive capabilities (Yu and Luo, 2008). Bazerman 
(1983) demonstrated that the concept of framing problems affects individual 
behaviour. This was based on research carried out by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979). Bazerman (1983) wrote that they demonstrated that individual decisions 
are systematically affected by the manner in which problems were presented. 
Specifically, individuals tend to avoid risks when problems are framed in a 
positive direction (e.g. concerning gains) and to seek risks when problems are 
framed in a negative direction (e.g. concerning losses). In the literature (Staw, 
1976, Teger, 1980, Staw, 1981, Bazerman et al., 1982, Brockner and Rubin, 
1984) it is demonstrated that decision-makers who commit themselves to a 
particular course of action may use additional resources in a non-optimal way in 
order to justify the previous commitment. In his article Bowen (1987)3 disagrees 
with that. He concluded that research on the escalation phenomenon to date  
                                                
3 “previous studies and theoretical work suggest that the “escalation phenomenon” represents a 
syndrome of decision errors which tend to lock decision-makers into a course of action.” 
BOWEN, M. G. (1987) The Escalation Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision Dilemmas or 
Decision Errors? The Academy of Management Review, 12, 52-66. 
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has arguably failed to demonstrate the phenomenon. 
Problem recognition is sometimes referred to as problem setting or problem 
framing (Dietz, 2005). Efforts to study this phenomenon have looked at 
organizational interpretation (Weick, 2001). Weick (1995)4 captures the 
challenge with regard to these efforts very well. The more individuals involved, 
the more complex and difficult it is to determine what the problem(s) are and the 
context in which they play out (Dooley, 2002), especially when company 
pension funds are surrounded by many stakeholders who are involved in the 




The conflict of interest and the distributed power among different stakeholders 
makes the issue of politics an element in the decision-making process within 
Dutch company pension funds. Board members are appointed as delegates to 
protect their parents’ interest. The Dutch supervisor recorded in his final report 
research theme Good pension fund governance 2011 (De Nederlandsche 
Bank, 2012d) that there are a number of stakeholders with different interests. In 
article 105 of the Pension Act, a balanced interest trade-off is prescribed. The 
implementation, (how to do it) is left to the pension funds. This brings in politics.  
Although the subject of politics is important the research is focused on the 
process and not on the influencing elements solely. However, politics as 
element in decision-making can be a topic for further future research. This 
research is not the place to elaborate on the issue of politics. Still it is important 
to understand politics as element in the decision-making process. Strauss  
(1962) deals in a study of lateral organizational relationships, with what he calls 
‘office politics’. He defines politics as the exploitation of resources, both physical 
and human, for the achievement of more control over other, and thus safer, or 
more comfortable, or more satisfying terms of individual existence. In short, the 
use of power for the achievement of more control is called politics. In Figure 2-2 
politics in decision-making is shown.
                                                
4 “Problem setting is a process in which, interactively, we name the things to which we will 
attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them.” WEICK, K. (1995) Sencemaking 
in organizations, Beverly Hills CA, Sage Publishing, Inc. 
 





Figure 2-2: Politics in decision-making (Source: Strauss, 1962).    
 
Many authors have argued that the source of politics is conflict (March, 1962, 
Baldridge, 1971, Pfeffer, 1981). When there is no conflict, there is no need for 
people to use politics to influence decision-making. Many authors have also 
argued that politics arise when power is decentralized (Hage, 1980, Pfeffer, 
1981, Dean et al., 1987). When the power of individuals is roughly equivalent, 
they band together to influence decision-making processes.  Conversely, when 
power is highly centralized, conflict is submerged and the use of politics 




Figure 2-3: Politics in decision-making (Source: March, 1962; Baldridge ,1971; Pfeffer, 1981). 
 
However, a study carried out by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois ((1988) showed 
something else. Although conflict was important, power imbalance was crucial. 
Specifically, the use of politics was closely linked to centralized, not centralized, 
decision-making. In their article (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois III, 1988) they made 
a statement5 about the relation between power, politics and control. In graphics 




Figure 2-4: Politics in decision-making (Source: Eisenhard and Bourgeois 1988). 
                                                
5 “The more powerful a CEO, the greater the tendency among remaining executives to 
consolidate power and engage in alliance and insurgency behaviours, while the CEO engaged 
in tactics for controlling and withholding information.” EISENHARDT, K. M. & BOURGEOIS III, 
L. J. (1988) Politics of Strategic Decision Making in High-Velocity Environments: Toward a 
Midrange Theory. The Academy of Management Journal, 31, 737-770. 
 
Politics Power Control Conflict 
Politics Power Control 
Power Politics Control 
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In the aforementioned study (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois III, 1988) political 
behaviour within top management teams was found to relate to poor firm 
performance. Papadakis and Lioukas (1996) claimed that decisions with a 
larger impact tend to be taken in a more rational mode (Stein, 1981, Dean et al., 
1987). Again, decisions with widespread impact are expected to follow more 
formalized processes and attract more collective attention, as multiple parties 
would like to contribute (Dutton, 1986). Pension fund decisions about coverage 
ratio can have a widespread impact and the decision-making process is 
therefore expected to follow a more formalized process. Decisions of this nature 
may also cause a variety of views about the proper ways in which issues should 
be resolved. This usually leads to more political activities.  
 
2.3.3 The Pension ‘Universe’ 
 
The financial importance of pension funds can be expressed as a percentage of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) weighted average asset-to-GDP ratio for 
pension funds increased from 67.3% of GDP in 2001 to 72.4% of GDP in 2011, 
with the Netherlands achieving the largest ratio in 2011, at 138% (OECD, 
2012). Due to the fact that the financial crisis had a worldwide impact, it is 
investigated whether there are countries with the same pension system, 
regulation and supervision. In case of similarity it is perhaps feasible to make 
use of the lessons learnt. To investigate whether there are similarities, 
information of the OECD and the European Union are explored. An overview 
(OECD, 2011) shows that the pension ‘universe’ in the 34 OECD countries and 
the eight major economies, which are members of the G20, differ. As the OECD 
(2011)6 comments that due to diversity classifying pension systems is difficult. 
For an overview of pension-systems see Appendix B. The International 
Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS) founded in July 2004 by the OECD 
and the International Network of Pension Regulators and Supervisors (INPRS)
                                                
6 “Retirement-income systems are diverse and often involve a number of different programmes. 
Classifying pension systems and different retirement-income schemes is consequentially 
difficult.” OECD (2011) Pension at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and 
G20 Countries. IN PUBLISHING, O. (Ed.). 
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is an independent international body. It represents those involved in the 
supervision of pension funds, representing pension supervisors from over 60 
countries - from Australia to Zambia - covering all levels of economic 
development and bringing together all types of pension and supervisory 
systems. It was felt that, concerning supervision, a more formal, independent,  
body could better serve as a world-wide forum for policy dialogue and the 
exchange of information, as well as a standard-setting body, promoting good 
practices in pension supervision. However, to date, little progress has been 
made and no results in the areas of information exchange, standardization, or 
promoting good practices in pension supervision have been made. The IOPS 
assigned Netspar (Broeders et al., 2012) to come up with a report regarding the 
design of European supervision of pension funds. However, this report has not  
yet reached the stage of political discussion. To conclude, there is currently no 
similarity in systems, schemes, funding, regulation, and supervision found on a 
worldwide basis. Any comparison of systems is likely to be controversial, as 
each system has evolved from that country’s particular economic, social, 
cultural, political, and historical circumstances. Taking this into account it is 
stated that there is no perfect system that can be applied universally (Australian 
 Centre for Financial Studies, 2012).  
In the European Union there are four freedoms laid down in the Delors’ white 
paper (Commission of the European Communities, 1985) concerning the 
creation of the Internal Market - free movement of goods, services, people, and 
money. To conduct a level playing field there are several institutions in which 
the pension sector is involved. Those institutions are responsible for setting up 
legislation or concept directives. One of those institutions is the Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). For the pension sector the IOPRP 
(Institutions for Occupational Retirement) directive is in place. In 2010 the 
Commission created a green paper (European Commission,2010) on pensions 
called: Toward adequate, sustainable and safe European pension systems in 
which is noted:   
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‘In his political guidelines for this Commission, President José Manuel Barroso 
highlighted the importance of adequate and sustainable penions for 
strengthening social cohesion7. Member States are responsible for pension 
provision: this Green Paper does not question Member States’ prerogatives in 
pension or the role of social partners and it does not suggest that there is one 
‘ideal’ one-size-fits-all pension system design. The principles of solidarity 
between generations and national solidarity are key in this regard. In the Call for 
Advice in April 2011 the Commission expressed the intention to introduce a 
harmonized, risk-based prudential regime for IORPs. The new framework 
should ensure regulatory consistency and enhance protection of members and 
beneficiaries. In spring 2012 the European Commission received advice from 
EIOPA regarding the new IORP directive (EIOPA, 2012). In short EIOPA 
proposes a ’holistic balance sheet’ as a means of developing a Europe-wide 
supervisory regime for IORPs. It  also suggests enhanced qualitative 
requirements for governance and risk management of IORPs and finally EIOPA 
proposes strengthened and consistent information requirements for defined 
contribution schemes. In short, in 2012 there is neither harmonized legislation 
nor harmonized supervision on pension funds in the European Union. Together 
with the information of the OECD (2011) it can be concluded due to all the 
differences, the similarities between the pension ‘industry’ participants can be 
found on a national level. The only similarity, which exists on a broader scale on 
regulation and supervision, is the ‘Pavlov response” of regulators and 
supervisors in terms of more is better. Haldane (2012) came up with the 
following data (see Table 2-2, Table 2-3 and Figure 2-6) which shows the 
increase in full time equivalents versus a decline in number of pension funds. 
 
                                                
7 “Millions of Europeans are wholly dependent on pensions. The crisis has shown the 
importance of the European approach to pension systems. It has demonstrated the 
interdependence of the various pension pillars within each Member State and the importance of 
common EU approaches on solvency and social adequacy. It has also underlined that pension 
funds are an important part of the financial system. We need to ensure that pensions do the job 
intended of providing the maximum support to current and future pensioners, including for 
vulnerable groups.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2010) GREEN PAPER: towards adequate, 
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2.3.4 Legislation 
 
Legislation plays an important role for pension funds. It regulates: basic 
principles, categories of pension funds, demarcation of pension fund activities, 
financial requirements, board, supervision, and pension fund governance. 
 
2.3.4.1 Basic Principles 
 
On January 1, 2007 the Pension Act (Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 2006c) was legalized and replaced the Pensions and 
Savings Funds Act. The new Act was primarily a modernization and technical 
revision of the previous Act. The division of responsibilities between the three-
cornered relationship of employee, employer and pension provider is clarified. 
Moreover, the supervisory framework is revised. These and other changes are 
intended to make the Dutch pensions system shock- and future-proof. Social 
developments such as increasing workforce mobility, the transition from the 
single-breadwinner model to the two-income model, and increasingly 
demanding citizens have all had consequences for pensions’ legislation and 
supervision. The new Pension Act does not change the basic principles of the 
pension system, the pension regulation, and pension supervision. The  
principles remain the same as those underlying the Pensions and Savings 
Funds Act. The starting point is that pension provisions form part of the 
compensation & benefits package of employees. Employers and employees, 
represented by social partners, retain primary responsibility for the 
establishment of these pension provisions. If an employer and an employee 
have entered into a pension agreement, the Pension Act contains terms and 
conditions that the pension provisions and agreement must comply with. One of 
these is that the pension agreement must be administered by a pension fund or 
an insurer in The Netherlands or in another EU-Memberstate (Article 23 
Pension Act). The Pension Act also sets out the operating requirements for the 
pension fund or the insurer. The Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank 
hereafter called: DNB) and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets 
(Autoriteit Financiële Markten, hereafter called: AFM) supervise compliance with
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the regulations of the Pension Act. More emphasis and transparency is a theme 
which runs throughout the Pension Act:  
1. A clear division of responsibilities between employer, employee, and 
pension provider. 
2. Transparency provided by the pension provider to pension scheme 
members (information). 
3. More and better insight into the financial solidity of pension funds through 
the Financial Assessment framework (FTK), (Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 2006a)). 
4. A clear division of responsibilities within pension funds (Pension Fund 
Governance). 
 
2.3.4.2 Categories of Pension Funds 
 
In the Netherlands pension funds are divided into three major categories: 
industry-wide pension funds (whether or not compulsory), company pension 
funds and occupational pension funds.  Various obligations have been laid 
down for pension funds in the Netherlands Civil Code (Minister van Justitie, 
1992), the Industry pension fund Act (Staatssecretaris van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 2000), the Obligatory Occupational Pension Schemes Act  
(Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2005),  and the Pension Act 
(Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c). To safeguard the 
pension, an employer must arrange for the obligations under a pension 
agreement to be organized outside the confines of his business. This can be 
done in a company pension fund connected to the employer or by means of an 
administration agreement with an insurer. If the employer comes within the 
scope of a compulsory industry-wide pension fund, he must arrange for the 
pension agreement to be administered by the industry-wide pension fund under 
certain administrative rules. A pension fund must be a recognized as a legal 
entity, usually a foundation. Under the law of legal entities contained in the Civil 
Code, pension funds are subject to a number of obligations. In addition, the 
Pension Act is applicable to the company and industry-wide pension funds as 
the Industry Pension Fund Act is applicable to the compulsory industry-wide  
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pension funds. The Obligatory Occupational Pension Schemes Act is relevant 
for occupational pension funds. 
 
2.3.4.3 Demarcation of Pension Fund Activities 
 
The board has to define the pension fund activities. This means that the fund 
may operate voluntary schemes in addition to the compulsory basic scheme, 
provided that the board observes rules of solidarity. In the case of occupational 
pension funds the law requires a flat-rate contribution, except in the case of 
contribution schemes or voluntary schemes. To guarantee solidarity, the 
conditions for the voluntary schemes should - as far as is possible - be the 
same as for company pension funds and industry-wide pension funds. 
Compulsory industry-wide pension funds generally have a duty to charge a flat-
rate contribution, are not permitted to advertise on behalf of associated 
institutions, and are subject to restrictions on the provision of financial 
information.  A pension fund may only concern itself with pension obligations. In 
other words, it may not engage in secondary activities. 
 
2.3.4.4 Financial Requirements  
 
The Financial Assessment Framework (FTK) lays down the statutory financial 
requirements for pension funds. The basic principle of the FTK is the market 
valuation of both liabilities and assets.  A pension fund must maintain a 
solvency buffer, referred to in the Pension Act as regulatory own funds. The 
minimum regulatory own funds are the lower limit of the regulatory own funds. If 
the own funds fall below this lower limit, a pension fund has a funding shortfall. 
The technical provision is determined by discounting expected future cash flows 
against the current nominal term structure of interest rates. The calculation of 
regulatory own funds is risk-based, so that the requirements increase and 
decrease in line with the fund's exposure to risk.   
 
  36 
2.3.4.4.1 Coverage Ratio  
 
As mentioned in section 1-1 the coverage ratio is defined as the current market 
value of total assets divided by discounted pension liabilities (Minister van 
Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c). Figure 1-1 shows the decline of 
the three different levels of coverage ratios. In Q4 2010, 14 Dutch pension 
funds were forced to reduce the pension entitlements as of April 1, 2011. In the 
following Table 2-4 one can see the status of the implemented pension 
entitlement reduction measure per April 1, 2012 and as proposed per April 1, 
2013 (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2012b). 
 
Subject 2012 realized 2013 proposed 
Number of funds 5 103 
Weighted average discount 6.8% 2.2% 
Total pension obligations 1.8 billion euro 390 billion euro 
Total (former) participants 28,000 7,500,000 
Participants 9,000 2,400,000 
Former participants 16,000 3,900,000 
Beneficiaries 3,000 1,200,000 
Table 2-4: Discount measures (source: DNB http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-en-archief/nieuws-
2012/dnb273014.jsp; accessed 22-05-2012). 
 
As of April 2013 the number of pension funds reducing the pension entitlements 
and entitlements will increase to a total of 122 and even the pension fund of the 
AFM (one of the two Dutch supervisors) is amongst them according to a 
newspaper article (Wijk, 2012). Without additional money from the employer a 
discount of the pension entitlements of 9% is needed to achieve a 105% 
coverage ratio for that specific pension fund. The solvency buffers are assets 
additional to those required to cover technical provisions, which pension funds 
may hold. The amount is related to the risk profile of the pension fund. They 
need to perform a solvency test of which the result is the percentage of the 
required additional assets. More precisely the solvency test determines whether 
sufficient solvency is present to cope with unforeseen events during the next 
twelve months. The test requires that a 97.5% probability should exist that the 
value of the assets will at least equal that of the liabilities. If the coverage ratio  
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is between 105 and 130% a pension fund needs to come up with a recovery 
plan in which it shows that a coverage ratio of 130% is feasible within fifteen 
years (see 2.3.4.4.5). With a coverage ratio of more than 130% neither 
legislation nor the supervisory board (DNB) requires additional proof of the 
financial situation, because the fund seems to have a solid financial basis. If the 
coverage ratio is below 105% a legally defined action is required (see 
2.3.4.4.4). The fund needs to make a so-called  ‘herstelplan’ or Recovery Plan. 
Such a plan can lead to turmoil amongst pension members since it often needs 
to include measures, which are disadvantageous for the members (i.e. reducing 
pensions, increasing the contribution of the participants, and delaying promised 
indexation to the pension value retention). In short, very unpleasant measures 
for the participants of a pension fund.  
 
2.3.4.4.2 Investments, Obligations and their Valuation 
 
Both investments and obligations are based on market value. Market prices of 
investments are in general immediately available. In determining the technical 
provision, expected future cash flows, calculated realistically, are discounted 
against the current nominal term structure of interest rates. The obligations 
must be fully covered by investments at all times, taking into account regulatory 
own funds and minimum regulatory own funds. 
 
2.3.4.4.3 Regulatory Own Funds  
 
A pension fund must have sufficient own funds to ensure with a confidence 
level of 97.5%, that the value of the fund's investments will not be less than the 
level of the technical provisions within a period of one year. This regulatory own 
funds requirement increases in line with the fund's exposure to risk.  
 
2.3.4.4.4 Minimum Regulatory Own Funds 
 
The minimum regulatory own funds are 105%. The requirement is the lower  
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limit of the regulatory own funds requirement, and is derived from the 
implementation of the European Pensions Directive. A fund whose own funds 
have fallen below the minimum regulatory own funds has a funding shortfall. It 
must draw up a short-term recovery plan within two months, outlining how it will 
eliminate the funding shortfall within three years. It must appear from the plan 
that: 
1. The likelihood of recovery will improve. 
2. The risks for entitlement beneficiaries and pension beneficiaries do not 
increase. 
3. The likelihood of granting additional rights is not adversely affected. 
4. If these conditions are not complied with, a recovery period of one year 
applies. 
 
2.3.4.4.5 Reserve Deficit 
 
A pension fund whose own funds are lower than the regulatory own funds but 
are still above the minimum regulatory own funds (105%) has a reserve deficit. 
It must draw up a long-term recovery plan within three months, outlining how it 
will eliminate the reserve deficit within fifteen years via a steady recovery. 
 
2.3.4.4.6 Reductions in Pension Entitlements and Rights 
 
A pension fund may only reduce pension entitlements and rights if: 
1. The technical provisions and the minimum regulatory own funds are not 
covered by the investments, and 
2. The pension fund is not in a position to recover this situation without 
disproportionately harming the interests of members, deferred beneficiaries, 
pension beneficiaries, other entitlement beneficiaries, or the employer, and 
3. All other available means of influence, except investment policy, have been 
applied in order to comply with the minimum regulatory own funds within 
three years. 
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2.3.4.5 Board 
 
The board of the pension fund administers and is responsible for the scheme. 
The principles of the board's policy are described in the Actuarial and Operating 
Memorandum (AOM). In a company pension fund the representatives of the 





The pension institutions are under the directive of two separate supervisors. 
The Pension Act distinguishes between prudential supervision and conduct of 
business supervision. In addition, the Pensions Act uses the term 'material 
supervision'. This activity is neither prudential supervision nor conduct of 
business supervision. DNB is responsible for prudential and material 
supervision. AFM is responsible for conduct of business supervision. The 
supervision carried out by AFM primarily relates to communications from the 
pension provider to employees who are acquiring or have acquired pension 
rights. The Pension Act introduces a more risk-based supervision. It focuses on 
consistency between the contents (the pension promise), the funding and the 
ultimate realization of pension provisions. The matters on which each 
supervisor exercises supervision are strictly designated by an Order in Council. 
This is set out in the Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act and the 
Obligatory Occupational Pension Schemes Act (Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 2006b). The aim is a strict separation of supervision without 
overlaps or blind spots. Rules have therefore been made concerning the 
cooperation and sharing of information between both supervisors, DNB and 
AFM. The prudential supervision carried out by DNB focuses primarily on the 
funding of pension provisions. Prudential supervision aims at contributing to the 
financial solidity of pension funds and the financial stability of the pension funds 
sector. The material supervision relates primarily to the content of the 
administration agreement between the employer and the pension provider, and 
to the content of the pension agreement describing the relationship between the 
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pension provider and the employee. 
 
2.3.4.7 Pension Fund Governance 
 
There is a body of literature covering pension fund governance (Drucker, 1976, 
O'Barr and Conley, 1992, Ambachtsheer et al., 1996, 1998b, Capelle, 2004, 
Capelle, 2005). Amongst many other issues, they (Ambachtsheer et al., 1998b) 
found that there is a link between governance and pension fund performance.  
In the Netherlands pension fund governance has its roots in the Pension Act 
(Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c) that places extra 
emphasis on transparency. These principles of pension fund governance, which 
are laid down in the Pension Act, were drawn up in 2005 by the Labour 
Foundation (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005). The Principles are aimed at the 
quality, accuracy, and openness of pension providers - insurance companies 
and pension funds - in The Netherlands.  The 'Principles for good pension fund 
governance' consist of the following elements: careful management, 
accountability, internal supervision, expertise, openness and communication. 
The management board has final responsibility for all activities of the pension 
fund. An institution must organize itself in such a way as to guarantee controlled 
and sound operations. Control has a legislative basis in article 33 (guarantee of 
sound management) and 143 (control and integrity of business operations) of 
the Pension Act. Further rules regarding the control and integrity of business 
operations are provided for in articles 18 to 22 of the Pension Fund Decree. 
These rules relate to the control of the business processes and business risks, 
the integrity and soundness of the pension fund. The control of business 
process and business risks also covers outsourcing (article 34 of the Pension 
Act). Further rules regarding outsourcing are provided for in articles 12-14 of the 
Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act. The pension fund will often 
seek assistance from specialized advisors such as actuaries, auditors, 
investors, pension lawyers, tax specialists and communication experts. If the 
management board has established advisory committees to prepare decisions 
of the board, either with or without the help of external experts, the composition 
of these committees must be stated. The management board should check the  
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adequate implementation of the business processes, even if they are 
outsourced. Therefore the basic goal of pension fund governance regulation is 
to minimize the potential agency problems, or conflicts of interest, that can arise 
between fund members and those responsible for the funds management, so 
that these do not adversely affect the security of pension savings and promises 
(Stewart and Yermo, 2008). Good governance goes beyond this basic goal and 
aims at delivering high pension fund performance whilst keeping costs low for 
all stakeholders. Good governance can have many positive side effects such as 
creating trust amongst all stakeholders, reducing the need for prescriptive 
regulation, and facilitating supervision. Good pension fund governance can also 
be conducive to more effective corporate governance of the companies that 
they invest in, as well-managed pension funds are more likely to seek value for 
their investments via a more active shareholder policy. Good governance also 
needs to be ‘risk-based’. For example, the more sophisticated the investment 
strategy the pension fund adopts, the stricter the governance oversight 
required; or the more complex the administrative arrangements of the plan, the 
tighter operational oversight needs to be. In the event of outsourcing, is risk 
management given additional attention? Is the board aware of the risks involved 
in outsourcing? Does the board take specific action to identify and manage the 
risks involved in outsourcing? Is the board in control (capable of exercising its 
responsibilities) regarding risk management of outsourced activities? In Dutch 
legislation, risk management has been embedded especially in articles 33 and 
143 of the Pension Act. Further rules regarding the control and integrity of 
business operations are provided for in articles18 to 22 of the Pension Fund 
Decree (FTK). However Pension fund governance has received, before and 
even after the compulsory implementation in the Netherlands based on legal 
regulation in 2007, worldwide attention (Capelle et al., 2008, Ambachtsheer et 
al., 1998b, Bikker and de Dreu, 2006, Ambachtsheer et al., 2006, Clark and 
Urwin, 2008, Ambachtsheer et al., 2007, Stewart and Yermo, 2008). A CEO 
Survey in 1997 (Ambachtsheer et al., 1998b) into the quality of pension fund 
governance uncovered a wide-spread competency problem. Ambachtsheer 
repeated the 1997 CEO Survey in 2005. This follow-up study analyzed the 
findings of the new survey (Ambachtsheer et al., 2007) and found a positive 
correlation between governance quality and fund performance. Ambachtsheer  
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et al. (2007) identified the main governance weaknesses as poor selection 
processes for members of the governing board, a lack of self-evaluation of 
board effectiveness, and weak oversight by the board. Other specific problems 
include lack of delegation clarity between board and management 
responsibilities, board micro-management, and non-competitive compensation 
policies in pension funds. At present the urgency of conducting good pension 
fund governance is well defined in the notes to the Law strengthening the 
governance of pension funds (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 
2012c)8.  
 
2.3.4.7.1 Being In Control 
 
According to Ezra (2010) ‘being in control’ is governance. Did the decision-
makers know what was going on, were they well-informed, did they establish 
the necessity of a decision and if a decision was taken did they act according to 
that decision? In short, was the decision-making process structured in such a 
way that the board was ‘in control’? For this research ‘being in control’ means: 
are we doing what we agreed to do, are we doing what we are required to do by 
law and are we prudently taking care of the assets? By using this definition 
‘being in control’ in this specific situation means the review of a body’s activities 
and operations to ensure that these are being performed or are functioning in 
accordance with objectives, budgets, rules and standards. The aim of this 
review is to identify, at regular intervals, deviations that might require corrective 
action.  Due to the fact that the risks for pension funds can vary depending on 
whether they are self-administered or insured, control activities should be  
focussed on questions to be answered. An overview of pension fund types is 
shown in the following Figure 2-6. 
                                                
8 Translated by researcher: “to preserve confidence in the system of supplementary pensions, it 
is very important that participants and beneficiaries can be sure that the board of the fund is an 
expert, ‘in control’ and counterbalancing the interests in a balanced way.”MINISTER VAN 
SOCIALE ZAKEN EN WERKGELEGENHEID (2012c) Wet versterking bestuur 
pensioenfondsen. s'-Gravenhage, Ministerie van Justitie. 
 













Figure 2-6: Types of pension funds based on risks 
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Table 2-5: Questions for being ‘in control’. 
FUNDS 
Type A:  
Self-administered 
Type B: Insured 





Type B 1:  
Fully re-insured 
Type B 2:  
Partly re-insured 
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In the above Figure 2-6, Type A funds (self-administered) can be in control 
when all board members know the agreement, if there is one, and information  
to calculate the coverage ratio is available.  Type B 1 funds (re-insured) can be 
in control when all board members know the agreement, if there is one, and 
information to calculate the coverage ratio is available. Type B 2 funds (fully re-
insured) can be in control when all board members know the agreement, if 
there is one, and information to calculate the coverage ratio is available. Type B 
1.1 funds (fully re-insured with a guarantee) can leave the pension entitlements 
with the insurer after termination of the insurance contract. The agreement with 
the insurer can contain all kinds of obligations for the fund. In short, the fund 
should pay a price for the guarantee, which is provided by the insurer. The price 
for that guarantee is dependent on the risk that the insurer has with the  
warranty on that specific contract. The insurer often demands a part of the 
assets to be hedged. For the fund it turns out that the contract with the insurer 
implies two investment portfolios.  One is the matching portfolio and the other is 
the return portfolio. The coverage ratio is perhaps not that important. It can 
become important when indexation promises have been given to the 
participants.  Type B 1.2 funds (fully re-insured without a guarantee) are fully 
responsible for pension entitlements after termination of the contract. The 
insurer is only responsible for the payments of the pension entitlements during 
the contract. When – at the end of the insurance contract term - the fund has a 
funding deficit it should solve it because it is their responsibility. The board 
should therefore focus on all the raised questions for control and thus perform 
good pension fund governance. To summarize the aforementioned situations:  
The norm of 105% coverage ratio is the yardstick to which each fund must 
adhere, regardless of whether the fund is fully re-insured or not. Therefore the 
questions to establish whether the board is ‘in control’ should be the same 
regardless of whether the fund is re-insured or not. 
 
2.3.4.7.2 Careful Management 
 
The process of decision-making should be organized in such a way that good 
governance/stewardship is ensured. Good governance should not be modified  
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under different situations. Currently it seems as if there is much to improve. 
Luyendijk (2012) wrote, based on his experience as a journalist in the City, that 
pension funds board members were called ‘muppets’ by asset managers in the 
City. This was so, because they apparently never ask questions. This should be 
done because countervailing power is part of good governance.  One study 
(Werkgroep Integriteit Pensioenfondsen, 2013) researched the quality of the 
governance of Dutch pension funds. They suggested a code of conduct for the 
management of pension funds in the Netherlands in which policy beliefs should 
be mentioned9. It indicates that there is a non-written assumption that the  
stewardship of board members would be beyond any doubt. Stewardship is an 
attitude, which is studied in mutual funds. Wellman and Zhou (2005) indicate 
that board quality is the most important factor to explain mutual funds’ 
performance among all possible fund governance factors. Khorana (1996) has 
shown that in the mutual fund industry, effective fund governance can be 
facilitated by “internal” (board) or “external sources”. Khorana, et al. (2007) 
demonstrate that boards containing more independent directors show little 
tolerance to poor performance. They continue to document that the effect is 
even stronger when all directors are independent. Wellman and Zhou (2005) 
argue that fund governance plays a role in mutual fund performance. Ding and 
Wermers (2005) use the number of independent directors to proxy fund 
performance and show that better board quality increases the probability to 
replace managers who under-perform their peers and predict better future 
performance. Qian (2006)  document that well-governed mutual funds not only 
have better performance but also take investors’ rights into their investment or 
policy making consideration. Considering Dutch pension funds it has been 
written (Sleijpen et al., 2012)  that it is not the coverage ratio that threatened 
Dutch pension funds but its governance. 
 
                                                
9 Translated by researcher: “they don’t go about their own money. They are about the money of 
the participants.” WERKGROEP INTEGRITEIT PENSIOENFONDSEN (2013) Besturen kijken in 
de spiegel. Transparency Nederland. 
 
  46 












Summary Table for Chapter Two 
 
1. Discussion of the theoretical underpinning with view on different decision-
making theories and the choice for the process approach. 
2. A discussion of biases and other background information such as the 
pension ‘universe’ and legislation. 
3. The goal of pension fund governance is explained, together with an 
overview of possible shortcomings such as not ‘being in control and not 
careful management. 
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To reach the objective of this research project, it is necessary to develop a 
conceptual decision-making process model which is tailored to analyze the 
decision-making processes regarding the coverage ratio. It is not supposed to 
be a prescriptive model. It should be an analyzing aid. By using this model for 
the analysis of the decision-making process of all participating organizations it is 
possible to compare the results. The value of this model lies in the fact that 
there is currently, no standard decision-making process for pension funds. 
Pension funds are free to develop their own processes within the confines of 
legal rules and regulation. An important issue in developing a conceptual 
decision-making process model with minimum conditions for appropriate 
establishment of the coverage ratio is the selection of the constructs used to 
represent the decision-making process. Two criteria are used to in making the 
choice. First, the constructs must be central to the decision-making literature. 
Second, the constructs must be logically and empirically distinct. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Foundation of Conceptual Research Model 
 
The conceptual research model originates from and addresses both theory and 
practice - it complies with the law whilst making use of the organization’s 
experience established in procedures. The procedures regarding decision-
making process are invariably recorded in the Actuarial and Operating 
Memorandum (AOM). In other words the law, the AOM and other factional 
documents, which describe or prescribe the process or parts of it specifies the 
TO BE situation.  
To arrive at a conceptual research model of the decision-making process of 
Dutch company pension funds it is important to discuss the theoretical building 
blocks underlying such a model. The logic for the process model is based on 
one theoretical foundation. According to McGrath’s (1984) classic input- 
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process-output (IPO) model, organizational input (e.g. new information from 
asset-managers or others) influence organizational outputs (decisions) through 
specific team processes (decision-making).  
Several authors (Lewin, 1951, Noorderhaven, 1995, Weick, 1995) provide 
starting points for the conceptual model and its different phases. For the 
process in itself, two important concepts require more discussion in terms of 
problem recognition. Those terms are complexity and context. Context is 
selective perception and illusion of control. The relationship between these two 
concepts leads to problem recognition. An organization’s complexity is based 
on the number of employees, teams, clients, services provided, and other 
similar elements. Within the organization some person or persons will identify 
an event that can have an effect on the organization.  This person will then 
attempt to define the event, usually through some type of interaction with others 
in the organization.  Every new person involved in discussion of the event 
brings with him or her a unique perspective.  The convergence of these 
perspectives becomes the defining context for the problem. This process can 
also be called information seeking.  Information seeking is generally an 
individual activity and is undertaken to identify and select information to satisfy 
a previously detected need for information on a certain topic. Information 
seeking is seldom an end in itself but is a part of a broader decision-making 
process.  Information seeking within organizations is a condition of the 
information flow within the organization, integration of information with internally 
generated information, and internal conditions that may influence access to and 
use of information.  The content of each of these conditions is dependent on the 
openness of an organization. The more open an organization, the more 
responsive the individuals and groups (teams) are to each other –internally as 
well as externally. When unity and responsiveness are low, information will tend 
to become compartmentalized and individuals will not share it readily.  This 
argument leads us back to the first step in Lewin’s (1951) problem-solving 
model. His model consists of the following three steps.  
1. The first step should be taken after a gap is acknowledged. A gap is the 
difference between the optimal defined situation (TO BE) and the actual 
situation (AS IS). After the discovery of such a gap the organization should 
draw up a strategy to close the gap between the real and the ideal. 
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2. The second step is the solution or in other words the production of a result.   
3. The third and last step is to evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy. If a 
weakness to problem solving in organizations is related to how well 
problems are recognized, then the more open an organization, the better 
opportunity it has to more completely frame or understand the problem 
regardless of the complexity of the problem and/or the organization. 
 
Board level debate is a deliberate process in which board members discuss, 
challenge and contest one another’s opinions, ideas and positions about the 
decision (Mitchel et al., 2009, Simons et al., 1999). Decision-making 
comprehensiveness describes the degree to which the board is exhaustive as it 
considers multiple approaches, courses of action, and decision criteria in its 
decision-making (Fredrickson, 1984, Simons et al., 1999). 
Karl Weick (2001) suggests that understanding a problem before moving into a 
problem-solving process is an aspect of organizational learning. Weick’s theory 
on organizational interpretation follows a particular path. The path moves 
through three stages – scanning, interpretation, and learning. Simply collecting 
data is the first step in Weick’s process.  The second step is the actual 
interpretation of the data, and Weick suggests there are two elements that 
govern this – equivocal reduction and assembly rules.  Equivocal reduction is 
the extent to which the data is unclear or ambiguous. Many decisions are made 
with limited information about their potential consequences. Good decisions are 
driven by data. Statistical skills allow decision makers to intelligently collect, 
analyze and interpret data relevant to decision-making (Cooper and Schindler, 
2006).  
Assembly rules are procedures or guidelines that organizations use to process 
data into a collective interpretation.  In other words, when information enters the 
organization it must have a value and a use.  The more ambiguous the 
information, the more difficult it is for the organization to determine the value of 
this information, and the fewer procedures the organization will have for using 
the information.  Likewise, the clearer or less ambiguous the information, the 
easier it is for the organization to determine the value of the information and use 
it appropriately. The discussion above suggests that before the problem-solving 
process starts, information of some type must reach the organization.  This is 
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generally referred to as scanning. The information managers of the organization 
filter the information and detect suspected problems. The results of scanning 
and interpretation become a source of knowledge for the organization and may 
become a problem to be resolved or a step in defining a problem to be 
resolved.   There is little formal research on problem recognition within 
organizations. There are some interesting ideas.  First, much of this research 
(Weick, 2001) acknowledges the complex nature of problems. Second, the 
activity of recognizing problems is built around relationships and shared 
information, and the shared interpretation of this information. However, the 
generation, transfer and sharing of specialized knowledge in boards can be 
time consuming and difficult (Szulanski, 1996, 2000). In particular, knowledge 
sharing can be impeded by the tendency to guard and selectively share 
information (Hansen, 1999, Szulanski, 1996). Furthermore, because knowledge 
is localized embedded (Lave, 1988), knowledge boundaries arise among board 
members from different background and functions. Such boundaries hinder 
interfunctional knowledge sharing and problem solving because of syntax, 
semantics, and political problems (Carlile, 2002). It would also suggest that a 
linear process for solving problems might not be the most effective process. In 
other words, complex organizations will have complex problems, and those 
problems will require complex (maybe non-linear) processes for recognizing 
and solving those problems. This means that default settings like procedures 
and checklists could contribute to less complexity in information which enters 
the organization. Data would become less multi-interpretable. Checklists could 
contribute to this. Originally the checklists came from aviation. They were first 
developed and used for the B-17 bomber some 80 years ago. Nowadays pilots 
have a checklist for virtually all complex situations that may arise. Every 
separate checklist covers only one complex situation. An appropriate checklist 
is accurate. They are efficient, practical, and easily applicable in business and 
thus the most complex situations. The use was extended from aviation to 
hospitals. Figures show that the use of checklists in hospitals leads to 
significantly fewer deaths, complications, infections, and a repeat of surgical 
procedures (Gawande, 2007, 2010). A decision-making checklist for pension 
funds could also lead to improvement of the decision-making process of 
pension funds as well. An insight into the fixed items on the agenda of Board 
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meetings is required for drafting checklists. There may be a checklist prepared 
per subject. A checklist can be an established contribution to the quality of 
decision-making. This is needed to verify that nothing is forgotten. 
 
3.2.1 Phases within the Conceptual Research Model  
 
The conceptual research model being developed for and examined through this 
research is an attempt to capture some of the complexity found in 
organizations. Though the steps of the model have a linear appearance, the 
idea behind the model is that organizational layering is not bound to a step-by-
step progression. This is in line with Weick’s model of information processing. 
The steps of the conceptual research model (4A-model) are: 
1. Availability of data (fact-finding and approved procedures). This is the 
equivalent of scanning. 
2. Awareness (problem recognition). This is the equivalent of interpretation.  
3. Analysis (weighing the alternatives) and 
4. Action (to come to a decision). This is the equivalent of decision-making 
from Weick’s (2001) model of organizational change.  
The aforementioned steps find their origin in the literature (Lewin, 1951, 
Mintzberg et al., 1976, Simon, 1976, 1979, Chaiken, 1980, de Smit, 1982, 
Noorderhaven, 1995, Roy, 1996).  
The awareness phase is critical to the entire process. This is a phase in which 
the context and the scanning are crucial for the problem recognition. Those 
elements are part of the conceptual process framework and will be elaborated 
on in the following sections.  
In the intermediate stage between awareness and analysis there is the decision 
to escalate, because a meeting needs to be prepared. It is known that decision-
makers often have to make decisions under escalated situations in which a loss 
has resulted from an earlier decision. During the research period the coverage 
ratio dropped. This was the result of previous asset management decisions. 
During the intermediate stage the decision-makers had to decide whether to 
quit or continue with the failing course of action. That choice presents a 
dilemma, which was also suggested by Staw (1997). 
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Research (Brockner, 1992, Staw, 1997) has shown that in this kind of situation, 
individuals who are personally responsible for the prior decisions have a 
stronger tendency to persist than do those who are not personally responsible 
for these decisions. A similar tendency has been observed in a variety of 
situations, including gambling (McGlothlin, 1956) and investment (Thaler, 
1980).  
 
3.2.2 Phases of the Model in Relation to Regulation  
 
The necessity of the various phases is also reflected in legislation and factional 
documents as one can consider the conceptual research model is, as 
mentioned before, based on theory, law, the AOM and other factional 
documents, which describe or prescribe (parts of) the process. An overview of 
the prescribed elements in the research model is shown in Table 3-1. As one 
can see, for three out of four phases legislation is applicable. For all phases the 
obligation stems from factional documentation. So far it seems as if the model is 
prescriptive. However, legislation does not prescribe how the process should be 
executed. The legislation is primarily a requirement to be met. It prescribes what 
should be achieved or conducted. In the internal documentation, particular 
attention is given as to how the legal requirement should be met. The applicable 
articles of the Pension Act are not rigidly defined. Therefore it should be noticed 
that interpretation is essential for the translation of legislation into pension fund 
own documents. All these legal requirements have been formulated on the 
basis of principles. This means that the legislator does not prescribe 
exhaustively and specifically how an institution must achieve e.g. controlled 
conduct of business. It is up to the fund itself to indicate why it considers its 
business operations to be in control. So far, it seems as if there is much 
freedom for pension funds to establish their own way of conducting the 
business as long as they can assure that the promised pension entitlements 
can be paid. However, it is also a foundation for conflict between the fund and 
the supervisor. The supervisor conducts a principle and not rule based 
supervision. Therefore the interpretation by the fund or the supervisor can vary. 
The process is the translation of the requirements/principles set by law and the 
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interpretation of it by pension funds for conducting the business.  In fact the 
process shows the actual implementation. 
 









































































































































Table 3-1: Overview of prescribed elements in the research model. 
 
The overview shows: 
1. The Availability phase has very much attention to law and factional 
documents in the acquisition of data to calculate a coverage ratio.  
2. The Awareness phase has a lower binding basis. Although this part of the
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process is governed by law and factional documents like AOM and other 
documents. 
3. The Analysis phase is governed solely by internal documents. 
4. Law and internal documents govern the Action phase. 
Taken into account the information of Table 3-1 it can be concluded that there 
are two TO BE situations. The first is the one required by law and based on 
principles. The second is the translation of those principles by the pension fund. 
An analysis of the different phases can show whether the final decision is based 
upon the consideration of the underlying standards, which, whether or not legal, 
are applied, and risks are weighed. These are interests of the company and 
members, beneficiaries and former members of the pension fund. It is therefore 
crucial that the process is traceable and explainable. By doing so, decision-
makers work on the issue of control and integrity of operations, and ensure 
good governance (Rademaker and Hinskens, 2011). 
 
3.3 Practical Application and the Conceptual Research Model  
 
In the previous sections the theoretical foundation is discussed. In the following 
sections of this chapter the theoretical foundation will be translated into a 
model, which will be used for analyzing the real life situation. Each stage will be 
enhanced with different variables and indicators. 
 
3.3.1 Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
The start of the decision-making process on coverage ratio is the gathering of 
information about the coverage ratio. In phase one of the conceptual research 
model (see section 3.3) three variables are investigated. The information about 
the coverage ratio should cover the actual value of assets and liabilities per 
period. The pension funds are legally required to report every three months on 
the coverage ratio to the supervisor, which was the reason for using the same 
period of time in the questionnaire. It can be the case that, for various reasons,  
the actual information is not available. There are many reasons for this situation 
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including:  
1. The asset manager provides the information about the assets. Difficulties, 
which can occur, can have an origin in the choice for complex products. 
Here also plays the often unknown or defective valuation of derivatives. 
Another cause may be whether the collateral and the clearing are 
implemented in the same timeframe, or this is done at other times. Often the 
asset manager is an external institution. The provision of information is a 
matter of contractual agreement. Often the information provision is not 
adjusted to the client’s requirements. In that case it is business as usual for 
the asset manager, even when a crisis is coming up. 
2. The information of the actual liabilities is provided by the administration. 
Often the market value of the liabilities is not known because there is e.g. a 
backlog in processing changes in the participants’ database. It always 
requires calculation. Due to the fact that liabilities are not publicly traded, 
there is no objective market value. To overcome this problem DNB has 
introduced the Interest Rate Term Structure (known as RTS) as a 
management tool, which provides the figures, which should be used as 
interest rate. 
The measurement points of the variable ‘information about coverage ratio’ are: 
1. Value of assets and liabilities per July 1, 2008. 
2. Value of assets and liabilities per October 1, 2008. 
3. Value of assets and liabilities per January 1, 2009. 
4. Value of assets and liabilities per April 1, 2009. 
Practically not knowing, within a reasonably margin, the value of the assets or 
the liabilities means that the rest of the decision-making process is based on 
guesswork. This is in conflict with proper risk management. Managing the 
coverage ratio is a process, which should be part of the integral risk 
management process. This process starts with an Asset and Liabilities 
Management study. ALM is the process of obtaining an understanding of the 
interdependencies in the development of the assets and liabilities of the fund. 
The result of the ALM study is the input for the strategic asset allocation 
portfolio. This requires two forms of risk management. Those are: the risk 
management of the strategy and risk management of the execution. Thereby
  56 
the definition of the risk attitude, risk measure and risk sources, as well as the 
scope and interpretation of the risk budget are important. There are different 
definitions of the risk measure.  
1. Volatility yardstick: for example the standard deviation of the coverage ratio 
rate of return or the tracking error of investments in relation to the liabilities. 
This measure shows the agility of the coverage ratio 
2. Value at Risk: for example the 2.5% VaR of the equity (also called Surplus 
at Risk). This measure shows the measure of decline of the coverage ratio 
in the 2.5 percent worst scenario’s. 
3. Expected shortfall measure: for example the 2.5% ‘expected shortfall (also 
called: ‘conditional ‘ Value at Risk (CVaR)). This measure shows the 
average coverage ratio in the 2.5% worst scenario’s. 
 
Nothing is prescribed and therefore choices need to be made. Managing the 
coverage ratio is therefore depending on the design and use of parameters 
within the ALM study. 
In order to be ‘in control’ the board needs to have correct, timely and relevant 
information available. The board should remain in constant contact with the 
asset manager and continuously monitor the investment policy in terms of risk, 
coverage ratio, liabilities, development regarding return, and strategic policy 
agreements. The board need to know whether the risks were in accordance 
with the policy and which returns are achieved? At discrepancies or if 
(economic) assumptions are no longer valid the policy or implementation should 
be adjusted. Managing on risks is an ongoing process of policy, implementation 
and monitoring. The use of VaR can be part of it. Risk restrictive measures 
could prevent the occurrence of a decrease on the coverage ratio. In terms of 
risk the interest rate is of major importance for pension funds, because it has 
consequences for the assets as well as for the liabilities. Any fluctuation of the 
interest rate has an impact on the balance sheet of a pension fund. Pension 
funds must quantify their liabilities according to the new accounting regulation of 
market-based valuation of liabilities. Before that, the use of a fixed interest rate 
for discounting the future expected benefit payment was common. For years, 
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the interest rate was fixed at 4%. To avoid the negative financial consequences 
of interest rate fluctuations, the fund could consider excluding the risk. This can 
be put into operation by interest rate immunization, to start by fully matching the 
entire portfolio. Several methods, including cash flow matching, duration 
matching, and volatility and convexity matching can accomplish interest rate 
immunization.  
When a pension fund makes use of external service providers, the same rules 
apply (article 34 Pension Act). This means that the board should be ‘in control’ 
and it needs to have correct, timely and relevant information available. Once 
again, it is a legal requirement to take care of these responsibilities in a prudent 
manner. Whether a pension fund makes use of external service providers 
depends for example on costs, own knowledge, and size of workforce. Dutch 
pension funds can choose from several options: 
1. Hiring many different external experts (in sourcing knowledge and capacity). 
The board is in contact with each external expert. 
2. Hiring fiduciary management. This in turn leases the asset manager on 
behalf of the pension fund and they keep track on the results which can be 
benchmark information and asset classes (Molenkamp, 2008).  
3. The pension fund does everything in-house. The costs of this option can be 
high and requires in-house knowledge of every activity.  
4. The pension fund hires an external government body or agency. A 
government body or agency can overcome a possible overload of 
information and activities for the board (Dautzenberg and de Jong, 2010).  
Due to the fact that the board remains responsible, even if they outsource or 
insource knowledge or capacity, the question is: how do they know that 
whatever is done is in line with the mission, vision, strategy and ambition. To 
know if the provided service matches the expectations an information provision 
should be arranged in the contract with the external service provider together 
with the terms and conditions. Internally the responsibility for monitoring or 
compliance should be addressed and executed. 
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Another variable is pension fund governance. In the Decree on the 
Implementation of the Pension Act (Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid, 2006b) there are legal requirements for pension funds to 
implement the pension fund governance principles and rules. The 'Principles for 
good pension fund governance' consist of: careful management, accountability, 
internal supervision, expertise, openness and communication. Based on the 
Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act, the following committees 
should have been installed: Supervisory board or Accountability body, Review 
Committee, Complaints body, and Members council. The dataset is completed 
by information about how the continuity and expertise of the board is ensured.  
The final variable to be configured in this phase is the default settings. 
Knowledge about the default settings is necessary, because it is feasible that 
agreed procedures and checklists are part of the decision-making process.  
Therefore, questions will be raised about the availability of a compliance officer 
and responsibilities. In the following Table 3-2 an overview is shown of the 
variables and indicators of phase one. 
 
Number Process phase  Variable Indicator 
1 Availability of data Information about 
coverage ratio 
Value of assets and liabilities per 
July 1, 2008 
 
Value of assets and liabilities per 
October 1, 2008 
 
Value of assets and liabilities per 
January 1, 2009 
 
Value of assets and liabilities per 
April 1, 2009 
 
  Pension fund 
governance 
Implementation of required bodies 
  Default settings Decision-making procedures 
 
Use of checklists 
 
Table 3-2: Overview of variables and indicator in phase 1. 
 
3.3.2 Phase 2: Awareness 
 
Based upon the previous phase, a clear view on the actual situation should be
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available. The first variable that is taken into consideration is: actual situation. 
The next variable is context. Six questions are raised about the illusion of 
control and time pressure, to be answered by either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’. From these 
questions an idea of biases in the decision-making process about the coverage 
ratio is established. The third and final variable for this phase is: problem 
recognition. This variable is of importance because when a situation is not seen 
as a problem it will not be addressed as such. Questions will be raised about 
whether the topic coverage ratio is an issue or not and whether that is a joint 
position. Table 3-3 shows the overview of the variables and indicators phase 2. 
Number Process phase  Variable Indicator 
2 Awareness Actual situation Who is responsible for putting 
the subject on the agenda of the 
board meeting? 
 
Own responsibility or agreed? 
 
  Context Illusion of control? 
 
Time constraints?  
 
  Problem recognition Is the topic an issue? 
 
Is there common agreement on 
it? 
 
Is a recovery plan made up? 
 
Table 3-3: Overview of variables and indicator in phase 2. 
 
The activity of recognizing problems is built around relationships and shared 
information, and the shared interpretation of this information. It would also 
suggest that a linear process for solving problems might not be the most 
effective process. This means that default settings like procedures and 
checklists could contribute to less complexity of information, and completeness 
and correctness of information, which enters the organization. Data would 
become less multi interpretable.  
3.3.3 Phase 3: Analysis 
 
When the actual situation is recognized as a problem to be solved, the analysis 
phase starts. This phase has two indicators. The following Table 3-4 shows the 
variables and indicators of this phase.
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Number Process phase  Variable Indicator 
3 Analysis Meeting preparation Who sets the goal for the board 
meeting? 
 
Who sets the agenda?  
 
Were alternatives looked for? 
 
  Meeting Were goals set for each agenda 
item? 
 
Were the options explained? 
 
Did this happen during the 
research period as well? 
 
Table 3-4: Overview of variables and indicator in phase 3. 
 
The analysis phase contains two key sub processes: the debate and decision 
comprehensiveness. These two decision-making sub processes represent 
important but distinct aspects of decision making (Simons et al., 1999). 
Whereas debate involves challenge in the decision-making process, 
comprehensiveness involves a process of generating many alternative course 
of action, thoroughly analyzing all strategic options, and using multiple criteria in 
making decisions. It is possible to come without comprehensiveness (Simons et 
al., 1999), such that members propose different options that are not given 
sufficient consideration. However, it is anticipated that the level of debate 
enhances comprehensive decision-making. Greater comprehensiveness 
reflects a more exhaustive decision-making approach, involving consideration 
and analysis of a wide array of information and many courses of action 
(Fredrickson and Mitchel, 1984). In the process of meeting preparation it is 
important to know who is involved. It has to do with the problem recognition of 
the previous phase but also with the translation of the topic. This is also known 
as “social construction” (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Media can extend this  
view of the constructed reality. Media have the ability to tell the audience what 
issues are important or more specifically what to think about. The rationale is 
that the media provide cues to which issues are important; and consequently, 
audience members accept those cues regarding salient issues and then adopt 
them as their own (Becker, 1982).  Berger and Luckman (1991) talk about the 
“social distribution” of knowledge. This is knowledge, which is shared within a 
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group. This “distribution cognition” (Gergen, 2009) will enhance the quality of 
the meeting. 
Was the board actively in charge to conduct an action or was the board just 
herding. Rubbaniy et al. (2011) provided evidence that Dutch pension funds are 
active traders and trade about 8.5% of their investment portfolio on a monthly 
basis. The recent financial crisis had a positive impact on both turnover and 
herding while it negatively affected feedback trading. Using this strategy means 
buying stocks when prices decline and selling stock when prices rise. Herding 
contains a risk (Slottje, 2011b, Rubbaniy et al., 2011, Slottje, 2011a) due to the 
fact that the added value of the action that arises from the herd behaviour is not 
mapped out in advance. Possible explanations of these herding effects are: 
1. Outsourcing of portfolio management and imitation of large pension funds 
lead to the same kind of asset allocation strategy. 
2. Many pension funds often hire the same large and reputable asset 
management firms for their portfolio management and are likely to have the 
same asset allocation of their portfolio. 
 
3.3.4 Phase 4: Action 
 
The action phase is the final phase of the model. The only variable in this phase 
is called decision. There are eight indicators questioned within the variable. The 
answer of five indicators can be ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  If the answer is no, then the 
motivation behind this negation becomes important. The following Table 3-5 
shows the variables and indicators of this phase.   
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Number Process phase  Variable Indicators 
4 Action Decision Are decisions registered? 
 
Are decisions communicated to 
the (former) participants? 
 
Is it recorded who implements 
the decision? 
 
Is it recorded who checks the 
implementation? 
 
Is recorded who reports to the 
board? 
 
Table 3-5: Overview of variables and indicator in phase 4. 
 
For a traceable decision, it is important that the decisions are documented. This 
is one of the indicators. In a report (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2012d) the 
supervisor it documented that minority opinions were “slain” in the preparation 
of the decision-making. Another one is, due to governance purposes, whether 
the decisions are communicated to the stakeholders. For the integrity of the 
board and their actions it should be decided and noted who is responsible for 
the execution of the decision and who is in control of the actions. This counts 
for every decision made by the board, so also for the specific subject of 
coverage ratio. The particulars of implementation vary widely from decision to 
decision, but virtually all decisions require effective implementation to be 
successful.  
 
3.4 Conceptual Research Model 
 
All the different phases, variables and indicators are grouped in a model, which 
is shown in Figure 3-1. 





















Figure 3-1: Conceptual Research Model. 
ENVIRONMENT  
(Social, Political, Economic, legislation, sponsoring company constraints) 
INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
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3.5 Overview of Phases, Questions and Fundament 
In the following Table 3-6 an overview is shown of the relationship between the 
phases of the conceptual research model, the questions which are raised per 
phase and the legal fundament of it, the necessary translation of it in internal 
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data. 
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board in control?) 
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board ready to 
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4: Action  
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board take action?) 
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Table 3-6: Overview of phases, questions and pension fund governance function 
 














Summary Table for Chapter Three 
 
1. Development of the conceptual research model for analyzing decision-
making processes. 
2. It has been argued that effective decisions must be based on 
organizational goals and accurate information about the likely 
relationship between choices and outcomes. 
3. Choices made on inadequate or incorrect information could lead to 
disappointing outcomes.  
4. The phases of the model, variables and indicators are integrated in the 
questionnaire (see Appendix C).  
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In the previous chapters the theoretical background underpinning decision-
making processes and research model was developed through a review of 
practice and existing literature. This procedure led to the development of the 
research question, which for format reasons, was established in Chapter 1. The 
purpose of this research is to investigate the existing situation (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003) within a sample of Dutch company pension funds. This chapter 
deals with how the study was conducted It will discuss the motivation for the 
choices made during the conducting of this research, as well as the choice for 
the selected epistemological and ontological perspective. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985) posit that epistemological orientations provide researchers with the 




The choice of which method to employ is dependent upon the nature of the 
research problem. Perhaps choosing a philosophical stance is not vital to the 
proper utilisation of research methodology. However, Holden and Lynch (2004) 
state that if a researcher perceives ontology and epistemology to be irrelevant, 
then how can they ensure that their methods are appropriate to the problem in 
hand? 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) argued that the actual suitability of a research 
method derives from the nature of the social phenomena to be explored. They 
find that there are two methodological approaches in social science: Positivism 
and Post-positivism. Discussions continued in the social and behavioural 
sciences regarding the superiority of one or the other of the two major social 
science paradigms or models. These two models are known alternately as the 
positivist/empiricist approach or the constructivist/phenomenological orientation 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The positivist paradigm underlies what are called 
quantitative methods, while the constructivist paradigms underlies qualitative
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methods (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Denzin and Lincoln (1994)10 
explained what qualitative research is. To them it is searching for in insight, 
discovery and interpretation, rather than hypothesis testing. Gordon (1991) has 
posited that all we can do as researchers is to qualify research findings as 
contextually explanatory and probably capable of generalisation, rather than in 
insisting that findings are absolute fact. According to Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
the ontology of post-positivism is critical realism. They postulate that reality is 
assumed to exist but to be only imperfectly apprehendable because of basically 
flawed human intellectual mechanisms and the fundamentally intractable nature 
of phenomena. The epistemology is modified dualist/objectivist. Special 
emphasis is placed on external ‘guardians’ of objectivity such as critical 
traditions (do the findings ‘fit’ with pre-existing knowledge?). Replicated findings 
are probably true but always subject to falsification. Some methodology 
researchers (Patton, 1990, Brannick and Roche, 1997) urge the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies in order to triangulate results. Gill 
and Johnson (1997) perceive that a multi-method methodology leads to a 
convergent validation of research results through internal cross-checking. The 
danger of not using a multi-method approach is highlighted by the 
anthropologist, Richard Wilk (2001). However, when using mixed method which 
combine qualitative and quantitative approached in the methodology of a study 
(such as in the data collection stage) testing of propositions is feasible. 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) claim that critical realism is a framework that 
competes with and has named itself as the leading alternative to and successor 
of positivism and post-positivism and social construction. However they 
themselves mention that this claim remains to be realized. It can be mentioned, 
for example, that the approach is not that well known in the US. This research 
uses critical realist theoretical lens (Doe, 2009) as approach because its  
                                                
10 “qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not rigorously 
examined, in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency. Thus, there are instances, 
particularly in the social sciences, where researchers are interested in insight, discovery and 
interpretation, rather than hypothesis testing.” DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (1994) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications. 
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interpretation of the structure-agency debate11. This project studies social reality 
as a concrete process. The ontological stance influences the core assumptions 
concerning epistemology and human nature. According to Morgan and Smircich 
(1980) reality is all imagination. Therefore, the relevant epistemological stance 
is that knowledge cannot be discovered, as it is subjectively acquired, 
everything is relative. Therefore in this research facts are gathered and 
measured to discover how often certain patterns occur. One should take into 
account that for researching propositions the results are only applicable for the 
participators and not for the entire population. The research objective, guide the 
research to be: exploratory. This is applicable for researching and discovering 
new areas of research. An exploratory research is undertaken when few or no 
previous studies exist. The exploratory of this research is the demonstration of 
the usefulness of the conceptual model. The aim of such a study is to look for 
patterns, hypotheses or ideas that can be tested and will form the basis for 
further research (Neville, 2012). 
 
4.2.1 Use of Case Study in Research 
 
A number of qualitative studies have been carried out in the past (Kaplan, 1993, 
Ryan et al., 2002, Lillis and Mundy, 2005, Lukka, 2005, Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, 2008). Those studies were focussed on the functioning of 
accounting in action. Kaplan (1993) claimed that applying traditional research 
methods, such as analytic modelling, and statistical observations and analysis 
on contemporary management accounting issues is not a useful method. He 
showed that there are many complex activities inside the organizations, which 
cannot be observed with traditional research methods. Kaplan and Norton 
(1993) used the case study as research strategy to study how the balanced-
scorecard combines management and measurement in different organizations. 
Three cases were involved in the study. Eysenck (1976), who originally saw the 
case study as nothing more than a method of producing anecdotes, later 
realized that looking carefully at individual cases could be a contribution in the
                                                
11 The social science dictionary defines agency as the capacity of humans to act independently 
and to make their own free choices, while structures refer to institutions, culture and social 
codes which constrain or influence individual actions. See online Social Science Dictionary, 
available at http://bitbucket.icaap.org/dict.pl, accessed 30/10/2013. 
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hope of learning something. Robert Yin (2003) stated that case studies due to 
its richness is also scientific research. The distinctive need for case studies 
arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena, because the 
case study allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events. Yin (2003: 11) argues that case study is the 
most appropriate method if the inquiry is concerned with the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of 
a social phenomenon and if ‘the boundaries between the phenomenon and its 
context are not clearly evident’. The case study approach is different from other 
research strategies because of its openness to the use of indicative a priori 
propositions.  The goal will be to generalize theories (analytical generalization) 
and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).  Flyvbjerg (2011)12 
agreed on that. Hartley (1994) argued that case study research is a 
heterogeneous activity covering a range or research methods and techniques, a 
range of coverage (from single case study through carefully matched pairs up to 
multiple cases), varied levels of analysis (individuals, groups, organizations, 
organizational fields or social policies) and differing lengthes and levels of 
involvement in organizational functioning. Flyvbjerg (2011) came up with the 
following Table 4-1: 
  
                                                
12 “The main strength of the case study is depth-detail, richness, completeness, and within case 
variance-whereas for statistical methods it is breadth. If you want to understand how 
widespread the phenomenon is, how it correlates with other phenomena and varies across 
different populations, and at what level of statistical significance, then you have to do statistical 
studies.” FLYVBJERG, B. (2011) Case Study. IN DENZIN, N. K. & LINCOLN, Y. S. (Eds.) The 
Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research. 4th ed. Thousands Oaks, CA, Sage. 
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 Case Studies Statistical Methods 
Strengths • Depth • Breadth 
 • High conceptual validity • Understanding how 
widespread a phenomenon is 
across a population. 
 
 • Understanding of context and 
process 
• Measures of correlation for 
populations of cases. 
 
 • Understanding of what causes 
a phenomenon, linking causes 
and outcomes 
 
• Establishment of probabilistic 
levels of confidence 
 • Fostering new hypotheses and 
new research questions 
 
 
Weaknesses • Selection bias may overstate or 
understate relationships 
• Conceptual stretching, by 
grouping together dissimilar 
cases to get larger samples. 
 
 • Weak understanding of 
occurrence in population of 
phenomena under study. 
 
• Weak understanding of 
context, process, and causal 
mechanisms. 
 • Statistical significance often 
unknown or unclear. 
 
• Correlation does not imply 
causation. 
  • Weak mechanisms for 
fostering new hypotheses. 
 
Table 4-1: Complementarity of Case Studies and Statiscal Methods (source: Flyvbjerg 2011). 
 
Due to the fact that this research project is focussed on decision-making 
processes a number of complex activities are involved. Kaplan (1993) stated 
that complex phenomena might not be well identified and understood by just 
observing statistical data. Therefore are several reasons why the case study 
approach is chosen, because: 1) due to time and money constraints, it is 
impossible for this research to study the entire population 2) there is no 
guaranteed access to the entire population of Dutch company pension funds 
and 3) another argument is that a survey would not have worked because of the 
expected high non-response and the superficial data that don’t provide insight 
into a process where it is precisely in this study is all about and 4) the case 
study approach is different from other research strategies because of its 
openness to the use of indicative a priori propositions. Therefore a sample has 
to be selected (Kumar, 2005).  
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4.2.2 Key Steps to Undertake  
 
Yin (2003) shows the process of a case study project as projected in Figure 4-1. 













Figure 4-1: Key steps to undertake a case study (source: Yin 2003). 
 
The steps shown in Figure 4-1 will be followed in the project. However, one step 
is added. Due to the fact that the Dutch pension fund sector can be separated 
into different categories the first step is to select which category will be the 
focus. Hereafter an explanation will be given for the selection of the category in 
the Dutch pension fund sector.  
 
4.2.3 Sampling Procedure Selecting Pension Fund Categories 
 
The following categories (see Section 2.6.2) and numbers of pension funds 
were found during the researched period, from July 1, 2008 – April 1, 2009 (De 







Draw cross-case conclusions 
Selection of cases and negotiation of access 







Design data collection 
Conduct first case study using a variety of methods: 
Observations, interviews, survey, internal documents, etc. 
Conduct the remaining case studies (looking for replications) 
 B 
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 Pension fund category July 1, 
2008 
% Oct. 1, 
2008 
% Jan. 1, 
2009 




1 Industry-wide Pension 
Scheme (compulsory 
membership) 
70 10 69 10 69 11 69 11 
2 Industry-wide Pension 
Scheme (non-compulsory 
membership) 
25 4 26 4 22 3 22 4 
3 Company pension funds 553 83 543 83 526 83 503 82 
4 Company savings funds 5 1 4 1 5 1 5 1 
5 Occupational pension 
funds 
13 2 13 2 13 2 12 2 
6 Special legislation 1  1  1  1  
 TOTAL  667 100 656 100 636 100 612 100 
Table 4-2: Categories and number of pension funds July 2008 – April 2009.( source: (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2010a) 
 
Looking at Table 4-2 the category of Dutch company pension funds (nr 3) is 
chosen to select cases from, for the following reasons: 
1. The Netherlands is the home base of the researcher.  
2. The number of pension funds in the category. This increases the chance 
that an organization will participate in the research. 
3. The influence that the company may have on the decision-making process 
within the pension fund board. Davis et al. (2007) presents in their study 
empirical evidence on the influence of sponsoring companies on the funding 
and on the portfolio allocation of pension funds. 
4. The special arrangements, which can exist between the company as 
financial sponsor (administration agreement) and the pension fund as 
executor of the pension agreement. 
As a result of the aforementioned criteria company pension funds are chosen to 
be the category from the sample to be extracted. 
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4.2.4 Sampling Procedure Selecting the Cases  
 
Flyvbjerg (2006) comes up with the following Table 4-3 which is the basis for 
selecting the case(s). 
 
Type of Selection Purpose 
A. Random selection To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample’s size is 
decisive for generalization. 
 
A1. Random sample To achieve a representative sample that allows for generalization 
for the entire population. 
 





To maximize the utility of information from small samples and 
single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of expectations 




To obtain information on unusual cases, which can be especially 
problematic or especially good in a more closely defined sense. 
 
B2. Maximum variation 
cases 
To obtain information about the significance of various 
circumstances for cases process and outcome (e.g., three to four 
cases that are very different on one dimension: size, form of 
organization, location, budget). 
 
B3. Critical cases To achieve information that permits logical deductions of the type 
“If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.” 
 
B4 Paradigmatic cases To develop a metaphor or establish a school for the domain that 
the case concerns. 
 
Table 4-3: Strategies for the Selection of Samples and Cases (source: Flyvbjerg, 2006) 
 
The number of company pension funds with an insufficient coverage ratio has 
grown from 0 in Q1 2007 to 241 in Q1 2009 (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2010a). 
In other words it has grown from 0% to 78.5% in Q1 2009. In Q1 2009 only 66 
Dutch company pension funds had a sufficient coverage ratio.  
The B2 scenario (maximum variation cases) is selected as a research strategy. 
This is done because: it provides a possibility to find out what the differences 
are between the decision-making processes of different pension funds. 
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4.2.5 Set up the Selection of the Cases   
 
For the purpose of this thesis it is important to find key members of Dutch 
company pension funds and convince them of the importance of the project.  
This was done in two ways. Firstly an appointment was made with the Dutch 
association of company pension funds to find out whether the association 
wanted to help the project to succeed. They could do so by writing a letter of 
recommendation for their members. On June 24, 2010 this meeting took place. 
The interviewee agreed to the use of a voice recorder. During the interview the 
question was raised whether the Association wanted to help the project to 
succeed. They could do so by drawing up a recommendation to their members, 
and in their newsletter regularly disclose the investigation. The interviewee did 
not want to answer immediately, and asked for reflection period. When asked 
why he did not answer immediately, he gave an answer.13 Due to integrity 
reasons (British Sociological Association, 2002) the literal content from the 
interview should not be included here. The text came down to: it is a delicate 
issue. However, due to the decision not to publicly disclose the thesis the literal 
answer is inserted because it shows a fear which was illustrative. On the 
question what he meant by that the interviewee answered.14  
During telephone contact the spokesman told that the Association did not want 
to cooperate.15 The researcher regrets the attitude shown. However, 
participation should be based on freely given informed consent.  In fact the 
answer means that pension funds as a sector is not ‘open’, not ‘proactive’, and 
is determined to tackle the challenges in the sector itself. The risk is avoiding 
the opportunity to learn. This attitude of avoiding or even neglecting cognition 
                                                
13 Translated by researcher: “You touch the pension funds directly and in the middle of the hart.” 
Response of spokesman Dutch association of company pension funds during interview 
conducted June 24, 2010. 
 
14 Translated by researcher: “Although the information would be treated as highly confidential, 
there is always a possibility that the funds will be identified, even though the researcher strives 
for anonymity. Finally, the board is jointly and severally liable for the board decisions. Due to 
this board liability it is not attractive for pension funds to participate.” Response of spokesman 
Dutch association of company pension funds during interview conducted June 24, 2010. 
 
15 Translated by researcher: “due to the sensitive nature of the research question, the 
Association would not encourage pension funds to participate in the research.” Response of 
spokesman Dutch association of company pension funds July 1, 2010.  
 
  76 
distribution (Gergen, 2009) (see 3.3.3) needs to be changed. Then it will be 
possible to capture the decision-making process, and establish what 
improvements can be made. 
In the theory of social exchange (Blau, 1964) it is argued that an individual’s 
actions are often motivated by the “rewards”  they  are likely to receive from 
others.  This was incorporated in the second attempt to motivate participation in 
this research project. A written request was drawn up. This request addressed 
the following topics: 
1. A summary of the research. 
2. Why it is important for the named pension fund to participate? 
3. What participation would entail for the pension fund? 
4. What benefit will be gained by the pension fund if they participate? 
5. A request to get acquainted and to decide on participation in the research. 
Due to the fact that the researcher is financing it privately no special attention 
was given to that subject (financing the research) although it is part of the 
applied ethical practice.  
 
4.2.6 Negotiation of Access  
 
The researcher has frequent contacts with pension funds. Access to boards of 
pension funds seems guaranteed. Between April 12, 2010 and February 18, 
2011, 22 pension funds and one association were invited to participate (see 
4.2.6.1). This is 4.4% of the total number of pension funds and 5.5% of the total 
number of company pension funds ultimo Q1 2011. 
 
4.2.6.1 Getting Access to Empirical Data  
 
The Dutch association of company pension funds did not want to encourage 
funds to participate. Since that moment it was solely the responsibility of the 
researcher to find funds prepared to join the research project. The first and 
exploratory stage was to ensure collaboration. To meet the substantial diversity 
among pension funds in number of participants, former participants, ratio of 
participants and invested assets and insurance liabilities, if required, the 
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participating organizations will be selected from the different supervision 
categories. This creates a better comparison in decision-making processes. The 
supervisor uses five categories, which are grouped on the basis of the 
insurance provisions (hereinafter referred to as the IP). The supervisor uses the 
following categories: 
1. IP smaller than 10 million.  
2. IP between 10 and 100 million euros. 
3. IP between 100 and 1,000 million euros. 
4. IP between 1,000 and 5,000 million euros and 
5. IP of more than 5,000 million euros. 
The selection of cases will focus on category 2-4, because the majority of Dutch 
company pension funds are in those categories. 
 
After an intensive exercise it was feasible to contact 22 company pension 
funds. Gathering the names of funds and board members to be contacted went 
as follows:  
1. Known board member were contacted by the researcher and asked whether 
their organization would like to participate. 
2. Known board members were asked to give names of other board members 
of other pension funds. 
3. It was asked around whether known people knew other pension fund board 
members. 
4. A list of attendees of a public congress was taken and googled for address 
information.  
Despite these contacts, the question to cooperate in the research project was 
often answered negatively. Of the group of 22 pension funds, 10 pension funds 
immediately refused their cooperation. Eight of the 12 remaining contacts 
responded otherwise. Ultimately, four company pension funds agreed to 
participate of which two needed to submit a legally required recovery plan to the 
supervisor. Finally only one of the participating pension funds needed to submit 
a recovery plan to the supervisor. After consultation with the responsible 
Minister, the supervisor decided in that it was not necessary for re-insured 
pension funds to submit a recovery plan. One participating organizations turned 
out to be in this specific group. 








1st attempt 10 organizations 10 organizations 2 organizations 
Immediate refusal 5 organizations 4 organizations 1 organization 
Left over 5 organizations 6 organizations 1 organization 
Refusal after initial 
agreement 
 




2 organizations 1 organization 1 organization 
Table 4-4: Overview of conducted contacts. 
 
Taken into account the Supervision categories the following Table 4-5 of 
participating organizations can be drawn. 
 







1 1,266 million euros 116 percent 4 
2 60 million euros 101.7 percent 2 
3 345 million euros 127.6 percent 3 
4 31 million euros 102.1 percent 2 
Table 4-5: Participating organizations. 
 
The cases meet the requirements of B2 mentioned in Table 4-3. They are very 
different on one dimension the value of the insurance liabilities and therefore 
the supervision category.   
A group of eight pension funds, which were asked to participate and initially 
verbally agreed, refused in a later stage when asked to confirm their 
participation in writing. Refusal to participate whenever and for whatever 
reasons the wish is conceived in the ethical practice.  
A brief overview of the answers are grouped and shown in the following Tables 
4-6 – 4-13. Those tables can be seen as being part of the research project. It 
has been investigated why the organizations did not want to participate. The 
given reasons for not participating in the study vary. The success of this 
research was the exceptional granting of access to four cases. Lack of such 
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access could well be the reason why research of this nature has not been 
previously achieved.16 
 
4.2.6.2 Reason for Refusal: Secrecy 
 
In order to keep anonymity a non-disclosure agreement was developed. For two 
out of eight organizations this proposal was not enough to safeguard their 
identity and win their participation, even a verbal explanation about the research 
and the way it would be conducted did not lead to a change of view. An 
overview of the answers given is shown in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7, which 
follow hereafter.  
 
 Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 1 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: 160.8%.  
Ultimo 2008: 88.2%. 
Ultimo 2009: 108.2%. 
 
Supervision category 3 
Date initial (verbally) 
agreement to 
participate 
April 12, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
May 24, 2010 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “Board is afraid that information will not be kept as 
secret as proposed”. 
 
Additional information The Dutch supervisor (DNB) reinforced supervision by inquiring into the 
cause of the loss of approx. 50% of the value of the assets. The 
recovery plan is initially rejected by DNB. 
 
Table 4-6: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 1. 
                                                
16 In 2012 and 2013 dr. H.M. Prast (2013), Professor of Personal Financial Planning at 
Tilburg University had the same difficulty of getting access to data. Prast and one of her 
students found that it was not easy to receive information from pension funds about the 
administrative burden of mandatory information. Quite a few funds did not want or 
could cooperate. 
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Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 2 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: 136.5%. 
Ultimo 2008: 95.2%. 
Ultimo 2009: 99.4%. 
 
Supervision category 3 
 




May 7, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
June 10, 2010 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “Chairman is afraid that the non-identifiable 
information will leak to the pension fund. He does not believe that 
secrecy is possible”. 
 
Additional information Four asset managers are involved. On March 2, 2012 a publication 
appeared in a national newspaper. It stated that after investigation it has 
been established that the financial sponsor at the turn of the century has 
received money from the pension fund as dividend. In 2013 the fund 
threatens to have six or seven percent cuts in the pension entitlements 
and therefore the benefits. Currently (May 2012) the fund is busy with 
liquidating and transferring the pension entitlements to an insurer and 
two non-compulsory industry-wide pension funds. 
 
Table 4-7: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 2. 
 
As an addition to the information shown in Table4-7 it is possible that the 
transfer of money from fund to financial sponsor also happened at other funds. 
In a national newspaper an article (Hermanides, 2012) appeared on May 25,  
2012 with an intriguing headline.17  ABP is the pension fund employees in the 
government, public, and education sector and it is the largest pension fund in 
the Netherlands in terms of participants, assets and liabilities. When the money 
was taken the fund had a very high coverage ratio, and an overabundance of 
money. In the 1990s it was not unusual that the financial contract between the 
company (employer) and its own pension fund had a special provision. The 
provision arranged that if the coverage ratio crossed a stated limit the surplus 
should accrue to the company. Although this was not illegal, one can still 
                                                
17 Translated by researcher: “Pension fund ABP for the first time told its customers that the 
Government has taken 30 billion euro in the past.” HERMANIDES, E. (2012) ABP rakelt "greep 
in kas" op. Het Financieele Dagblad. 
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consider the action as inappropriate. The same counts for the non-participating 
company pension fund # 2 as shown in Table 4-7. In that case, the financial 
sponsor (company) received a significant amount of money as dividend 
because it was legally agreed. In both cases, the transfer of the money took 
place before or around the turn of the century. The continuous pressure of 
participants and the openness which is so important today, allowed for the 
creation of painful situations when the sequence of events was revealed to the 
participants afterwards. Incidentally, ABP is not the only pension fund where 
money was transferred from the pension fund to the financial sponsor. The 
same applies for, Philips, Unilever, ABN Amro, Unisys among others. Moreover, 
there is little visibility on this practice. As Secretary of State in 2002, the current 
Prime Minister promised that an investigation would be conducted to find out 
which fund had done this and how much money was involved. That research is 
never materialized. A secret pilot conducted by the government in 2012 into 
fewer than five company pension funds showed that one billion euros was taken 
and refunded to the employer. The current Secretary of State did not want to 
undertake more detailed research because of the costs involved, the reliability 
of the data and the reluctance of funds to cooperate (van Baars, 2012). The fact 
remains that, if the money was not paid to the financial sponsor, the chance that 
a cut on the pension entitlements and retirement benefits would not be 
necessary, is very substantial. Today it is publicly known that both the ABP and 
the non-participating company pension fund # 2 cut the pension entitlements 
and retirement benefits as from April 1, 2013 because the coverage ratio did not 
increase before December 31, 2012. 
 
4.2.6.3 Reason for Refusal: Time 
 
As mentioned before, the second attempt to motivate participation in this 
research project was a written request. In the document a specific section is 
called: What participation would entail for the pension fund. In collaboration with 
the pilot organization it was empirically tested how long it would take in term of 
time spent from the participating organization. The completion took between 15-
20 minutes. The pilot organization was asked whether this would be too long.
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Their answer was NO. This information was part of the document. Nevertheless 
four organizations refused to participate at a later stage. Tables 4-8 – 4-11 
shows the overview of the given answers. 
 
Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 3 
 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: not known. 
Ultimo 2008: approx. 98%. 
Ultimo 2009: unknown. 
 
Supervision category 2 
 




 July 12, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
August 16, 2010 (by mail) 
Reason Spokesman says: “our attention was more focused on strategic choices 
of the fund rather than funding and investment in itself.” 
 
Additional information The pension fund is liquidated. It transferred the pension obligations to 
an insurer. 
 
Table 4-8: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 3. 
 
Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 4 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: not known. 
Ultimo 2008: approx. 98%. 
Ultimo 2009: unknown. 
 
Supervision category 3 
 




September 10, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
November 3, 2010 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “We are too busy with other things.” 
 
Additional information No additional information available or known. 
 
Table 4-9: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 4. 
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Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 5 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: not known. 
Ultimo 2008: approx. 96%. 
Ultimo 2009: unknown. 
 
Supervision category 2 
 




September 20, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
 November 12, 2010 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “after a very short discussion we have decided not to 
participate. I do not have the time.” 
 
Additional information No additional information available or known. 
 
Table 4-10: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 5. 
 
Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 6 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: not known. 
Ultimo 2008: approx. 98%. 
Ultimo 2009: unknown. 
 
Supervision category 3 
 




January 25, 2011 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
April 1, 2011 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “We have decided to liquidate the pension fund, so I 
will not have the time to contribute.” 
 
Additional information After asking spokesman said: “I do not think the board wants to 
participate”. Why: “Perhaps a bit afraid.” 
 
Table 4-11: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 6. 
 
4.2.6.4 Reason for Refusal: Other  
 
Although the document ‘request for participation’ was developed to convince 
the board to participate it was obviously not enough. Two out of eight 
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organizations refused to participate at a later stage (see Table 12 and Table 4-
13) using other arguments.  
 
Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 7 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: not known. 
Ultimo 2008: 92,2%. 
Ultimo 2009: 97,3%. 
 
Supervision category 2 
 




May 13, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
May 28, 2010 (by mail) 
Reason Spokesman says: “We never contribute to studies.” 
 
Additional information Currently the pension fund is in liquidation. It transferred the pension 
obligations to two different insurers. 
 
Table 4-12: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 7. 
 
Subject Information 
Organization Non participating company pension fund no. 8 
Coverage ratio Ultimo 2007: 136,4%. 
Ultimo 2008: 105%. 
Ultimo 2009: 109%. 
 
Supervision category 3 
 




October 14, 2010 
Date of refusal to 
participate  
 
January 12, 2011 (by phone) 
Reason Spokesman says: “I‘ve only been in service since 2009 and do not know 
what happened before.” 
 
Additional information After asking the spokesman said: “I do not think that the board wants to 
provide confidential information to an outsider.” 
 
Table 4-13: Answers given by non-participating pension fund no. 8. 
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4.2.6.5 Openness, Transparency and Governance  
 
The answers displayed in the previous tables 4-6 – 4-13, acquired by means of 
e-mail or telephone, remarkably enough, display a reluctance to participate in  
this research. It is not further investigated, but there are a few possible reasons 
why the willingness to cooperate was lacking. The statement made by the 
spokesman of the Association is probably the best clue. Summarized he said: 
the answer to the research question is a delicate matter. This can be translated 
in perhaps fear of liability, loss of respect, the ego, in short there are many 
reasons to think of, which were not further investigated by the researcher. 
Therefore, further speculation makes no sense. However, the recalcitrance 
actually stands in stark contrast to the spirit of pension fund governance, which 
demands transparency. Participation in the research could have realized this 
transparency and would have been a paragon of openness and transparency. 
Weick (1995) describes that the more open an organization is, the more 
responsive the individuals and groups (teams) are to each other – both 
internally and externally. When unity and responsiveness are low, the 
information will tend to become compartmentalized and is not shared readily. 
However, perhaps transparency is not what the funds want to establish – which 
is an interesting idea for further research. The fact remains that the 
collaboration came with great difficulty. In one case even after the collaboration 
some restraint occurred. One of the participating organizations was asked four 
times to agree upon a date for the interview, but these requests were never 
answered. Finally on the 28th June 2012 the researcher succeeded in 
contacting the chairman of the board of the participating organization to agree 
on a date for the interview, but the chairman of the board answered he did not 
want to have an interview. The interview was necessary to verify the accuracy 
and, the completeness of the information (as will be explained in section 4.3.6). 
After a lengthy phone call, the chairman eventually agreed to be interviewed. 
Due to ethical reasons (British Sociological Association, 2002) there is no 
transcription made of the phone call. The reason for the initial refusal to 
cooperate shows that there are benefits in enlarging the accessibility of pension 
funds. Why this closed attitude when there could be lessons to be learned for 
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them or others? It is recommended to tackle the closed attitude of the pension 
funds. This should be addressed in a form, that in the sector of pension funds 
the openness leads to an improvement of the quality of the executive duties of 
pension funds. The executive duties of a pension fund board are to formulate a 
policy for contributions, indexation and investments. How this should be 
implemented one should look at pension fund governance. So it needs to 
consist of careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
openness, and communication. 
 
4.2.7 Design Data Collection 
 
The project started with a pre-test of the questionnaire with an expert panel that 
consisted of four practitioners with in-depth knowledge of pension funds. The 
researcher asked these experts to discuss each survey question and to provide 
feedback on the content and on the provided instructions. The feedback was 
used to improve the clarity and design of the survey, making it more appealing 
for board members to complete. During the entire process of the research the 
members of the expert panel were consulted several times. Prof. dr. T. Nijman 




The research is built up out of multiple case studies with a retrospective 
reconstruction of decision-making processes regarding the coverage ratio. 
Because all cases differ, it is obvious that this type of research design relies on 
more than one data collection technique. Data accumulated by different 
methods but bearing on the same issue are part of what is called the ‘multi-
method approach’ (Jick, 1979). The approach is focused on getting the true 
picture.18 
                                                
18 “Different methods have different strengths and weaknesses. If they converge then we can be 
reasonably confident that we are getting the true picture.” GILLHAM, B. (2000) Case study 
research methods, London, Continuum. 
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4.3.1 Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis is the appropriate decision-making process within Dutch 
company pension funds to establish the coverage ratio. It can be said that such 
a process contributes to a healthy financial yardstick and all concerned with 
information required meeting the legal and social requirements and internal 
regulations of the fund itself. 
 
4.3.2 Pilot Case Study 
 
After the approval of the mini-viva on May 21, 2010 the research project started 
with the pre-test of the questionnaire followed by a pilot. During that phase and 
in discussion with the pilot organization new insight information was gained. 
The pilot case is one of the four participating organizations.  
 
4.3.3 Non-Disclosure Agreement  
 
In order to keep anonymity a non-disclosure of information contract was signed 
between the researcher and the competent authority of the participating 
organization.  
 
4.3.4 Additional Measures 
 
The researcher motivated respondents by assuring them confidentiality and 
offering a summary of the research results and a free workshop on the research 
findings (information that would be meaningless to them in the absence of 
accurate data). Complete confidentiality within the scope of this thesis cannot 
be guaranteed in advance. It would be an unrealistic guarantee. However, a 
number of measures are taken to this end. Starting with a non-disclosure 
statement, followed by the secure storage of all information made available and 
the anonymity of the case descriptions and results. During the research and 
after the promotion the research results will only be shared with the participating  
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organizations. Before disseminating anonymous research information, the 
participating organization will receive a document and verbal explanation 
covering recommendations on how their situation attributed (possible found) 
shortcomings can be addressed. 
 
4.3.5 Different Data Sources 
 
To answer the research question and establish the objective of the research, 
several data sources were consulted. For answering each phase of the model, 
various sources were used (see Table 4-14). Triangulation of multiple informant 
responses was used to improve (Patton, 1990, Denzin, 1989, Lincoln and 
Guba, 1985)  and to increase the prospect that responses would be truthful 
(Denzin, 1989).  
 





Document Annual report 2008 Content analysis Phase 1 
 
Document Annual report 2009 Content analysis Phase 1 
 
Document Actuarial and Operating 
Memorandum 
 
Content analysis Phase 1 and 3 
Documents Agendas of board 
meetings 
 
Content analysis Phase 3 
Documents Minutes of board 
meetings 
 




Content analysis Phase 1 – 4 
People Chairman of the board 
 
Structured interview Phase 1 – 4 
People Manager of the pension 
fund 
 
Structured interview Phase 1 - 4 
Table 4-14: Use of resources for data collection. 
 
4.3.6 Conducting the Case Studies 
 
After the adjustments of the questionnaire the data collection started May 24, 
2010. The last questionnaire was returned on 20 August 2012. The recall time 
frame is restricted to three years or fewer to minimize problems associated with
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retrospective data collection (Miller et al., 1997). The last interview took place 
12 August 7, 2012. Although this date is beyond the time frame of three years 
the interview took place because no new information was collected. The 
purpose was to verify and discuss the conclusions. There was no need for 
clarification because the received data was clear. Another issue why this 
interview was important was the rejection of the chairman of the board to 
participate in the interview. During that period the following activities were 
conducted. 
1. The documents mentioned above (when available) were reviewed during the 
desk research phase of the project and provided data about the 
characteristics of the pension fund, the volume of assets and liabilities, the 
number of beneficiaries, members of the pension plan, and early leavers. An 
overview of the coverage ratio during the researched period is included, 
because it demonstrates the need for intervention. 
2. Direct communication with the decision-making board members took place 
via questionnaires. 
3. A comparison of existing documents (when available) and the narratives 
resulting from the completed questionnaires identified inconsistencies and 
gaps in the “story” that led to a decision. 
4. These inconsistencies and gaps were explored in a follow-up in-depth 
interview with the respondent using semi-structured questions. In the 
interview attempts were made to reconcile differences and fill in the gaps 
(Huber and Power, 1985). The interviews were focussed on collecting three 
answers. Those were: 
5. The accuracy of the information. Is the information correct? 
6. The completeness of the information. Is there missing information? 
7. The verification of the information. Why is the conscious answer given in the 
questionnaire? 
8. To ensure integrity of the data received the researcher telephoned each 
informant subsequent to the collection of the completed questionnaire to 
verify that he or she completed the questionnaire.  
9. A digital voice recorder was used if the interviewee consented. Those 
interviews were necessary to get an explanation of the information obtained.  
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All recordings of interviews are transcribed verbatim. The recordings are 
stored on one computer and on one external hard disk. 
10. For collection of the data questionnaires were used to obtain a standard and 
uniform approach regarding both the questions asked and the mode in 
which subjects are addressed. 
11. The questionnaires and interviews were in Dutch as agreed during the mini 
viva May 19, 2010. The reasons for this are: 
a. The clearness of expression of the interviewees. 
b. The risk that participation is hampered by the use of the English 
language.  
12. The data collection covered all phases of the conceptual research model. 
13. The questionnaires also collected data about some biases. The effect of 
overconfidence and wishful thinking were taken into consideration.   
14. Agendas and minutes of the various meetings during the researched period 
were gathered, because these documents showed the result of the problem 
recognition leading to the preparation for the meeting and the meeting itself. 
 
4.3.7 Response Rate 
 
Before distributing the questionnaires it was necessary to establish which of the 
board members of the participating organizations were also board members 
during the research period. The decrease of the to be involved board members 
compared to the official number of members is the result of people’s 
transferring, leaving the company, termination of term of appointment as 
member of the board and the like. However the high turnover of board members 
could be a co-incidence but could also be a consequence of doubt of their own 
expertise, which could lead to voluntary resignation as board member. The new 
board members were not asked to participate because they were not involved 
in the decision-making process during the specific time frame. In Table 4-15 an 
overview is shown of the response rate. 
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Table 4-15: Response rate of questionnaires 
 
Column 1: the number corresponding with the participating organization.  
Column 2: the number of board members, which should be functioning 
according to the statutes.  
Column 3: the number of board members who were also board member during 
the research period (1July 2008 – 31 March 2009).  
Column 4: the number of distributed questionnaires. This number differs from 
the number in column two, because of resignation or expiring term. 
Column 5: the number of questionnaires received. 
Column 6: the percentage of response rate.  
 
4.3.8 The Questionnaire and Measures 
 
The questionnaire took an average of 20 minutes to complete and was divided 
into four main sections (translated full version of the questionnaire is attached 
as Appendix C). In Table 3-6 an overview is given of phases, questions and 
























1 8 3 3 2 66 
 
2 4 3 3 3 100 
 
3 8 3 3 2 66 
 
4 5 3 3 1 33 
 
TOTAL 25 12 12 8 66 
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1. Availability of data 
The variables are: information about coverage ratio, pension fund governance 
rules and default settings. Per variable different indicators are defined. The 
pension funds are legally required to report every three months about the  
coverage ratio to the supervisor, which was the reason for using the same 
period of time in the questionnaire. If information about one of the two indicators 
is not available or current, an actual calculation of the coverage ratio is not 
possible. Formally not having the information to calculate the coverage ratio is 
in violation of the Pension Act (article 33 and 143). Operations should be 
organized in such a way that good governance and sound operations are 
controlled and safeguarded. In other words, a proper system of risk 
management should be in place, which is also discussed in section 3.5.1. 
Practically not knowing, within a reasonably margin, the value of the assets or 
the liabilities means that the rest of the decision-making process is based on 
guesswork. This is in conflict with proper risk management. On this premise the 
answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board meetings and 
interviews show whether the fund has fulfilled its legal obligations for controlled 
and sound operations, as well as the internal agreements about preparing 
meetings or decisions and risk management.  Therefore the answers show 
whether the pension fund board complied with the most basic obligations. It 
provide an answer to the question if the board was able to respond because 
without the appropriate information the progress of the process is based on 
guesswork. This also answers whether the pension fund governance functions 
careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise and 
openness are configured and lived by. 
2. Awareness 
In the Awareness phase three variables were examined: actual situation, 
context and problem recognition. Based on this premise, the answers in the 
questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board meetings and interviews show 
whether the fund has fulfilled its legal obligations for the organization of 
controlled and sound business processes and risks management and to the 
internal agreements about risk management and preparing meetings or 
decisions. The answer to the question whether the funds have fulfilled their 
legal obligations shows whether the board was adaptive to the situation. This 
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 means that the board is aware that something is going on and perhaps 
intervention is needed. The answers provide a view on the question of whether 
the board was adaptive to the situation. In short did the board have the ability to 
respond? This also answers whether the pension fund governance functions  
careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise and 
openness are configured and lived by. 
3. Analysis. 
In the Analysis phase two variables were examined: meeting preparation and 
meeting. The answers to the questions raised show whether the board was 
ready to respond based on confirmed information. Proper pension fund 
governance requires discussion, alternatives and information exchange. These 
are the basics considering the ‘Principles for good pension fund governance’ 
(Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005, Vereniging van Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen, 
2006) in which openness and communication are mentioned as principles for 
good governance. If the board did not respond on confirmed information why 
did they decide? Did the board decide because others decided as well? This 
also answers whether the pension fund governance functions careful 
management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise and openness are 
configured and lived by. 
4. Action 
On this premise the answer shows whether the board takes action or not. This 
also answers whether the pension fund governance functions careful 
management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, openness and 
communication are configured and lived by. It is also considered whether all the 
decisions were registered very accurate. This is necessary to be able to 
communicate with the external environment including the (former) participants. 
This calls for a meticulous registration of the decision in which all the 
considerations were recorded, including the minority opinions. With all the given 
answers, an opinion can be formed concerning the appropriateness of the 
decision-making process regarding the coverage ratio. This opinion will be the 
start for the recommendations. The recommendations will not only focus on 
streamlining the decision-making process, but especially on increasing the 
quality of the decision-making process and hence the exercising of control by 
the board. When one or more phases do not meet the requirements than there 
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is a shortcoming in the process. As a consequence there are also shortcomings 
in governance which is not properly organized and lived by.  
As mentioned before Ambachtsheer et al. (2005) published a report in which 
causes for an excellence shortfall were notified. A follow-on study  
(Ambachtsheer et al., 2007) analyzed the findings of a new survey and found a 
positive correlation between governance quality and fund performance.   
When case studies show a shortcoming in the decision-making process and a 
shortfall of coverage ratio it is feasible to conclude that the governance should 
be improved in the participating organizations.  
 
4.3.9 Content Analysis 
 
In the case of using qualitative content analysis in case study research, 
triangulation takes place on two different levels. Integrating different material 
triangulates data and evidence by integrating quantitative and qualitative steps 
of analysis. By applying a method of qualitative content analysis triangulation 
takes place, which has not been particularly developed for this purpose. 
(Kohlbacher, 2006). There are no simple guidelines for data analysis: each 
inquiry is distinctive, and the results depend on the skills, insights, analytic 
abilities and style of the investigator (Hoskins and Mariano, 2004). One 
challenge of content analysis is the fact that it is very flexible and there is no 
simple ‘right’ way of doing it (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). The empirical data is 
organized as shown in Figure 4-2. 
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Figure 4-2: Abstraction process 
 
4.3.10 Draw Cross-Case Conclusions 
 
Before cross-case conclusions can be drawn the collected data needs to be 
analyzed. For the analysis of the data (Marsh, 1988) it is important to 
distinguish two types of data. The first type, qualitative data, was collected 
through interviews and questionnaires. The second kind of data, quantitative 
data, was collected via the questionnaires. For the analysis of the qualitative 
data, Miles and Huberman (1994) are followed. They offer in their “sourcebook” 
methods, which are designed to systematically come to conclusions that can be 
drawn and verified. In their approach (1994: 10) they distinguish three parallel 
streams of activities within the data collection and processing process: data 
reduction, data display and drawing and verifying conclusions. These steps 
Sub-category Generic category  Main category 
Internal Supervision 
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were followed in the data analysis part of the research. To verify the findings, 
the following tactics were undertaken: 
1. Check on researchers’ impact through peer feedback.  
The researcher attended two peer review workshops every year. The 
University of Bradford organized those workshops.  
2. Triangulation of data sources and collection methods.  
The data collected in questionnaires was compared with the data in the 
annual reports, the AOM, the agendas, the minutes of board meetings and 
other bodies. 
3. Feedback from informants. 
The contribution of the expert panel was very valuable. Most of the feedback 
was collected via mail or telephone. Occasionally a meeting took place with 
individual members of the virtual panel. The last meeting with one of its 






Summary Table for Chapter Four 
 
1. Answering the question: How can the goals of this research project be 
achieved? 
2. Discussion of the research paradigms with reference to positivism and 
phenomenology as well as multi method and the choice for the 
exploratory approach. 
3. A discussion of the selection of case study as method, samples, and 
methods for data collection and analysis. 
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5. Empirical Data and Findings  
 
5.1 Empirical Data of Participating Organization # 1 
 
Due to the fact that the different case studies vary in terms of design, number of 
participants, assets and liabilities, each individual section will provide the 
empirical data per case, starting with a brief outline of the participating 
organization.    
 
5.1.1 Outline of Participating Organization # 1 
 
The following outline (Table 5-1) is based on four documents (Participating 
organization # 1, 2008a, 2008e, 2009c, 2010b). 
 
Facts company pension fund # 1 Year 2008 Year 2009 
(former) participants   
Participants 4,901 4,756 
Former participants 5,159 5,116 
Beneficiaries 2,886 2,950 
TOTAL 12,946 12,822 
Coverage ratio   
Valuation at market value of liabilities € 1,266,458,000 € 1,258,150,000 
Assets 19 € 1,440,469,000  € 1,521,466,000  
Coverage ratio according to annual report 20 116% 123% 
 
 
                                                
19 The investment portfolio consisted of 90% fixed income securities and 10% shares and real 
estate. 
 
20 The calculation of the coverage ratio shows a different percentage than listed in the table and 
the annual report. The reason for this lies in the interpretation of the rule for the drafting of the 
annual report. The fund is fully re-insured and, as such, has no equity in the legal sense 
because all resources are part of the investment depot. The board thinks this is incorrect. 
Therefore publications about the coverage ratio include the entire capital surplus. In December 
2008 this amount was around € 20 million and in 2009 around € 29 million. A calculation of the 
coverage ratio using the figures shown in the table would result in 113.74% for 2008 and 
120.93% for 2009. 
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Facts company pension fund # 1 cont’d Year 2008 Year 2009 
Board   
General management board 8 members 8 members 
Representation of employer 4 members 4 members 
Representation of employees 3 members 3 members 
Representation of beneficiaries 1 member 1 member 
Organization   
Executive Committee Yes Yes 
Manager/director 1 1 
Investment Advisory Committee Yes Yes 
Supervisory board No No 
Accountability body Yes Yes 
Complaints Committee Yes Yes 
Review Committee Yes Yes 
Members’ council  Yes Yes 
External service providers   
Accountant Yes Yes 
Actuary Yes Yes 
Asset manager Yes Yes 
Administration Yes Yes 
Government body No No 




Table 5-1: Outline of participating organization # 1. 
 
To gain better insight into, and to conduct data triangulation about, the decision-
making process concerning coverage ratios in the studied organization the 
following documents were used during the desk research phase: 
• Organization chart (Participating organization # 1, 2010b). 
• Annual reports 2008 and 2009 (Participating organization # 1, 2008e, 
2009c) 
• Actuarial and Operating Memorandum (Participating organization # 1, 
2008a). 
• Five agendas of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 
1, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009a, 2009b) 
• Five minutes of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 1, 
2008h, 2008i, 2008j, 2009f, 2009g). 
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• Four minutes of the Investment Advisory Committee meetings (Participating 
organization # 1, 2008f, 2008g, 2009d, 2009e). 
• Memo to the board (Participating organization # 1, 2010a).  
In addition to the aforementioned documents two members of the board 
completed a questionnaire (Participating organization # 1, 2010c, 2010d). 
During 2009 six new board members were appointed. The member 
representing the employer and the member representing the employees were 
the only ones who were board members during the research period. Documents 
containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy and the decision-making 
process(es) were missing. To check and verify the findings one interview was 
conducted. This took place on February 22, 2012. The interviewee did not reject 
the use of a digital voice recorder. The recording of this interview is transcribed 
verbatim (Participating organization # 1, 2012). As follow up a second meeting 
took place on March 9, 2012. This was due to the findings based upon the 
questionnaires. The board member wanted to discuss the differences in the 
answers because he thought that some of the differences could be explained.  
 
5.1.2 Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
In this phase it is researched whether the data necessary for the decision-
making process about the coverage ratio is available.  
 
5.1.2.1 Information about Coverage Ratio 
 
It is mentioned that the information about the coverage ratio should cover the 
actual value of assets and liabilities per period. If there is no up-to-date 
information available concerning the actual value of these assets and liabilities, 
a calculation of the actual coverage ratio is not possible. In documentation 
(Participating organization # 1, 2002, 2006, 2008a) one can find the TO BE 
situation about the process and information exchange. With the information 
available as described it is possible to calculate the coverage ratio. The 
previous description of the TO BE situation corresponds with the TO BE 
situation of the conceptual research model. All the phases in the model are also
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found in the various documents. The AS IS situation is determined by the 
questionnaires and the interview starting with the information about the assets 
the following is established: 
  
Location Assets 
July 1, 2008 
Assets 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Assets 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Assets 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 € 1,370,000,000 € 0.00 
(UNKNOWN) 
€ 1,440,000,000 €1,441,000,000 
Respondent 2 € 1,370,000,000 € 1,350,000,000 
21 
€ 1,440,000,000 €1,440,000,000  
Annual report 2008 Not reported Not reported € 1,440,000,000  
Annual report 2009   Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-2: Fact-finding about assets. 
 
The annual report includes only the amount of assets at 31 December of any 
year. As an addition to the answer that the value of the assets per October 1 
was unknown, one of the responders reported in the questionnaire that no 
report was available because the concerning reports were not made on a 
structural basis before 2009. This statement is in contradiction with what is 
described in the AOM22. Even though the AOM explicates a decision 
concerning the information flow of the assets, it has not been realized.  
According to this document the information about the assets should be sent to 
the Investment Advisory Committee. The committee consists of three members  
appointed by the board, and supplemented with four participants, which are an 
advisor, the asset manager, the re-insurance company and a secretary.  
                                                
21 Respondent 2 had made an Excel sheet and calculated the value of the assets himself. 
 
22  Translated by the researcher: “The board receives a monthly asset management report.  
It also receives the valuation at market value of the coverage ratio and the actual value of the 
assets. Every three months the asset manager sends the board a report with a reflection on 
past developments, and a prediction of future developments in the investments markets.” 
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 1 (2008a) Actuarial and Operating Memorandum. 
Amsterdam. 
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Considering the minutes23 of the board the delegation of responsibilities was not 
clear. Although the Investment Advisory Committee could not comply 
withgoverning rules, it did demand the release of the asset management 
reports. During the research period the Investment Advisory Committee met 
twice in 2008 and twice in 2009. The meeting of the Investment Advisory 
Committee was scheduled previous to the board meeting, so that information 
can be shared during the board meeting to assist in the decision-making 
process. 
In the meeting of the Investment Advisory Committee of July 2, 2008 
(Participating organization # 1, 2008f) it is recorded that the stock fall far back 
causing a coverage decline. This means that the coverage ratio is in danger 
and dropping. During the board meeting on July 10, 2008 (Participating 
organization # 1, 2008h) it is recorded  that the external asset manager, within 
the bandwidth of the investment mandate, is allowed to make changes in the 
portfolio. In the meeting of the Investment Advisory Committee of October 6, 
2008 (Participating organization # 1, 2008f) two important issues were 
discussed. The first one recorded is as follows: By strong decrease of the value 
of the equity portfolio the interest of shares in portfolio dropped below the 
allowable bandwidth. Mandate required to purchases. The Investment Advisory 
Committee would like to be informed by the asset manager if there is a 
necessity to depart from the mandate.  The second issue recorded is: To come 
to an improvement of the current month reports elaboration of a proposal must 
be executed. The Investment Advisory Committee would like to have better 
view on: 
1. How the performance of the asset manager is compared to the benchmark.  
2. The development of the matching portfolio compared to the liabilities. 
3. The development of the yield portfolio versus benchmark inflation. 
                                                
23 Translated by researcher: "It is not clear how far the jurisdiction of this committee (Investment 
 Advisory Committee)  extends. This should be the purpose and instructions appear, or the  
control rules that are made to be. The existing arrangement is that a change in the investment  
mandate only on the basis  of a board decision can be made. A proposal to amend the 
investment mandate will in principle only be based on the results of an ALM study. To this end  
the Investment Advisory Committee will be proposed to the board.” PARTICIPATING 
ORGANIZATION # 1 (2008h: 2) Minutes of pension fund board meeting 10-07-2008.  
Amsterdam. 
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On October 15, 200824 the board decided. During the meeting a member of the 
board asks what the coverage ratio was on September 30, 2008. The answer, 
which is recorded, reads: 128%. In the past the board has chosen for a 100% 
re-insurance contract. By doing so, they have chosen to transfer the 
underwriting risks matching the market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk to an 
insurer. The underwriting risks include the possibility that participants live longer 
than expected. Market risk includes the risk that short-term value of investments 
strongly fluctuates. The credit risk is determined mainly by lower-quality 
investments. Liquidity risk is the chance that there is temporarily no money 
available to pay benefits.  The transfer of the underwriting risks costs money, 
but in return the transferred risks are under control or at least limited. As a 
consequence of transferring some of the risks, the liabilities administration, 
which covers all the insured liabilities, was also outsourced to the insurer. The 
insurer needs that administration to carry out their responsibilities as an insurer 
of the liabilities. For the calculation of the coverage ratio it is necessary to know 
the value of the liabilities. In the AOM it is recorded, that the board receives a 
quarterly report on the implementation of the pension scheme by the re-insurer, 
but this was not included in the Service Level Agreement with the insurer. As a 
consequence the insurer determined the content of the report. For an insurer it 
should be feasible to report the actual sum of liabilities on a monthly basis. 
However, it was not delivered nor could it be enforced, because nothing about 
the information flow of the liabilities was contractually committed. Yet, the 
questionnaires show figures of liabilities. In the interview the question was 
raised how this was possible and on what basis the calculation took place. The 
answer was that probably it was a best guess. The questionnaires and the 
annual report 2008 show the following information about the liabilities (see 
Table 5-3): 
                                                
24 Translated by researcher: “The Board feels nothing for derogation of the mandate and 
 decides: no derogation.” PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 1 (2008i) Minutes of pension 
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Location Liabilities 
July 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Liabilities 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 € 0.0 
(Unknown) 
€ 0.0  
(Unknown) 
€ 1,266,000,000 €1,300,000,000 
Respondent 2 
 
€ 1,000,000,000 € 1,080,000,000 € 1,270,000,000 €1,300,000,000 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported € 1,266,000,000  
Annual report 2009 
 
  Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-3: Fact-finding about liabilities. 
 
The annual report includes only the amount of liabilities at 31 December of any 
year. Looking at the coverage ratio it is no longer surprising that again the 
respondents provide not the same information, which is shown in the following 
Table 5-4: 
 
Location Coverage ratio 
July 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Coverage 
ratio 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
136.1% 128.2% 115.7% 111.0% 
Respondent 2 
 




Not reported Not reported 116% Not reported 
Annual report 
2009 
    Not reported 
Table 5-4: Fact-finding about coverage ratio. 
 
It was unknown to the researcher how a coverage ratio can be shown in the 
questionnaires when the information necessary to calculate a ratio is not  
available. Yet, the questionnaires show an actual coverage ratio for every three 
months. How this is possible has been asked during the interview. Two answers
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are given. One of the respondents used an excel sheet from the insurer made 
in 2010. The other respondent came up with a figure because he had a 
personal interest in the subject and he had set up a personal administration. 
This was used in his calculation. 
In one of the questionnaires it has been formulated that coverage ratios are not 
judged since 2006.Yet during the board meeting of October 15, 2008 
(Participating organization # 1, 2008i) the issue of the coverage ratio was a 
subject of discussion. A figure of 128% is given. How this was possible cannot 
be concluded from the documents researched. During the board meeting of the 
January 14, 2009 (Participating organization # 1, 2009f) the subject coverage 
ratio is discussed again. According to the minutes of the board meeting, the 
coverage dropped to 116,5%. In December 2008 a member of the board 
indicates that it is desirable to calculate the actual coverage ratio several times 
a year. It is obvious that the subject coverage ratio had the attention of the 
board members. However, actual information about the assets and liabilities 
was not available. No actions are determined to get the actual information from 
the asset manager and the insurance company. An action to improve that 
information flow regarding the coverage ratio was established in 2010. 
To summarize the results of the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of 
the variable of the coverage ratio, the following Table 5-5 can be drawn: 
 


















Assets 2 5     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 10 6 60 4 40 
       
Liabilities 2 5     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 10 6 60 4 40 
       
Coverage ratio 2 4     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 8 4 50 4 50 
       
Other 2 8     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 16 6 37.5 10 62.5 
       
TOTAL 2 44 22 50 22 50 
Table 5-5: Overview of answers regarding fact finding coverage ratio. 
 
The participating organization # 1 has chosen for a re-insurance contract. By 
doing this, they have chosen to transfer certain risks to an insurer. However, the 
matching risk was only 90% covered. The matching risk is the difference 
between the duration of pension liabilities and the duration of assets. Through 
this decision the organization agreed with the contractual arrangement made by 
the insurer. The organization has chosen to set up the rest of their assets a 
separate assets portfolio to make a profitable use of the rest of these assets. A 
profitable use can be achieved if investment markets are picking up again to 
show that there are higher yields, which can be achieved. The results of this 
assets portfolio can then contribute to the required cash flow matching of 100% 
and a possible surplus can provide an indexation grant for the increased cost of 
living, to preserve purchasing power.  
To summarize the facts of the first variable of phase 1, which is information 
about the coverage ratio the following is established: 
1. In the questionnaires 50% of the responses on the information about 
coverage ratio are non-identical answers.  
  106 
2. The participating organization # 1 has chosen for a reinsurance contract. By 
doing so, they have transferred the underwriting risks matching the market 
risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk to an insurer. 
3. The board in consultation with the insurer had chosen for hedging the 
interest risk by a cash flow matching to a size of 90% for five years. 
4. The Investment Advisory Committee should receive a monthly asset 
management report. This policy was not in operation per July 1, 2008 or per 
October 1, 2008 and January 1, 2009. 
5. There are no contractual arrangements or a Service Level Agreement (SLA) 
with the insurer to provide the sum of the insured liabilities on a monthly 
basis. 
6. A personal administration made it feasible for one of the respondents to 
show a coverage ratio.  
 
The fact that 50% of the given answers are non-identical is a worrying fact. The 
board members should have the same information available. By means of data 
triangulation the correct numbers are checked in the year reports. Without 
correct information no decisions could have been taken at all. Yet, the process 
of decision-making went on. 
 
5.1.2.2 Pension Fund Governance Principles 
 
The second variable in the first phase of the research model is pension fund 
governance. This variable is aimed mainly at the organization and processes of 
a pension fund. Following a transitional measure, the principles should be 
implemented at least at January 1, 2009. The question that remains is whether 
the fund has implemented the required proper governance measures and if so, 
has the participating organization # 1 lived and worked along required lines of 
pension fund governance.  Based on the Decree on the Implementation of the 
Pension Act, the following committees should have been installed: 
Accountability body or Supervisory board, Review Committee, Complaints 
body, and Members’ council.  Looking at the participating organization # 1 and 
Table 5-1, it must be concluded that the bodies required by pension fund 
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governance were implemented.  Hereafter, the facts concerning the 
participation of different committees in the decision-making process about the 
coverage ratio are discussed. The minutes of the various board meetings do not 
show that:  
1. The different committees are informed.  
2. Responses are received from committees.  
The conclusion seems justified that although the pension fund governance 
bodies were installed, the board had not institutionalized its application.  
To summarize the results of the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of 






















2 14     
Total nr. of 
questions. 
 
 28 24 86 4 14 
Table 5-6: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding pension fund governance. 
 
To summarize, the facts of the second variable of phase 1, which is pension 
fund governance, are as follows: 
1. In the questionnaires, 14% of the responses on the information about 
pension fund governance are non-identical answers. 
2. The different bodies required by the pension fund government rules are 
implemented. 
3. The pension fund governance rules are not in operation in the desired size 
yet, so that the goals of pension fund governance are reached. Discussions 
about responsibilities were still conducted. 
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5.1.2.3 Default Settings 
 
Neither default settings, nor references to them were found in the various 
examined documents. In the questionnaires, questions about different default   
settings were raised as to whether default settings exist in practice. The 
answers are shown in the following Table 5-7.  
 
Question: where there default settings for: Respondent 1 Respondent 2 
• Agenda topics? Yes No 
• Frequency of meetings? Yes Yes 
• Advance distribution of meeting documents? Yes Yes 
• Meeting quorum? Yes No 
• Decision-making quorum? Yes Yes 
• Communication with (former) participants? Yes No 
Were checklists used? No No 
Are the meeting subjects prepared in writing? Yes Yes 
Did this happen during the research period as well? Yes Yes 
Table 5-7: Fact-finding about default settings. 
 
Table 5-7 shows that: 
1. There is a settled frequency of meetings. The frequency is once every three 
months (Participating organization # 1, 2008a). 
2. There is a disagreement about the meeting quorum and communication with 
former members. 
3. No checklists are used. 
To summarize the results of the questionnaires about the fact finding stage of 



















Default settings 2 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 24 18 75 6 25 
Table 5-8: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding default settings. 
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A summary of the facts of the 3rd variable of phase 1: 
1. In the questionnaires, 25% of the responses on the subject default settings 
are non-identical answers.  
2. The frequency of the meetings, the advance distribution of the meeting 
documents and the decision-making quorum are the default settings 
recognized by the responders. 
3. No checklists are used regarding the decision-making process. 
 
Summarizing the facts and the results of the questionnaires one can draw the 
conclusion for the first phase of the decision-making process, in which three 
variables of the availability of information are researched. The summary is 


























2 28 24 86 4 14 
Default settings 
 
2 24 18 75 6 25 





 96 64 67 32 33 
Table 5-9: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 1. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires an average of 33% of the responses on the subject of 
availability of data are non-identical answers. 
2. A majority of the risks are transferred to an insurer. 
3. Interest rate immunization is established by a cash flow matching of 90% for 
five years. 
4. On July 1, 2008 the decision-making process of participating organization # 
1 regarding the coverage ratio is not organized in such a way that the 
information necessary to calculate the coverage ratio is available. 
  110 
5. No contractual arrangements were made to deliver the necessary 
information.  
6. The different committees required by pension governance rules are 
established, but not fully in operation as prescribed by the objectives of the 
pension fund governance rules. 
7. No default settings are established nor are checklists used. 
 
The answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board meetings and 
interviews show whether the fund fulfilled its legal obligations for controlled and 
sound operations as well as internal agreements about preparation of meetings 
or decisions and risk management. If the board fulfilled its obligations it was 
able to respond. The answers showed that the fund is not doing what it is 
supposed to do because the information about the coverage ratio or to calculate 
it is not available. A coverage ratio based on available or distributed facts could 
not be calculated nor checked by each individual board member because the 
information was not available. Taking the AS IS information into account it must 
be concluded that the board was not able to respond because the appropriate 
information was lacking.  This was due to faulty governance, because the board 
had no insight into the actual operation of the organisation – which, of course, 
they should have had. 
 
5.1.3 Phase 2: Awareness 
 
In the second phase of the conceptual research model, the question is whether 
the board was aware that something was happening that formed an exceptional 
risk for the coverage ratio and that they were adaptive to it. Based upon the 
previous phase of the conceptual research model and the TO BE situation 
based on information found in the documents, a clear view on the actual 
situation should be available. This is not the case given the lack of the required 
information to calculate the coverage ratio. That the information is not available 
is due to the lack of clarity in the contractual arrangements made with the 
insurer and the asset manager. In this phase, three variables were researched 
to see if the actual situation was recognized as a problem. 
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5.1.3.1 Actual Situation 
 
Keeping in mind that phase 1 was completed with incomplete information the 
question remains: did the board continue the decision-making process? The 
answer is yes, although the available information was not complete. One may 
also wonder if the board developed that idea based on the actual situation or if 
there were personal views involved. The interview showed that one of the 
respondents kept its own (shadow) administration. The only variable discussed 
is who is responsible for putting the subject on the agenda of the different 





















2 2     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 4 0 0 4 100 
Table 5-10: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding actual situation. 
 
One respondent answered that the subject of the coverage ratio was placed on 
the agenda according to the standards of the Investment Advisory Committee. 
The other respondent answered that the manager of the pension fund placed 
the subject on the agenda. In the previous phase of the conceptual model it is 
established that: 
1. There is an Investment Advisory Committee. 
2. The governing rules are not entirely implemented yet. 
As mentioned, the regulations concerning decision-making did not exist yet 
according to the minutes of the board (Participating organization # 1, 2008h). In 
the AOM it is recorded that the Executive Committee shall prepare and 
implement board decisions. The Executive Committee consists of a secretary, 
an employee member, the manager and the administrator of the pension fund. 
The manager is the chairman of the Executive Committee. This is a reason to 
see the decision as ascribable to the initiative of the Executive Committee.   
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To summarize the facts of the first variable of phase 2: 
1. In the questionnaires 100% of the responses on the subject of the actual 
situation are non-identical answers. 
2. Due to the decision of the executive board, the subject coverage ratio was 
put on the agenda of the board. 
 
The fact that 100% of the answers are not identical is not that important. It is a 
relative number for only two questions. Secondly, it is possible that only one 
respondent knew the proper procedure while he was in charge, as a member of 
the executive committee. However, it is important that all board members know 





The second variable in the second phase of the research model is context. Six 
questions with a yes or no answer are raised about the illusion of control and 
time pressure. With these questions a view on biases in the decision-making 





















2 6     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 12 8 67 4 33 
Table 5-11: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding context. 
 
The questions, which were answered differently, are: 
1. Nothing can happen to us. 
2. All risks are covered or hedged. 
These answers show that there was doubt among those answering the 
questionnaire about what was happening. In short there are biases, which could 
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have an impact on the next variable, which is problem recognition. During the 
second meeting with the interviewee he said that the equity risk was not  
hedged. Therefore the answer given by him in the questionnaire was not 





















2 6     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 12 10 83 2 17 
Table 5-12: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding context. 
 
5.1.3.3 Problem Recognition 
 
Three questions with a yes or no answer were raised about the recognition of 
the problem. With these questions, a view on the impact of the biases in the 






















2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 2 33 4 67 
Table 5-13: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding problem recognition. 
 
The questions, which are answered differently, are: 
1. Was the subject coverage ratio recognized as a problem? 
2. Was the problem recognition a joint position? 
The answers show that the subject could or could not be placed on the agenda. 
During the research period the received agenda and minutes of the meetings 
show that the subject coverage ratio was an item during the board meetings. 
As an addition to the gathered information through desk research and 
questionnaires the spokesman of the board explained during the second 
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meeting on March 9, 2012, that in 2006 the contract with the financial sponsor 
had been changed. The pension fund received in amending the contract a  
“dowry” in the form of a commitment that the fund only after 5 years itself had to 
take care of the financing of the indexation. Since the nominal pension 
entitlements are assured, the topic coverage ratio never has been a topic of 
conversation during the board meetings since 2006. The revised financing 
agreement that was developed after the financial crisis in 2008 caused the 
board of the pension fund to pay more attention to the development of the 
return portfolio.  
A summary of the facts and results of the questionnaires can lead to a 
conclusion concerning the second phase of the decision-making process, in 
which three variables of the availability of information are researched. The 





















2 4 0 0 4 100 
Context 
 




2 6 2 33 4 67 




 22 12 55 10 45 
Table 5-14: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 2. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 45% of the responses on the subject of awareness are 
non- identical answers. 
2. The actual situation was not recognized as such, because the information 
about the coverage ratio was not available. 
3. Biases (nothing can happen to us) are part of this phase considering the 
recognition of the problem because one respondent answered that the 
subject coverage ratio was not recognized as a problem. 
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Even though 45% of the answers are not identical and not vital for the decision-
making process, attention should be given to this fact. It is not vital because  
looking at the agendas it is obvious that the subject was a discussion point 
during board meetings. However, attention should be given because the board 
as a whole is responsible. This means, according to pension fund governance 
principles, that board members should be open - to participants, but also to 
each other. This requires a behaviour which probably is not currently present.  
 
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interviews show whether the fund fulfilled its obligations. The 
obligations are the organization of controlled and sound operations, 
outsourcing, business processes and business risks management and the 
internal agreements about risk management and preparing meetings or 
decisions. The answer to the question if the fund fulfilled its obligations shows if 
the board was adaptive to the situation. It seems that despite the fact that the 
board lacked concrete information of the assets and the liabilities it was 
adaptive to the situation, as ascertained from minutes of the board meetings. 
Various board reports seem to imply that this was based on personal views or 
obligations as laid down in law and internal documents.  
 
5.1.4 Phase 3: Analysis 
 
The third phase of the conceptual research model revolves around the question 
how the analysis of these subjects takes place. Six questions research two 
variables of the subject. The first variable is meeting preparation. 
 
5.1.4.1 Meeting Preparation 
 
There is unanimity in the responses provided by two board members which is 
shown in the following Table 5-15: 
 






















2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 6 100 0 0 
Table 5-15: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting preparation. 
 
The answers are: 
Yes, the manager in co-operation with the chairman set the goal for the 
meeting. 
Yes, meetings have a predetermined goal. 
Yes, there are alternatives developed in preparation for the meeting. 
In terms of preparation of the meeting, every board member has the ability to be 
aware of what is going to be discussed. They also can inform properly 





There is less unanimity in the answers regarding the meeting, which is shown in 





















2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 2 33 4 67 
Table 5-16: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting. 
 
The only question, which was answered unanimously, is: are the choices 
explained? The answer is yes. 
The questions, which are answered differently, are: 
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1. Are goals set per subject? 
2. Did this happen during the research period regarding the coverage ratio? 
The reason for this can be found in the answer that the subject coverage 
ratio was not an agenda subject for the board meetings during the research 
period.  
By summarizing the facts and the questionnaires, a conclusion can be reached 
concerning the third phase of the decision-making process, which entails the 






















2 6 6 100 0 0 
Meeting 
 
2 6 2 33 4 67 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 3: Analysis 
 12 8 67 4 33 
Table 5-17: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 3. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 33% of the responses on the subject of analysis are 
non- identical answers. 
2. The setup of the meetings is carried out accordingly to the internal rules. 
 
The fact that 33 percent of the answers are non identical are not vital for the 
discussion of the subject. However, as mentioned before it should get attention 
of the board.  
 
In the Analysis phase two variables were examined: meeting preparation and 
meeting. The answers to the questions raised shows - whether the board was 
ready to respond based on confirmed information. The meetings were properly 
prepared and organized as they should be. Therefore, it was possible to 
properly discuss the subject of the coverage ratio. However, due to the biases 
involved and the lack of correct information (see the description of the previous  
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phases) it is feasible that the discussion, which took place before the decision, 
was inefficient and ineffective and the board was not ready to respond. During  
the second meeting of March 9, 2012 it became clear that the lack of concrete 
information was not regarded as desirable. This was the trigger for the board to 
work towards a more far-reaching professionalization of the process of decision-
making. In this phase of the process it can be concluded that the board have 
learned from the past. The result is the customization of the service level 
agreements with the asset manager and the insurer. In 2011 the changes 
herein relate inter alia to the content and timing of the information flow. 
 
5.1.5 Phase 4: Action 
 
In the fourth and last phase of the conceptual research model the question is 
how the action is conducted and how the entire decision-making process about 





Five questions with a yes or no answer are raised about the action called the 
decision. With these questions a view on the impact of the biases in the 
decision-making process about the coverage ratio is established. An overview 





















2 8     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 16 12 75 4 25 
Table 5-18: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision. 
 
There is uniformity in answers that the decisions are in writing. This is proven by 
the minutes of the different meetings. However, there is disagreement whether 
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the decision is up to those who report on the progress. The minutes of the 
meetings show that decisions are recorded without mentioning who is 
responsible for conducting the control of the decision. In the memo25 to the 
board (Participating organization # 1, 2010a) it is recorded that one of the 
recommendations of the Review Committee relates to the decision-making 
process of the board in the development of policy. As a follow-up to this 
recommendation of the Review Committee, the board has decided to: 
1. To record more specifically the decisions in the minutes of board meetings 
(this happens from July 1, 2010). 
2. In meeting documentation, when a decision is required to include a template 
with the following information for each decision: 
a. Decision. 
b. Reasons for the decision. 
c. Implications for employer, participants, former participants, retirees, 
Actuarial and Technical Business Report and other legal documents. 
d. Communication. 
e. Whether or not advice of the council of members is required. 
3. Setting up a decisions registry. 
 
In improving the decision registry and designing a template mentioned in 
number 2 above the issue of RISKS is missing. In the phase of the action when 
the decision is at stake the question is: Are decisions taken regarding the 
coverage ratio? The answer is YES. The mandate of the asset manager is 
discussed several times, due to the changes, which as a result of the meetings 
of the Investment Advisory Committee, were proposed to the board. However, 
nothing was changed, because the board has decided “no derogation”. The 
decision was explicitly taken not to change the strategic investment policy. 
The interview shows that the board was convinced that the re-insurance of the 
risks and hedging the interest rate risk for 90% were the two components that  
                                                
25 Translated by researcher: “ From reports is not always obvious when a decision is taken and 
what considerations have underpinned the decision. It is recommended to lay down clearly in 
reports when a decision is taken and what considerations underlie the decision. Decisions 
derogating from the Actuarial and Technical Business Report and financing agreement hereby 
ask special attention.” PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 1 (2010a) Memo to the board. 
Amsterdam.  
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gave the board the confidence not to depart from the strategic investment 
policy. The issue of coverage ratio triggered other decisions as well. Decisions 
were made about the responsibilities of the Investment Advisory Committee and 




Twelve questions with either yes or no as possible answers were raised about 
the evaluation of the entire decision-making process regarding the subject of 
the coverage ratio. The questions give a picture of the lessons learned and any 
change to which these questions have led. The results of the answers are 





















2 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 24 16 67 8 33 
Table 5-19: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 33% of the responses on the subject of evaluation are 
non-identical answers. 
2. One of these non-identical answers concerned the question whether any 
lessons were learned. 
3. When the question of whether there were lessons learned is answered 
ambiguously, it is impossible to determine whether changes since then 
emerge from the decision-making process around the coverage ratio or 
otherwise. 
 
The non-identical answers are not vital for the process of decision-making. 
By summarizing the facts and results of the questionnaires, a conclusion can be 
drawn concerning the fourth phase of the decision-making process, in which the  
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2 16 12 75 4 25 
Evaluation 
 
2 24 16 67 8 33 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 4: Action 
 40 28 70 12 30 
Table 5-20: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 4. 
 
The available information does not show who is responsible for the 
implementation or control of the decision. It seems as if personal involvement is 
the basis on which the decision-making and the implementation is based.  
On this premise the answer shows whether the board takes action or not. On 
the basis of the AS IS situation found in the organization, an opinion can be 
justified concerning the quality of the decision-making process. It is known that 
the board was not in control. There was room for improvement of the quality of 
the process. The situation of not being in control has triggered a process of 
improvement.  
 
5.1.6 Comparison of TO BE and AS IS Process of Decision-Making 
 
There are two TO BE situations. The first one has to do with the legal 
requirements and its translation in internal documents. Whether the 
organization was prepared to act during a crisis situation can be tested against 
the measures, procedures and rules that are available and accessible. The 
actual implementation indicates the importance that the fund attaches thereto. 
The implementation can also be considered as lessons learned from the past. 
The following table shows the TO BE and AS IS situation of the fundament of 
the processes.  
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Table 5-21: Overview of fundament of decision-making processes. 
 
5.1.6.1 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
Considering the phase of availability of data a clear and adequate division of 
roles and responsibilities should be organized. Appointments for receiving 
information considering assets, liabilities and developments are set out in the 
internal control rules and AOM. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. For phase 1: Availability of data the following is 
established. One should consider that the following pension fund governance 
functions are involved: careful management, accountability, internal 
supervision, expertise and openness.  
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The board receives a monthly asset 
management report. 
 
2. The board receives the valuation at 
market value of the coverage ratio and the 
actual value of the assets. 
 
3. Every three months the asset manager 
sends the board a report with a reflection 
on past developments, and a prediction of 
future developments in the investment 
markets 
 
1. Vague verbally agreements are made with 
asset manager. 
 
2. No written contractual arrangements were 
made with the insurer. 
 
 






Basis TO BE based on law and 
regulation 
AS IS  Pension fund governance 
function 
IOPS regulation & 
pension fund governance 
rules 
Mission, vision, strategy Not available Careful Management 
IOPS regulation & 




Not available Careful Management 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A clear and adequate 
organisational structure. 
An organization chart is 
available. 
Careful Management & 
Openness 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A description of 
responsibilities of the board 
(members).  
A short description of 
some responsibilities can 




Accountability & Expertise 
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TO BE process Cont’d AS IS process Cont’d 
4. The board receives a quarterly report on 






5. The Executive Committee makes and 
disseminates within the board a report 
covering relevant developments in the 
pension field and possible implications for 
the fund. 
 
6. The Investment Advisory Committee (IAC) 
discusses, once every three months with 
the advisors of the board the results of the 
investments versus that of the benchmark. 
 
 
4. With the insurer that registers the liabilities 
nothing is agreed about the information 
delivery. A board member keeps on 
personal title a shadow administration out 
of personal interest. This is not shared 
with other board members 
 






6. Considering the minutes of the IAC this is 
performed. 
 
Table 5-22: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 1. 
 
5.1.6.2 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 2: Awareness 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. After the consultation and discussion the 
IAC takes a decision whether a decision of 








2. The manager in consultation with the 
Executive Committee sets up the agenda 
of the board meeting 
1. Distribution of information is done verbally 
during the meeting of the IAC. 
 
2. In September the asset manager asked 
the IAC to adjust the investment mandate 
due to market developments. He assesses 
the situation as not required or even 
dangerous. The process is conducted as 
should be. 
 
3. The manager in consultation with the 
Executive Committee sets up the agenda 
of the board meeting. 
 
Table 5-23: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 2. 
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5.1.6.3 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 3: Analysis 
 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The agenda together with the gathered 
information is sent to the board members 
one week in advance of the meeting. 
 
 




2. In September the asset manager asked 
the IAC to adjust the investment mandate 
due to market developments. He assesses 
the situation as not required or even 
dangerous. The process is conducted as 
should be. The IAC submitted this 
statement without alternatives to the 
board. It is unknown whether this was in 
writing. 
 
Table 5-24Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 3. 
 
5.1.6.4 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 4: Action 
 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
openness, and communication. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 




1. The assessment of the investments and 
the full preparation for decision-making by 
the board considering the subject of the 
coverage ratio is in the hands of the IAC. 
 
2. The request of the asset manager to 
adjust the investment mandate was 
rejected by the board because the interest 
risk was hedged for the most part. 
However, the board did not know whether 
this was enough. 
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TO BE process Cont’d AS IS process Cont’d 
2.  3. The assessment of the investments and 
the full preparation for decision-making by 
the board considering the subject of the 
coverage ratio is in the hands of the IAC 
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5.2 Empirical Data of Participating Organization # 2 
 
The participating organization number two (# 2) has some specific 
characteristics. It differs from the first case not only in terms of design, number 
of participants, assets and liabilities, but also with regard to the sponsoring 
organization. The sponsoring organization went bankrupt on July 28, 2008. 
Therefore, participating organization # 2 was not only occupied with the 
changing financial market conditions but also with the consequences of the 
bankruptcy of its sponsor(ing company). This has influenced the decision-
making process about the coverage ratio during the research period. One of the 
consequences of bankruptcy of the sponsoring party is that the traditional 
instrument of the premium (increase) can no longer be used as an instrument to 
absorb the risks of the fund. It is therefore important to determine whether there 
was a decrease of coverage ratio, which required action, and if so, which action 
was taken. Being in control is therefore a major topic for the participating 
organization. Control in this situation means: Are we prudentially taking care of 
the money to pay the pension entitlements? A brief outline of the participating 
organization is included in the following section.  
 
5.2.1 Outline of Participating Organization # 2 
 
The following outline is based on four documents (Participating organization # 
2, 2007, 2008d, 2008h, 2009b). 
 
Facts company pension fund # 2 Year 2008 Year 2009 
(former) participants   
Participants 338 201 
Former participants 181 287 
Beneficiaries 4 12 
TOTAL 523 500 
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Facts company pension fund # 2 cont’d Year 2008 Year 2009 
Coverage ratio   
Valuation at market value of liabilities € 60,526,000 € 57,442,000 
Assets 26 € 60,419,000 € 62,347,000  
Coverage ratio according to annual report 27 101.7% 107.7%  
Board   
General management board 5 members 4 members 
Representation of employer 3 members 2 members 
Representation of employees 2 members 2 members 
Representation of beneficiaries 0 members 0 members 
Organization   
Executive Committee Yes Yes 
Manager/director 0 0 
Investment Advisory Committee No No 
Supervisory board No No 
Accountability body Yes Yes 
Complaints Committee No No 
Review Committee Yes Yes 
Members’ council  No No 
Facts company pension fund # 2 cont’d Year 2008 Year 2009 
External service providers   
Accountant Yes Yes 
Actuary Yes Yes 
Asset manager Yes Yes 
Administration Yes Yes 
Government body Yes Yes 
Re-insurance (only disability claims type B 2 see 
section 1.3.1) 
Yes Yes 
Table 5-26: Outline of participating organization # 2. 
 
Looking at the participating organization # 2 and Table 5-26, it must be 
concluded that not all of the bodies required by pension fund governance were 
                                                
26 The strategic investment portfolio consisted of a matching and a return portfolio. The matching 
portfolio was designed to hedge the interest rate risk for 65% by using fixed income securities. The return 
portfolio was 35% of the assets and consisted of shares and funds. 
 
27 The calculation of the coverage ratio shows a different percentage than listed in the table and the 
annual report. Using the figures from the table the coverage ratio for 2008 is 99.82% and for 2009 
108.53%. The reason for this lies in the interpretation of the rule for the drafting of the annual report. In 
2008 and 2009 an endowment for implementation costs for future years is included. 
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implemented.  The Members’ council agreed to stop, due to the bankruptcy of 
the sponsoring organization (Participating organization # 2, 2008e). The 
Supervisory board and the Complaints Committee were not installed. The 
Members’ council is in agreement with the participants, after the bankruptcy of 
the sponsoring organization, eliminated in December 2008 (Participating 
organization # 2, 2008f, 2010d). In terms of pension fund governance a pension 
fund board can decide to install a permanent Supervisory board or an 
Accountability body. The participating organization had chosen to install an 
Accountability body.  To gain better insight into, and to conduct data 
triangulation about, the decision-making process concerning coverage ratios in 
the studied organization the following documents were used during the desk 
research phase: 
• Organization chart (Participating organization # 2, 2008h). 
• Two annual reports 2008 and 2009 (Participating organization # 2, 2008d, 
2009b). 
• Actuarial and Operating Memorandum (Participating organization # 2, 2007). 
• Four agendas of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 
2, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2009a). 
• Four minutes of pension fund board meetings(Participating organization # 2, 
2008e, 2008f, 2008g, 2009e). 
• Two coverage ratio monitors made up by the consultant (Participating 
organization # 2, 2009c, 2010a).  
• Minutes of the consultation between the pension fund board and 
Accountability body (Participating organization # 2, 2009d). 
• Report of the Review Committee (Participating organization # 2, 2010d). 
• Memo about the liquidation of the participating organization (Participating 
organization # 2, 2010b). 
Besides the aforementioned documents three members of the board completed 
a questionnaire (Participating organization # 2, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Due to 
the bankruptcy of the sponsoring company de facto three board members 
remained, although the annual reports for 2008 and 2009 mention four 
members. Documents containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy and the 
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decision-making process(es) were missing. To check and verify the findings one 
interview was conducted (Participating organization # 2, 2012). This took place 
on March 8, 2012. Although the interviewee did not reject the use of a digital 
voice recorder no recordings were made due to a technical fault of the voice 
recorder. The microphone was broken. To overcome the damage, abbreviated 
minutes (Participating organization # 2, 2012) were then drawn up and 
forwarded to the interviewee for authentication. He agreed with the content of 
the abbreviated minutes. 
The following sections will provide more in-depth information about the AS IS 
situation. 
 
5.2.2 Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
In this phase it was researched whether the data necessary for the decision-
making process about the coverage ratio was available. Minutes of the board 
meeting (Participating organization # 2, 2008g) prior to the research period 
were made available by the participating organization. In these minutes one can 
read that five financial issues were discussed. 
1. The minutes indicated that in the annual report of 2007 a difference of 
approximately two million euros should be explained before finalizing the 
year report. The external consultant offered apologies. However no specific 
decisions were reported in the minutes on action(s) to be performed to 
prevent recurrence. 
2. Another interesting issue is the sub prime crisis, which caused the 
uncertainty on the financial markets to increase. The impact on the asset 
portfolio, however, was not so huge that it should be explained in the 
financial statement.  
3. The certifying actuary stressed the importance of an alignment between the 
risks hedging in the investment and the actual insurance liabilities with 
associated duration. He argues that this topic played a role at numerous 
pension funds this year (2008).  
4. One of the board members pointed out that in the report to the supervisor on 
the Q1 2008 a higher coverage ratio was calculated and reported than the  
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coverage ratio that followed from the figures of the external consultant. One 
of the participants of the meeting answered that the figures of the external 
consultant contained a mistake. 
5. It was discussed that an adjustment of the investment policy should be 
considered. It was decided that 10 percent of the return portfolio should be 
invested in emerging markets. 
 
Taking the previous minutes into account in which 2 million euros worth of 
errors, the sub prime crisis, the duration, a mistake in the report to the 
supervisor and the consideration to change the strategic investment policy are 
pointers for the board that something was happening and they were not 
informed before the meeting and therefore not in control. A pension fund, which 
has transferred only a part of the pension entitlement to an insurer, should 
prudentially take care of the money. Control in this situation means: are we 
taking care of the money to pay the pension entitlements or promised 
indexation in a prudent manner? To execute this the board should have all the 
required information available so it can decide whether they take care of the 
money prudently. Taking the previous minutes into account, the board should 
have been informed about these issues earlier. In the AOM (Participating 
organization # 2, 2007) it is recorded that the service provider will comply with 
the policy rule regarding outsourcing (Pensioen-& Verzekeringskamer, 2004, 
Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006c)  It can be established 
at this stage already, that 
1. Agreed rules and regulations to be informed are established. 
2. No information is exchanged between service provider and board prior to the 
board meeting. 
3. Apologies during the meeting (Participating organization # 2, 2008g) are 
enough for the board to continue with the service providers without giving a 
signal or sanction. 
 
Based on this knowledge, the topic of focus is: did the board take action to 
prevent recurrence? If they did, it should be recorded in the minutes of the 
meeting and visible in the gathered data concerning the first research phase.  
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The next sections will provide insight into the fact-findings of this stage of the 
conceptual model.  
 
5.2.2.1 Information about Coverage Ratio 
 
As mentioned before, three questionnaires were returned. One of them did not 
provide the answers to the questions about figures of the coverage ratio. It was 
added that this information was known, but the respondent would need to 
search for it, which he was not willing to do. In documentation (Participating 
organization # 2, 2007) one can find the TO BE situation about the process and 
information exchange, which is: 
1. The board determines the investment policy. It is assumed to be a strategic 
asset mix of 65% fixed income and 35% business values. 
2. Administrative reports are periodically provided to the board.  
3. The service provider delivers a quarterly investment report that meets the 
requirements of the supervisor. 
4. The developments resulting from b. and c. will be presented together with 
periodic coverage ratio reports. 
The described TO BE situation corresponds with the TO BE situation of the 
conceptual research model. The AS IS situation is determined by the 
questionnaires and the interview. Starting with the information about the assets 
the following is established (see Table 5-27): 
 
Location Assets 
July 1, 2008 
Assets 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Assets 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Assets 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
€ 58,678,000 € 57,487,000 € 60,094,000 € 56,788,000 
Respondent 2 
 
€ 55,359,000 € 56,749,000 € 61,235,000 € 57,768,000 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported € 61,676,000  
Annual report 2009 
 
  Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-27: Fact-finding about assets. 
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The annual report includes only the amount of assets at December 31st of any 
year. As an addition to the provided answers about the value of the assets, one  
of the respondents replied that the asset manager prescribed the amounts 
mentioned above. The amounts listed on the report to the supervisor are 
different. The respondent recorded the differences in an excel sheet 
(Participating organization # 2, 2009f). It is unknown what the real figures are. 
This was also earlier the case according to the minutes of the board meeting of 
June 7, 2008. The administration of the liabilities administration was outsourced 
to a service provider. For the calculation of the coverage ratio it is necessary to 
know the value of the liabilities. The questionnaires and the year report of 2008 
show the following information about the liabilities (see Table 5-28):  
 
Location Liabilities 
July 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Liabilities 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
€ 46,220,000 € 49,620,000 € 59,330,000 € 58,850,000 
Respondent 2 
 
€ 45,681,000 € 49,348,000 € 59,330,000 € 59,970,000 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported € 60,526,000  
Annual report 2009 
 
  Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-28: Fact-finding about liabilities. 
 
The annual report includes only the amount of liabilities at December 31st of any 
year. Looking at the coverage ratio it is no longer surprising that, once again, 
the respondents provide different information, as is shown in the following Table 
5-29: 
 
Location Coverage ratio 
July 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Coverage 
ratio 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
127% 116% 101.3% 96.5% 
Respondent 2 
 
121.2% 113.9% 101.5% 96.3% 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported 101.7%  
Annual report 2009    Not reported 
Table 5-29: Fact-finding about coverage ratio. 
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The annual report includes only the coverage ratio at December 31st of any 




















Assets 2 5     
Total nr. of questions  10 0 0 10 100 
       
Liabilities 2 5     
Total nr. of questions  10 4 40 6 60 
       
Coverage ratio 2 4     
Total nr. of questions  8 0 0 8 100 
       
Other 3 8     
Total nr. of questions  24 17 71 7 29 
       
TOTAL  52 21 40 31 60 
Table 5-30: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding coverage ratio. 
 
To summarize the answers of the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of 
the variable of the coverage ratio, the following can be stated: 
The participating organization # 2 has chosen to divide the strategic investment 
portfolio in two parts: one to cover the interest risk, which is the matching 
portfolio, and one called the return portfolio which includes only shares and 
funds. The matching portfolio was designed to hedge the interest rate risk for 
65%. The matching risk is the difference between the duration of pension 
liabilities and the duration of assets. The board chose for government bonds28. 
The return portfolio covering 35% of the liabilities was set up to make profit with 
the rest of the assets. This can be achieved if investment markets pick up again 
and show that there are higher yields, which can be achieved. The results of 
this assets portfolio can then contribute to the required cash flow matching of 
100% and with a possible surplus to the objective of the pension fund, to 
provide an indexation grant for the increased cost of living. This objective is in  
                                                
28 Translated by researcher: “However, the interest, which the supervisor is required to 
calculate for the pension obligation is based on the SWAP yield curve and this is during the 
research period below that of government bonds. As a result the liabilities increased more than 
the value of the matching portfolio. The consequence is that the coverage ratio decreased.” 
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 2 (2009d) Minutes of consultation between the pension 
fund board and accountability body. Arnhem. 
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fact aimed at preserving purchasing power. Due to a decrease of stock value 
and interest rate the coverage ratio decreased which, taking into consideration  
the minutes of the board meeting of June 7, 2008, should be known.  
The sponsoring organization went bankrupt on July 28, 2008. This event has 
consequences of a different nature for the pension fund. In the board meeting of 
September 16, 2008 (Participating organization # 2, 2008f) several options of 
how to continue were discussed. The considerations for the fund itself: 
1. The fund can decide to move directly to an insured scheme. 
2. Join the industry-wide pension scheme. 
3. Continue as independent pension fund. 
 
Another consequence mentioned before is that the traditional instrument of the 
premium (increase) can no longer be used as an instrument to absorb the risks 
of the fund. Then there are legal issues, such as who is considered to be a 
participant. At that time there was a vacancy for the position of compliance 
officer. The board decided to ask a member of the accountability body to fulfil 
this task. Finally a discussion took place about when it is reasonable to declare 
bankruptcy in response to the level of risk the investment policy. It is assumed 
that the investment horizon has become significantly shorter. How much 
shorter, however, is not clear yet. The board decided not to execute the 
decision in the previous board meeting to invest 10% of the return portfolio in 
emerging markets. The board also decided not to change the strategic 
investment policy. One can read in the minutes of the board meeting of 
December 9, 2008 (Participating organization # 2, 2008e) that no major 
decisions will be taken and the investment policy will be maintained temporarily. 
The investment policy for 2009 will be discussed at the beginning of 2009. 
To summarize the facts of the first variable of phase 1 - information about the 
coverage ratio - the following is established: 
1. During the board meeting before the start of the research period, five 
financial issues were discussed, i.e. errors in the reports and financial 
dangers. However, it is not recorded in the minutes that measures were 
taken to prevent mistakes in the future.  
2. In the questionnaires 60% of the responses on the information about 
coverage ratio are non-identical, although in the AOM and internal control  
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rules the TO BE situation is described. It is described what the board would 
receive in terms of information reports, so there would be no difference  
within the board about the investments, the liabilities, and the coverage ratio. 
The interview showed that the reports are received in a different frequency. 
The service provider did not provide the reports in a frequency as described 
in the AOM. 
3. The board had chosen for hedging the interest risk by a matching portfolio to 
a size of 65%. 
4. The set-up of the matching portfolio did not cover the interest risk as 
required. 
An explanation was given during the interview29 on how the questionnaires can 
show an actual coverage ratio, which is different from the reported one.  
The fact that 60% of the given answers are non-identical is a worrying fact. The 
board members should have the same information available. By means of data 
triangulation the correct numbers are checked in the year reports. Without 
correct information no decisions could have been taken at all. Yet, the process 
of decision-making went on.  
 
5.2.2.2 Pension Fund Governance Principles 
 
The second variable in the first phase of the research model is pension fund 
governance. The question, which should be answered, is whether the fund has 
implemented the required proper governance measures, and if so, if the 
participating organization # 2 has complied to the rules of pension fund 
governance.  Based on the Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act, 
the following committees should have been installed: Accountability body or 
Supervisory board, Review Committee, Complaints Committee and Members’ 
council.   Hereafter, the facts concerning the participation of different 
                                                
29 Translated by researcher: “One of the board members set up an administration for his own  
purpose. He used data from that Excel sheet. The board sometimes received the reports with  
financial information as agreed in the AOM, but that was always afterwards and never timely.”  
PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 2 (2012) Abbreviated minutes of meeting with the 
chairman of the board. Duiven.  
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committees in the decision-making process about the coverage ratio are 
discussed. The minutes of the various (board) meetings show that: There were 
only two meetings (Participating organization # 2, 2009d, 2010c) with the 
Accountability body. Both dates are beyond the research period. The 
Accountability body was only informed about the situation during the meetings.  
1. There is only one report from the Review Committee (Participating 
organization # 2, 2010d).  
An overview of the results of the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of 






















3 14     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 42 35 83 7 17 
Table 5-31: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding pension fund governance. 
 
To summarize, the facts of the second variable of phase 1, which is pension 
fund governance, are as follows: 
1. In the questionnaires, 17% of the responses on the information about 
pension fund governance are non-identical answers.  
2. Not all the different bodies required by the governmental rules concerning 
pension funds were established. 
3. The rules have not been put into operation in the desired size yet, so that 
the goals of pension fund governance have not been reached. 
 
Fact # 2 shows that there is a difference between the legally required TO BE 
situation and the pension fund specific implementation. 
 
5.2.2.3 Default Settings 
 
Neither default settings, nor references to them were found in the various 
examined documents. In the questionnaires, questions about different default  
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settings were raised as to whether default settings exist in practice. During the 
interview it was mentioned that internal rules of procedure described the  
frequency of meetings and the different quorum. The questionnaires showed 
that no checklists are used. An overview of the results of the questionnaires 





















3 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 36 32 89 4 11 
Table 5-32: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding default settings. 
 
A summary of the facts of the 3rd variable of phase 1: 
1. In the questionnaires, 11% of the responses on the subject default settings 
are non-identical answers. 
2. No checklists are used regarding the decision-making process. 
An overview of the gathered responses considering phase 1 of the conceptual 





















3 52 21 40 31 60 
Pension fund 
governance rules 
3 42 35 83 7 17 
Default settings 
 
3 36 32 89 4 11 





 130 88 67 42 32 
Table 5-33: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 1. 
 
Summarizing the facts and the results of the questionnaires forms the basis for 
the conclusion for the first phase of the decision-making process, in which three 
variables of the availability of data are researched. The facts are: 
  138 
During the board meeting before the start of the research period, five financial 
issues were discussed.  Summarized, the issues had to do with errors in the 
reports and financial dangers. However, it is not recorded in the minutes that 
measures were taken to prevent mistakes in the future.  
1. It is established on the basis of the minutes of the board meeting 
(Participating organization # 2, 2008g) that the board was not in control on 
the June 17, 2008. 
2. In the questionnaires 32% of the responses on the subject of availability of 
data are non-identical answers. 
3. Interest rate immunization should be established by a minimum cash flow 
matching of 65%. However due to the duration this was not the case as 
mentioned by the accountant during the meeting of the June 17, 2008. 
4. On July 1, 2008 the decision-making process of participating organization # 
2 regarding the coverage ratio is organized on paper in such a way 
(Participating organization # 2, 2007) that the data necessary to calculate 
the coverage ratio could be available. However, due to the vague 
formulation of times when it will be available it is uncertain whether it is 
available when required. 
5. At first the information necessary to calculate the coverage ratio was not 
available, and when it became available, it was not accurate.  
6. Two bodies required by pension governance rules are established. 
7. The rest of the mandatory committees and methods as prescribed by the 
objectives of the pension fund governance rules are not implemented. 
8. No default settings are established nor are checklists used. 
 
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interview show whether the fund fulfilled its legal obligations for 
controlled and sound operations and to the internal agreements about preparing 
meetings or decisions and risk management. If the board fulfilled its obligations 
it was able to respond.  
The answers showed that the fund is not doing what it is supposed to do 
because the information about the coverage ratio or to calculate it is not 
available. A coverage ratio based on available or distributed facts could not be 
calculated nor checked by each individual board member because the  
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information was not available. The information for continuing the decision-
making process about the coverage ratio should be available but in practice it  
was not, and if available not correct. Taken the AS IS information into account it 
must be concluded that the board was not able to respond because the 
appropriate information was lacking. This was due to faulty governance, 
because the board had no insight into the actual operation of the organisation – 
which, of course, they should have had. 
 
5.2.3 Phase 2: Awareness 
 
In the second phase of the conceptual research model, the question is whether 
the board was aware that something was happening that formed an exceptional 
risk for the coverage ratio and that they were adaptive to it. Based upon the 
previous phase of the conceptual research model and the TO BE situation 
based on information found in the documents as described in section 5.2.1, a 
clear view on the actual situation should be available. This is not the case given 
the lack of the required information to calculate the coverage ratio. However, in 
practice it is not. That the data is not available is caused by a wait-and-see 
attitude of the service providers. No document examined showed that the board 
appealed to the service providers thereto.  
In this phase, three variables were researched to see if the actual situation was 
recognized as a problem. 
 
5.2.3.1 Actual Situation 
 
Keeping in mind that phase 1 was completed with untimely and inaccurate 
information, the question remains if the board continued with the decision-
making process although they were not in control. This was the case, although 
the available information was not correct. One may also wonder whether the 
board developed the idea that a decision was necessary based on the actual 
situation or whether there were personal views involved, and whose interests 
were served by this decision. The following Table 5-34 shows the answers 
given in the questionnaires. 





















3 2     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 2 33 4 67 
Table 5-34: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding in the actual situation. 
 
Two respondents answered that the subject of the coverage ratio was placed 
on the agenda by the board. The other board member answered that the 
chairman of the board placed the subject on the agenda. The internal control 
rules on this subject are inconclusive. 
The other question was whether this was a consensual decision or an individual 
initiative. One respondent answered that it was a combination of both, the other 
respondent answered that it was the responsibility of the board and the third 
respondent answered that it was done with the support of all. These differing 
answers demonstrate that not all board members were aware of who was 
responsible for this decision, and so they did not take conscious responsibility. 
To summarize the facts of the first variable of phase 2: 
1. In the questionnaires 67% of the responses on the subject actual situation 
are non-identical answers. 
2. It is unknown who put the subject coverage ratio on the agenda of the board. 
 
Both facts are worrying, but not vital for the process. More openness could 




The second variable in the second phase of the research model is context.  
 





















3 6     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 18 18 100 0 0 
Table 5-35: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding context. 
 
Table 5-35 shows that all the answers are identical. This means that on the 
basis of the given answers no biases can be demonstrated. At least nobody 
admitted in writing that there was a bias involved.  
 
5.2.3.3 Problem Recognition 
 






















3 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 9 9 100 0 0 
Table 5-36: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding problem recognition. 
 
In two situations the subject of the coverage ratio was discussed according to 
the agenda (Participating organization # 2, 2008a, 2009a). This complies with 
the given answers in the questionnaires. However, it is unknown who is 
responsible for putting the subject on the agenda. A summary of the facts and 
results of the questionnaires can lead to a conclusion concerning the second 
phase of the decision-making process, in which three variables of the 
awareness phase were researched.  
 





















3 6 2 33 4 67 
Context 
 




3 9 9 100 0 0 




 33 29 87 4 12 
Table 5-37: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 2. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 12% of the responses on the subject of awareness are 
non- identical answers.  
2. All the board members did not know the exact and agreed process of the 
agenda setting.  
3. The actual situation was recognized as such, but was not based on accurate 
information about the coverage ratio considering the numbers of the assets 
and liabilities. 
4. The subject of the coverage ratio was on the agenda twice during the 
studied period. 
5. It is not known who is responsible for putting the subject on the agenda. 
6. The researched biases are not a part of the recognition of the problem. 
 
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interviews show whether the fund fulfilled its obligations. The 
obligations are the organization of controlled and sound operations, 
outsourcing, business processes and business risks management and the 
internal agreements about risk management and preparing meetings or 
decisions. The answer to the question if the fund fulfilled its obligations shows if 
the board was adaptive to the situation. Based on these facts, the following 
conclusion can be drawn: the data for continuing the decision-making process 
about the coverage ratio was not influenced due to personal biases, or incorrect 
information. However, the decision-making process was continued although no 
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correct data was available. This means that, despite the fact that the board 
lacked the concrete data of the assets and the liabilities it was adaptive to the 
situation, as ascertained from minutes of the board meetings. 
 
5.2.4 Phase 3: Analysis 
 
The third phase of the conceptual research model revolves around the question 
how the analysis of these subjects takes place. Six questions research two 
variables of the subject. The first variable is meeting preparation. 
 
5.2.4.1 Meeting Preparation 
 
There is unanimity in the responses provided by two board members, which is 






















3 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 9 7 78 2 22 
Table 5-38: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting preparation. 
 
There was no fixed agenda or agenda items, but if a subject was placed on the 
agenda it was prepared in writing. This corresponds with the given answers in 
the questionnaires. This written preparation should also count for the subject of 
the coverage ratio. However, the coverage ratio came under the heading 
‘notices’. Usually, ‘notices’ are not prepared in advance, but are given during 
the meeting 
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5.2.4.2 Meeting  
 
There is almost unanimity in the answers regarding the meeting, which is shown 





















3 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 9 8 89 1 11 
Table 5-39: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting. 
 
The only question, which was not unanimously answered, is: ‘Are goals being 
set per subject during meetings?’ The answers were yes, yes and sometimes. 
The following Table 5-40 provides an overview of all the given answers for this 






















3 9 7 78 2 22 
Meeting 
 
 9 8 89 1 11 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 3: Analysis 
 18 15 83 3 17 
Table 5-40: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 3. 
 
By summarizing the facts and the questionnaires, a conclusion can be reached 
concerning the third phase of the decision-making process, which entails the 
analysis of the research of the two variables. 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 17% of the responses on the subject of analysis are 
non- identical answers. 
2. The setup of the meetings is not carried out as required and agreed in the 
internal control rules (Participating organization # 2, 2006).
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Not all the subjects are prepared, analysed and distributed before the 
meeting. This certainly counts for the subject coverage ratio. 
The answer to the raised questions provides the answer whether the board was 
ready to respond based on confirmed information. The board continued the 
decision-making process, even though they knew that the information was not 
correct, new information was available, and severe mistakes in different reports 
were discussed. During the interview (Participating organization # 2, 2012), the 
chairman told that due to the liquidation of the sponsoring organization the 
board was not only focussed on the subject of the coverage ratio, but on 
existing as a pension fund as well. Caused by the changing financial situation, 
having reliable and correct financial information is crucial. No document shows 
that the board has taken steps to have that information available. The chairman 
stated that the board relied on the expertise of the service providers and 
external consultants. 
The conclusion for this phase of the conceptual research model is the following: 
the meetings were not prepared and organized, as they were supposed to be.  
Yet, two agendas carried the subject of the coverage ratio and the subject was 
discussed. Due to the lack of correct information (see the description of the 
previous phases) it is feasible that the discussion, which took place before the 
decision, was inefficient and ineffective. Therefore the board was willing but not 
ready to respond.  
 
5.2.5 Phase 4: Action 
 
In the fourth and final phase of the conceptual research model the question is 
how the action is conducted and how the entire decision-making process about 
the coverage ratio is evaluated. Two variables answer this question. The first 
variable is decision. 
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5.2.5.1 Decision  
 
Five questions with a yes or no answer were raised about the action labelled 
‘decision’. 
With these questions, a view on the control over the activities in the decision-
making process about the coverage ratio is established. The other three 
questions are open. They speculate about the motivation of this process. The 





















3 8     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 24 21 88 3 12 
Table 5-41: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision 
 
There is uniformity in answers that the decisions were written down. This is 
proven by the minutes of the different meetings. However, there is 
disagreement whether the decisions and correct information were  
communicated30 to the beneficiaries. It seems as if beneficiaries are informed. It 
is also known and discussed during the previously mentioned meeting that, 
again, the information is at least doubtful and needs to be thoroughly 
investigated. In the previously mentioned minutes of the meeting one can find a 
part of a transcript of a discussion, which took place about a presentation of the 
asset manager. Again one of the slides of the asset manager shows a different 
coverage. It differs from the official report to the supervisor, the coverage 
monitor conducted by the other external advisor, and the information put in the 
newsletter to the beneficiaries. In that same meeting a discussion took place  
                                                
30 Translated by researcher: “The stated coverage in the newsletter to the participants (101%) is  
based on the coverage monitor of the external advisor at the end of December, 2008. The  
coverage ratio percentage in the supervisory-quarterly reporting is different.” PARTICIPATING 
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about the strategic asset management. Obviously the current matching portfolio 
is 80% instead of 65%, which is the standard. The change took place as a 
result of a decision of the asset manager to tactically underweight the present 
strategic standard of 65-35%. The board decided that the current strategic 
standard for asset mix should be maintained as 65% matching portfolio and 
35% return portfolio. It should be a tactical underweight position in accordance 
with the actual 80/20-distribution to be maintained. In the phase of the action 
when the decision is at stake, the question is: Are decisions taken regarding the 
coverage ratio? The answer to the question is affirmative. The mandate of the 
asset manager as well as the different asset portfolio’s are discussed several 
times. However, facts reported in the minutes are: 
1. No correct information is available. 
2. Beneficiaries are informed with incorrect information about the coverage 
ratio. 
3. The supervisor was informed with incorrect information about the coverage 
ratio. 
4. The asset manager changed the asset portfolios in such a way that there 
was a more matching asset portfolio for hedging the interest risk so it would 
decrease the interest risk.  
5. The asset manager retrospectively asked permission to change the  
portfolios. 
6. Decisions were made which had an impact on the coverage ratio in the 




Twelve questions with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as possible answers were raised about 
the evaluation of the entire decision-making process regarding the subject of 
the coverage ratio. The questions give a picture of the lessons learnt and any 
change to which these questions have led.  The results of the given answers 
are shown in Table 5-42. 
 





















3 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 36 30 83 6 17 
Table 5-42: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 17% of the responses on the subject of evaluation are 
non- identical answers. 
2. One of these non-identical answers concerned the question whether any 
lessons were learned. One of the answers was: UNKNOWN. 
3. When the question of whether there were lessons learned is answered 
ambiguously, it is impossible to determine whether changes since then 
emerge from the decision-making process around the coverage ratio or 
otherwise. 
By summarizing the facts and results of the questionnaires, a conclusion can be 
drawn concerning the fourth phase of the decision-making process, in which the 





















3 24 21 88 3 12 
Evaluation 
 
3 36 30 83 6 17 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 4: Action 
 60 51 85 9 15 
Table 5-43: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 4. 
 
The available information does not show who is responsible for the 
implementation or control of the decision. It seems as if personal involvement is 
the basis on which the decision-making and the implementation is based.  
Whether the board takes informed action or not is tested in Phase 4 of the  
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conceptual research model. The board acted without verifying the facts or  
written documentation in which alternatives could have been discussed and 
ignored agreed procedures.   
Based on these facts, the following conclusion can be drawn: the information for 
deciding about the coverage ratio was not correct, nor verified. Even an action 
conducted by the asset manager without prior knowledge was not discussed. 
Due to the fact that eventually it turned out to be the best, the asset manager 
was not asked for his motivation. During the interview (Participating 
organization # 2, 2012), the chairman provided the following statements: 
1. Better decision-making had to be logged. Displays mean, that decisions 
taken in the informal circuit should be documented and established. 
2. The decisions taken informally would need to be confirmed by the board. 
3. The practical setting of board members detracts from the importance of 
transparency and accountability that is pursued by the pension fund 
governance rules and regulations. 
 
5.2.6 Comparison of TO BE and AS IS Process of Decision-Making 
 
The following table shows the TO BE and AS IS situation of the fundament of 
the processes. 
 
Table 5-44: Overview of fundament of decision-making processes. 
 
Basis TO BE based on law and 
regulation 
AS IS  Pension fund governance 
function 
IOPS regulation & 
pension fund governance 
rules 
Mission, vision, strategy Not available Careful Management 
IOPS regulation & 




Not available Careful Management 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A clear and adequate 
organisational structure. 
An organization chart is 
available. 
Careful Management & 
Openness 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A description of 
responsibilities of the board 
(members).  
A short description of 
some responsibilities can 




Accountability & Expertise 
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5.2.6.1 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
Considering the phase of availability of data a clear and adequate division of 
roles and responsibilities should be organized. Appointments for receiving 
information considering assets, liabilities and developments are set out in the 
internal control rules and AOM. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. For phase 1: Availability of data the following is 
established. One should consider that the following pension fund governance 
functions are involved: Careful management, accountability, internal 
supervision, expertise and openness.  
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. “Section 4.1 AOM. Administrative reports. 
The service provider provides the board 
periodically called administrative reporting, 
in which significant developments are 
reported. On the basis of the 
administrative reports, the service provider 
is also able to say all those things that the 
board enables the board to act to parties 
involved. 
 
2. Section 4.2. AOM (Quarterly) investment 
reports.  
The service provider provides a quarterly 
investment report that meets the 
requirements of the regulator investment 
reports and quarterly investments reports. 
 
3. Section 4.3. AOM Coverage ratio reports. 
Developments such as those listed in the 
above sections 4.1en 4.2 are presented 
together in periodic coverage ratio reports 
that meet the FTK as defined in the 
Pension Act. The coverage ratio reports 
provide the board with a handle for taking 
future (policy) decisions and conducting 
continuity analysis. 
 
1.Information about liabilities was not available 
and timely as vaguely described in AOM. 








2.No information about the assets was 
exchanged. The numbers exchanged with 
the supervisor were verbally gathered and 




3.A graphical chart with the coverage ratio 
information was provided. The information 
was not correct. Before the board meeting 
informal contact between two out of three 
board members was established to 
exchange information about the coverage 
ratio. This information was based on a 
personal administration of one of the board 
members 
 
Table 5-45: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 1. 
 
5.2.6.2 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 2: Awareness 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise  
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and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted.  
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The manager in consultation with the 
external service provider (government 
body) sets up the agenda of the board 
meeting. 
1. The chairman found it necessary to put 
the subject coverage ratio on the agenda.  
 
2. Minutes of board meeting indicated that in 
the annual report of 2007 a difference of 
approximately two million euros should be 
explained before finalizing the year report. 
Board did not take action.  
 
3. Incorrect information about coverage ratio 
was communicated with participants. 
Board did not take action. 
 
4. Incorrect information about coverage ratio 
was communicated with supervisor. Board 
did not take action. 
 
Table 5-46: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 2. 
 
5.2.6.3 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 3: Analysis 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The agenda together with the gathered 
information is sent to the board members 
in advance of the meeting. 
 
1. The process is not conducted as should 
be. 
 
2. The chart of the external service provider 
was exchanged to the board members 




Table 5-47Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 3. 
 
5.2.6.4 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 4: Action 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
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openness, and communication. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The board decides. 
 
 
1. The asset manager verbally informed the 
board he changed the asset mix. This is in 
conflict with the AOM and the contract. 
 
2. The asset manager changed the hedging 
of the interest risk without an decision of 
the board. 
 
3. The board agreed afterwards (4 months 
after the change took place) with the 
decisions of the asset manager. 
  
Table 5-48: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 4. 
 
During the interview (Participating organization # 2, 2012) the chairman gave 
his personal view on the established facts.  
The pension fund was established in 2006, after the mother organization had 
sold the business part. This sale led to the legal obligation for the pension fund 
to dispose of the pension entitlements of participants involved. The sold 
company took the decision to set up a new company pension fund. The sold 
business became the new financial sponsor. The workforce of the sponsor 
organization consisted of two branches of which one was the headquarters and 
the other the factory. This led to problems. To staff the board and the various  
committees was virtually impossible. As a consequence the advisors and 
service providers had the upper hand in delivering knowledge. That is an 
understandable but undesirable situation afterwards. It is feasible that by this 
dependence matters may not go well. This dependency and lack of financial 
instruments makes the board convinced that survival as an independent 
pension fund after the liquidation of the financial sponsor was not attainable.  
Ultimately the board decided to liquidate the pension fund in 2010 and 
transferred the obligations to an insurer. The closed deal is well received by all 
participants noted. As one of the few former pension funds have noted, 
participants about 2.73% index retrieved from last year. This is 78% of the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices excluding tobacco (HICP excl T). In 
short, all’s well that ends well.  
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5.3 Empirical Data of Participating Organization # 3 
 
The participating organization number three (# 3) has some specific 
characteristics. It differs from the other cases in terms of design, number of 
participants, assets and liabilities. A brief outline of the participating 
organization is included in the following section.  
 
5.3.1 Outline of Participating Organization # 3 
 
The following outline is based on four documents (Participating organization # 
3, 2008e, 2009b, 2010a, 2010d). 
 
Facts company pension fund # 3 Year 2008 Year 2009 
(former) participants   
Participants 953 936 
Former participants 573 570 
Beneficiaries 1,457 1,454 
TOTAL 2,983 2,960 
Coverage ratio   
Valuation at market value of liabilities € 345,836,000 € 365,838,000 
Assets 31 € 441,174,000 € 476,015,000 
Coverage ratio according to annual report 32 127.6% 130.1% 
Board   
General management board 8 members 8 members 
Representation of employer 4 members 4 members 
Representation of employees 3 members 3 members 
Representation of beneficiaries 1 member 1 member 
 
 
                                                
31 The strategic investment portfolio consisted of a matching and a return portfolio. During the year 2008 
the interest rate for the entire coverage ratio was fully hedged. Firstly in May 2009 the level of interest 
rate hedging was lowered to 110 percent of the coverage ratio. Secondly per September 2009 the hedging 
was lowered to 100 percent of the coverage ratio.  
 
32 The coverage ratio is calculated and presented as legally defined. 
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Facts company pension fund # 3 cont’d Year 2008 Year 2009 
Organization   
Executive Committee Yes Yes 
Manager/director 0 0 
Investment Advisory Committee Yes Yes 
Supervisory board No No 
Accountability body Yes Yes 
Complaints Committee No No 
Review Committee Yes Yes 
Members’ council  Yes Yes 
External service providers   
Accountant Yes Yes 
Actuary Yes Yes 
Fiduciary manager (asset manager) Yes Yes 
Administration Yes Yes 
Government body Yes Yes 
Re-insurance (type A see section 1.3.1) No No 
Table 5-49: Outline of participating organization # 3. 
 
Looking at the participating organization # 3 and Table 5-49, one can see that 
only one governance body was installed. However, this should be nuanced. In 
article 28 of the Statute, a system for complaints and disputes is regulated. The 
board of the pension fund designated the government body to deal with any 
complaints or disputes in the first instance. If the parties do not come to an 
agreement on the solution of the complaint or the dispute, the board will take 
over. In short, there is a complaint regulation but the question is whether this 
complies with the governance rules. There is doubt, because the treating 
authority is not complying with these rules. The second issue is the Supervisory 
board. In terms of pension fund governance a pension fund board can decide to 
install a permanent Supervisory board or an Accountability body. The 
participating organization had chosen to install an Accountability body. 
To gain better insight into, and to conduct data triangulation about, the decision-
making process concerning coverage ratios in the studied organization the 
following documents were used during the desk research phase: 
• Organization chart (Participating organization # 3, 2010d). 
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• Two annual reports 2008 and 2009 (Participating organization # 3, 2008e, 
2009b). 
• Actuarial and Operating Memorandum (Participating organization # 3, 
2010a). 
• Five agendas of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 
3, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d, 2009a). 
• The stature of the Investment Advisory Committee (Participating 
organization # 3, 2008f). 
• Matrix of functions and responsibilities allocation (Participating organization 
# 3, 2010b). 
• A description of the pension fund investment process (Participating 
organization # 3, 2010e). 
• Two reports of the Accountability body (Participating organization # 3, 
2009c, 2010f). 
• Report of the Review Committee (Participating organization # 3, 2010c). 
Besides the aforementioned documents the chairman of the board and the 
manager of the government body completed a questionnaire (Participating 
organization # 3, 2011a, 2011b). During 2009 five new board members were 
appointed. Three board members who were a board member during the 
research period were asked to participate. Two of them returned the completed 
questionnaire. Documents containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy and the 
decision-making process(es) were missing. However, in different documents 
and Statute parts are pre- and described. This means that there is not an 
agreed policy document available. To check and verify the findings one 
interview was conducted (Participating organization # 3, 2012). 
 
5.3.2 Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
In this phase it was researched whether the information necessary for the 
decision-making process about the coverage ratio was available. In chapter 3 of 
the document regarding the pension fund investment process (Participating 
organization # 3, 2010e) it is recorded that the fiduciary manager will deliver 
reports, while the custodian performs a shadow administration. In chapter five of 
the same document it is recorded that the fiduciary manager provides monthly  
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and quarterly reports and performance measurements. The Investment 
Advisory Committee provides a quarterly report to the board and every board 
meeting the board is informed about the state of affairs verbally. The agendas 
of the board meetings (Participating organization # 3, 2008a, 2008c, 2008d, 
2009a) show that under the heading ‘notices’ the subject ‘Chairman of 
Investment Advisory Committee’ is mentioned every time.  
The next sections will provide insight into the fact-findings of this stage of the 
conceptual model.  
 
5.3.2.1 Information about Coverage Ratio 
 
As mentioned before, two questionnaires were returned. The answers given are 
shown in Table 5-50. 
 
Location Assets 
July 1st 2008 
Assets 
Oct 1st 2008 
Assets 
Jan 1st 2009 
Assets 
April 1st 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
€ 401,100,000 € 417,400,000 € 441,200,000 € 456,900,000 
Respondent 2 
 
€ 401,100,000 € 417,400,000 € 441,200,000 € 456,900,000 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported € 441,174,000  
Annual report 2009 
 
  Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-50: Fact-finding about assets. 
 
The annual report includes only the amount of assets on December 31st of any 
year. From the figures of the previous table it can be deduced that the 
information about the assets is shared with the board members. 
The questionnaires and the year report of 2008 show the following information 
about the liabilities (see Table 5-51).  
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Location Liabilities 
July 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Liabilities 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Liabilities 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 € 299,300,000 307,800,000 € 345,800,000 € 359,800,000 
 
Respondent 2 € 299,300,000 307,800,000 € 345,800,000 € 359,800,000 
 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported € 345,836,000  
Annual report 2009 
 
  Not reported Not reported 
Deviation between 














Table 5-51: Fact-finding about liabilities. 
 
The annual report includes only the amount of liabilities on December 31st of 
any year. Looking at the coverage ratio it is no longer surprising that, once 
again, both the respondents provide identical information, as is shown in the 
following Table 5-52. 
 
Location Coverage ratio 
July 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Oct. 1, 2008 
Coverage ratio 
Jan. 1, 2009 
Coverage 
ratio 
April 1, 2009 
Respondent 1 
 
134% 135.6% 127.6% 127% 
Respondent 2 
 
134% 135.6% 127.6% 127% 
Annual report 2008 
 
Not reported Not reported 127.6%  
Annual report 2009    Not reported 
Table 5-52: Fact-finding about coverage ratio. 
 
The annual report only includes the coverage ratio on December 31st of any 
year. To summarize the answers of the questionnaires about the fact-finding 
stage of the variable of the coverage ratio, the following can be stated: 
 



















Assets 2 5     
Total nr. of questions  10 10 100 0 0 
       
Liabilities 2 5     
Total nr. of questions  10 10 100 0 0 
       
Coverage ratio 2 4     
Total nr. of questions  8 8 100 0 0 
       
Other 2 8     
Total nr. of questions  16 14 88 2 12 
       
TOTAL  44 42 95 2 5 
Table 5-53: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding coverage ratio. 
 
In 2007 the participating organization # 3 chose to divide the investment 
portfolio in two parts: one to cover the interest risk, which is the matching 
portfolio, and one called the return portfolio. In determining the investment 
policy the board carefully weighs the benefits (more security) and 
disadvantages (less return) of more or less duration matching off compared to 
alternative strategies. During the year 2008 the interest rate for the entire 
coverage ratio was fully hedged. In May 2009 (Participating organization # 3, 
2009b) the participating organization changed the investment policy. Based on 
the expectation that the risk of further decline in interest rates had declined 
significantly, the board on advice of the Investment Advisory Committee 
reduced the interest hedging in two steps. Firstly in May 2009 the level of 
interest rate hedging was lowered to 110 percent of the coverage ratio. 
Secondly per September the hedging was lowered to 100 percent of the 
coverage ratio.  
 
To summarize the facts of the first variable of phase 1 - information about the 
coverage ratio - the following is established: 
1. In the questionnaires 5% of the responses on the information about 
coverage ratio are non-identical. It is described what the board would 
receive in terms of information reports, so there would be no difference 
within the board about the investments, the liabilities, and the coverage ratio. 
This figure confirms the impression that the pension fund has a very active
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information exchange about the investment policy. For this cause, various 
documents are drawn up and the execution is very closely monitored.  
2. The board had chosen for hedging the interest risk by a matching portfolio.  
3. The set-up of the matching portfolio covered the interest risk of the entire 
coverage ratio in 2008. In 2009, after the research period, the policy 
changed. 
 
5.3.2.2 Pension Fund Governance Principles 
 
The second variable in the first phase of the research model is pension fund 
governance. The question, which should be answered, is whether the fund has 
implemented the required proper governance measures, and if so, if the 
participating organization # 3 has complied with the rules of pension fund 
governance.  Based on the Decree on the Implementation of the Pension Act, 
the following committees should have been installed: Accountability body or 
Supervisory board, Review Committee, Complaints Committee and Members’ 
council.   
Hereafter, the facts concerning the participation of different committees in the 
decision-making process about the coverage ratio are discussed. The 
documents show, that: 
1. There were only two meetings (Participating organization # 3, 2009c, 2010f) 
with the Accountability body. Both meetings were beyond the research 
period. The Accountability body was only informed about the situation during 
the meetings with the board. No information was exchanged during the 
research period. 
2. There is only one report from the Review Committee (Participating 
organization # 3, 2010c).  
 
To summarize the results of the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of 
the coverage ratio, the following can be established (see Table 5-54). 
 






















2 14     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 28 22 78 6 22 
Table 5-54: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding pension fund governance. 
 
To summarize, the facts of the second variable of phase 1, which is pension 
fund governance, are as follows: 
1. In the questionnaires, 22% of the responses on the information about 
pension fund governance are non-identical answers. 
2. A Complaints Committee is not installed, but there is an internal regulation 
that deals with the handling of complaints. 
The non-identical answers are not vital for the decision-making process. It only 
covers knowledge about internal procedures and bodies. 
 
5.3.2.3 Default Settings 
 
Neither default settings, nor references to them were found in the various 
examined documents. In the questionnaires, questions about different default 
settings were raised as to whether default settings exist in practice. To plan 
meetings the fund produces a year calendar with dates and meetings. In 
practice this calendar shows the minimum of meetings. Intermediate meetings 
are scheduled due to unplanned circumstances, which occur yearly. The 
questionnaires showed that one of the respondents confirmed that checklists 
are used, while the other respondent answered this same question in the 
negative. The answers in the questionnaires about the fact-finding stage of the 
default settings are shown in the following Table 5-55. 
 


















Default settings 2 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 24 18 75 6 25 
Table 5-55: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding default settings. 
 
A summary of the facts of the 3rd variable of phase 1: 
1. In the questionnaires, 25% of the responses on the subject default settings 
are non-identical answers. 
2. In the received questionnaires there is doubt whether checklists are used 
regarding the decision-making process.  During the interview the chairman 
told that no checklists were used but they’ve standardized the information 
flow.  
Again, the non-identical answers are not vital for the decision-making process. 


























2 28 22 78 6 22 
Default settings 
 
2 24 18 75 6 25 





 96 82 85 14 15 
Table 5-56: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 1. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 15% of the responses on the subject of availability of 
data are non-identical answers. 
2. Interest rate immunization is established by cash flow matching of 100% of 
the entire coverage ratio. 
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3. On July 1, 2008 the decision-making process of participating organization # 
3 regarding the coverage ratio is organized in such a way (Participating 
organization # 3, 2008f, 2010a, 2010e) that the information necessary to 
calculate the coverage ratio is available. 
4. No checklists are used. 
 
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interview show whether the fund fulfilled its legal obligations for 
controlled and sound operations and to the internal agreements about preparing 
meetings or decisions and risk management. If the board fulfilled its obligations 
it was able to respond. Based on the facts obtained, the following conclusion 
can be drawn: the information for continuing the decision-making process about 
the coverage ratio should be available and, in practice, is available. 
Based on this, another conclusion is that the board had fulfilled its legal and 
internal obligations and was completely in control. Control in this sense means: 
due to the fact that a complete policy note is missing, is the board prudently 
taking care of the assets so the fund can pay the pension entitlements? The 
answer is affirmative. 
 
5.3.3 Phase 2: Awareness 
 
The phase of awareness in the conceptual research model verifies whether the 
board had fulfilled its legal but most and above all its internal rules. The added 
value lies especially in risk management. In other words, it questions if the 
board was aware that something was happening that formed a possible 
exceptional risk for the coverage ratio. In this phase, three variables are 
researched to provide an idea of whether the actual situation was recognized as 
a problem. Based upon the previous phase of the conceptual research model, a 
clear view on the actual situation should be available, because all the data was 
there.   
 
  163 
5.3.3.1 Actual Situation 
 
Phase 1 was completed with correct information. In that phase only 7 percent of 
the given answers are non-identical. There was no difference in answers given 
to the questions about the assets, the liabilities and the coverage ratio. The 



















Actual situation 2 2     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 4 4 100 0 0 
Table 5-57: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding in the actual situation. 
 
Again the process is organized in a very strict way, in which everyone knows 




The second variable in the second phase of the research model is context. The 



















Context 2 6     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 12 4 33 8 67 
Table 5-58: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding context. 
 
Most answers are non-identical which is shown in Table 5-58. This means that 
on the basis of the given answers, personal biases can be demonstrated. The 
differences in responses occur in the following questions: 
1. We are alerted when we should do something. 
2. Time constraints have played a role in the care of decision-making process. 
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3. Time constraints have played a role in the way of awareness. 
4. Time constraints have played a role in the recognition of the problem. 
 
As mentioned in before as time pressure increases, our ability to examine and 
compare choice alternatives is challenged, and the decision-making process is 
modified. Time pressures can increase biasing effects (Kruglanski and Freund, 
1983, Freund et al., 1985), perhaps because information selectivity is higher 
and decision criteria thresholds are lower (Dror et al., 1999). The study by 
Papadakis and Lioukas (1996) claimed that in crisis situations, decisions posing 
pressure seem to be subjected to the formal rules. That happened in this 
situation as well. The formal procedures and thereby the process of decision-
making during the research period was not adjusted. The internal regulations 
how decisions serve to come were strictly followed. This endorses the study by 
Papadakis and Lioukas in this sense. 
 
5.3.3.3 Problem Recognition 
 






















2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 2 33 4 67 
Table 5-59: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding problem recognition. 
 
In terms of problem recognition one of the respondents answered that the issue 
of coverage ratio is not a problem. That is the reason that the recognition of the 
problem was not a joint position. Looking at the figures in Table 5-45 one can 
read that the coverage ratio ultimo 2008 was 127.6%. This figure is far above 
the required coverage ratio of 105%. The risk appetite and the attention to risk  
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was the cause of the different answer. One respondent thought, we have the 
matter well ‘in control’, while the other respondent thought, you never know 
what might happen. 
A summary of the facts and results of the questionnaires can lead to a 
conclusion concerning the second phase of the decision-making process, in 





















2 4 4 100 0 0 
Context 
 




2 6 2 33 4 67 




 22 10 45 12 55 
Table 5-60: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 2. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 55% of the responses on the subject of awareness are 
non- identical answers.  
2. The respondents knew the exact and agreed process of the agenda setting. 
3. The subject of the coverage ratio as such was not on the agenda during the 
studied period. However, the subject was covered by the agenda item: 
notices under which the chairman of the Investment Advisory Committee 
verbally explained what was done and why, regarding the investments. 
4. The coverage ratio was not in danger because of the fulfilled hedging 
strategy. This was the maximum risk mitigating measure the fund could have 
taken. 
The fact that 55 percent of the responses are non-identical answers could have 
an influence on the decision-making process. This could be the case because 
the identified biases are responsible for the number of non-identical answers.  
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interviews show whether the fund fulfilled its legal obligations for  
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the organization of sound business processes and risks management and to 
the internal agreements about risk management and preparing meetings or 
decisions. The answer to the question whether the funds have fulfilled their 
obligations show whether the board was adaptive to the situation.  
Based on these facts, the following conclusion can be drawn: the data for 
continuing the decision-making process about the coverage ratio was 
influenced due to personal biases, because time constraints played a role for at 
least one board member. However, the decision-making process was continued 
as agreed in the internal agreements about risk management and preparing 
meetings or decisions. As mentioned before this endorses the study by 
Papadakis and Lioukas (1996). As a result the board was adaptive to the 
situation, as ascertained from agendas of the board meetings. 
 
5.3.4 Phase 3: Analysis 
 
The third phase of the conceptual research model revolves around the question 
how the analysis of these subjects takes place. Six questions research two 
variables of the subject. The first variable is meeting preparation. 
 
5.3.4.1 Meeting Preparation 
 
There is unanimity in the responses provided by two board members, which is 





















2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 4 67 2 33 
Table 5-61: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting preparation. 
 
There were fixed agenda items. However, the subject coverage ratio came 
under the heading ‘notices’. Usually, ‘notices’ are not prepared in advance, but 
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are given during the meeting. This is also the case in this specific situation. That 
is the reason why one of the respondents answered that no alternatives were 




There is almost unanimity in the answers regarding the meeting, which is shown 



















Meeting 2 3     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 6 6 100 0 0 
Table 5-62: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding meeting. 
 
By summarizing the gathered information in the questionnaires, a conclusion 
can be reached concerning the third phase of the decision-making process, 





















2 6 4 67 2 33 
Meeting 
 
2 6 6 100 0 0 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 3: Analysis 
 12 10 83 2 17 
Table 5-63: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 3. 
 
The facts are: 
1. In the questionnaires 17% of the responses on the subject of analysis are 
non- identical answers. 
2. The setup of the meetings is carried out as required and agreed in the policy 
document. 
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3. Not all the subjects are prepared, analysed and distributed before the 
meeting. This certainly counts for the subject coverage ratio. 
 
The answer to the questions raised in this phase shows whether the board was 
ready to respond. The board did respond to the situation, and during meetings 
new information was taken into account. The board continued the decision-
making process. The conclusion for this phase of the conceptual research 
model is the following: the meetings were prepared and organized, as they 
were supposed to be. Therefore it can be concluded that the board was ready 
to respond.  
 
5.3.5 Phase 4: Action 
 
In the fourth and last phase of the conceptual research model the question is 
how the act of decision-making is conducted, and how the entire decision-
making process about the coverage ratio is evaluated. Two variables answer 




Five questions with a yes or no answer were raised about the action labelled 
‘decision’. With these questions, a view on the control over the activities in the 
decision-making process about the coverage ratio is established. The other 
three questions are open. They speculate about the way of this process was 




















Decision 2 8     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 16 10 63 6 37 
Table 5-64: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision. 
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In the phase of the action when the decision is at stake, the question is: Are 
decisions taken regarding the coverage ratio? The answer to the question is 
unknown, due to the fact that minutes of board meetings were not handed over 
to the researcher. It is established that the fund is fully in control and that it 
could have made decisions about the subject of coverage ratio, because all the 




Twelve questions with either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as possible answers were raised about 
the evaluation of the entire decision-making process regarding the subject of 
the coverage ratio. The questions give a picture of the lessons learnt and any 



















Evaluation 2 12     
Total nr. of 
questions 
 24 20 83 4 17 
Table 5-65: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding decision. 
 
The fact is: 
1. In the questionnaires 17% of the responses on the subject of evaluation are 
non- identical answers. 
 
By summarizing answers in questionnaires, a conclusion can be drawn 
concerning the fourth phase of the decision-making process, in which the two 
variables of this process are researched. 
 




















2 16 10 63 6 37 
Evaluation 
 
2 24 20 83 4 17 
Total nr. of 
questions about 
Phase 4: Action 
 40 30 75 10 25 
Table 5-66: Overview of answers regarding fact-finding phase 4. 
 
On this premise the answer shows whether the board takes action or not. The 
board acted on correct information about assets, liabilities and coverage ratio. 
With all the given answers, an opinion can be justified concerning the quality of 
the decision-making process regarding the coverage ratio and therefore the 
activity of control. The quality of the decision-making process was very 
appropriate. 
 
5.3.6 Comparison of TO BE and AS IS Process of Decision-Making 
 
The following table shows the TO BE and AS IS situation of the fundament of 
the processes. 
 
Table 5-67: Overview of fundament of decision-making processes. 
 
Basis TO BE based on law and 
regulation 
AS IS  Pension fund governance 
function 
IOPS regulation & 
pension fund governance 
rules 
Mission, vision, strategy Elements are available in 
the Statue of the fund. 
Careful Management 
IOPS regulation & 




Not available Careful Management 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A clear and adequate 
organisational structure. 
An organization chart is 
available. 
Careful Management & 
Openness 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A description of 
responsibilities of the board 
(members).  
Yes, a document 
containing an extensive 
description of 
responsibilities of board 




Accountability & Expertise 
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5.3.6.1 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
Considering the phase of availability of data a clear and adequate division of 
roles and responsibilities should be organized. Appointments for receiving 
information considering assets, liabilities and developments are set out in the 
internal control rules and AOM. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. For phase 1: Availability of data the following is 
established. One should consider that the following pension fund governance 
functions are involved: Careful management, accountability, internal 
supervision, expertise and openness. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The government body should inform the 
full board of all relevant  
management information. In the AOM 
examples are given. One of them is at the 
latest 6 week after the quarter end an 
extensive financial report should be made. 
Included should be: 
a. Composition of the investments. 
b. Investment results. 
c. Pension paid. 
d. Received premium/ lump-sum 
premium. 
e. Costs. 
f. Development of pension entitlements. 
 
 
2. The fiduciary manager will deliver a 
monthly and quarterly report and 
performance measurement.  
 
3. The custodian performs a shadow 
administration33. 
 
4. The Investment Advisory Committee 
provides a quarterly report to the board 
and every board meeting the board is 
informed about the state of affairs verbally.  
 
1. The process begins with the collection of 
information. Appointments are set out in 
the various documents. Who delivers 
which information to whom? It is shown 
that this part of the process is monitored 
properly. Each vendor does what is 
demanded of him and delivers the 
Investment Advisory Committee the 







Table 5-68: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 1. 
 
                                                
33 For governance purposes the custodian checked the figures provided by the fiduciary manager. 
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5.3.6.2 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 2: Awareness 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted.  
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The asset portfolio consists of two 
portfolios. One is set up to hedge the 
interest risk. The other one is the return 
portfolio. The level to which the interest 
rate is hedged is dependent on the actual 
interest rate. During the research period 
the interest rate was fully hedged for the 
entire coverage ratio. 
 
1. The committee assesses, in consultation 
with the fiduciary manager, whether there 
are developments requiring action. In that 
consultation the results of investments 
versus that of the benchmark, as well as 
the possible adjustments are discussed 
when there have been unwanted 
developments.  
 
2. The Investment Advisory Committee did 
not assess the situation as not required or 
dangerous. They base their judgment on 
the fact that the interest risk of the entire 
investment portfolio was hedged and the 
actual coverage ratio was above the 
required solvency level. 
 
Table 5-69: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 2. 
 
5.3.6.3 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 3: Analysis 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. The agenda together with the gathered 
information is sent to the board members 
in advance of the meeting. 
 
1. The committee assesses, in consultation 
with the fiduciary manager, whether there 
are developments requiring action. In that 
consultation the results of investments 
versus that of the benchmark, as well as 
the possible adjustments are discussed 
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TO BE process Cont’d AS IS process Cont’d 
 2. After the consultation and discussion the 
Investment Advisory Committee takes a 
decision whether a decision of the board is 
required.  
 
3. Before every regular meeting of the board 
an agenda is set up in joint collaboration 
by the chairman, the secretary and the 
manager of the government body. A fixed 
agenda item is notices 
Table 5-70: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 3. 
 
5.3.6.4 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 4: Action 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
openness, and communication. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 







1. During the discussion of the notices three 
people: the secretary, the manager of the 
government body and the chairman of the 
Investment Advisory Committee verbally 
exchange information.  
 
2. The Investment Advisory Committee 
provides a quarterly report to the board 
and every board meeting the board is 
informed about the state of affairs 
verbally. 
 
3. When a decision of the board is required 
the board decides what information they 
need for a decision. Its preparation is put 
back to the Investment Advisory 
Committee and its consideration is 
postponed to a future board meeting. 
 
4. The executive committee, if not assigned 
to portfolio holders or a (ad hoc) Working 
Group of the board, prepare the board 
decisions take care for the development 
and settlement of the board decisions.  
 
  
Table 5-71: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 4. 
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5.4 Empirical Data of Participating Organization # 4 
 
The participating organization number four (# 4) has some specific 
characteristics. It differs from all the other cases not only in terms of design, 
number of participants, assets and liabilities, but also with regard to the re-
insurance contract. The re-insurance contract deserves explanation. The 
insurer guarantees all the promised pension entitlements (accrued rights and 
pension benefits) after the end of contract (December 31, 2011).  After the end 
of the contract the pension fund can leave the pension entitlements with the 
insurer. This situation has a consequence for the pension fund. Coverage ratio 
as such is not a management variable, because regardless of the coverage 
ratio the pension entitlements can be left with the insurer without having to pay 
something extra. The price for that warranty is already purchased and paid 
annually and is discounted in the premium. Even the supervisor controls it in a 
different way, because there is little risk for the pension fund. The fund will not 
end up in a position where it cannot pay the pension entitlements. It will only 
occur if the insurance company goes bankrupt. In 2007, DNB published a 
circular stating points they completely reassessed its supervision of completely 
reinsured pension funds. Two points from the circular are of specific 
importance: 
1. When the re-insurer has a credit quality of AA- or better than the pension 
fund, he does not need additional reserves for the claim against the insurer. 
In October 2009 Standard and Poor’s changed the credit rating of the 
insurer by lowering the rating from AA- to A+.  
2. The fully reinsured pension funds must create a recovery plan if the rating 
(creditworthiness) of the re-insurer falls under a certain norm. This was the 
case in October 2009. 
Knowing that there is a reinsurance contract the question is: Is coverage ratio 
important for the pension fund? The answer is YES. The coverage ratio is 
important for the indexation. When the fund has a coverage ratio above 110% it 
becomes feasible for the board to decide to grant an indexation percentage. 
Secondly, coverage ratio is important for fully re-insured funds as well, because 
control in that situation still means: is the board doing what it legally is  
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supposed to do?  Based on law the fund is and remains responsible for 
controlled and sound operations (art. 33 Pension Act), outsourcing (art. 34 
Pension Act), control and integrity of business operations (art. 143 Pension 
Act), business processes and business risks (art. 18-22 Pension Fund Decree). 
Summarized, outsourcing does not eliminate responsibilities of the fund. The 
fund should have established an information flow and checked the data 
thoroughly before they could lean back.  Secondly, the indexation is dependent 
on the coverage ratio. Thirdly, law prescribes that a recovery plan should be 
made up when the fund has a finding shortfall. The Minister of Social Affairs 
and Employment changed this requirement in 2010 for only one year. 
  
5.4.1 Outline of Participating Organization # 4 
 
The following outline is based on four documents (Participating organization # 
4, 2008a, 2008d, 2008i, 2009a). 
 




Participants 174 174 
Former participants 112 122 
Beneficiaries 91 95 
TOTAL 377 391 
Coverage ratio   
Valuation at market value of liabilities € 31,631,000 € 32,527,000 
Assets 34 € 30,444,000 € 33,095,000 
Coverage ratio according to annual report 35 102.1% 95.6%% 
 
 
                                                
34 The investment portfolio consisted of 95% fixed income securities and 5% shares and properties.  
 
35 The coverage ratio is calculated as follows: own capital and reserves + the total sum of liabilities 
divided by the total sum of liabilities. For 2008 this was (-€ 653 + €31,631,000)/(€31,631,000)x 100% = 
102.1%. For 2009 this was (-€ 1,417 + €32,527,000)/(€32,527,000)x 100% = 95.6% The annual report 
mentions five different calculated coverage ratios. The added value of this is not explained in the 
interview or the annual report. 
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Facts company pension fund # 4 cont’d Year 2008 Year 2009 
Board   
General management board 5 members 5 members 
Representation of employer 2 members 2 members 
Representation of employees 2 members 2 members 
Representation of beneficiaries 1 member 1 member 
Organization   
Executive Committee Yes Yes 
Manager/director 0 0 
Investment Advisory Committee No No 
Supervisory board No No 
Accountability body No No 
Complaints Committee No No 
Review Committee Yes Yes 
Members’ council  No No 
External service providers   
Accountant Yes Yes 
Actuary Yes Yes 
Fiduciary manager (asset manager) Yes Yes 
Administration Yes Yes 
Government body Yes Yes 
Re-insurance (100% re-insured, type B 1.1 see 
section 1.3.1) 
Yes Yes 
Table 5-72: Outline of participating organization # 4. 
 
Looking at the participating organization # 4 and Table, 5-72 it must be 
concluded that not all bodies required by pension fund governance were 
implemented.  The Accountability body, the Complaints Committee, and 
Member’ Council were not installed although this is mandatory by law. In terms 
of pension fund governance a pension fund board can decide to install a 
permanent Supervisory board or an Accountability body. The participating 
organization had not undertaken any action at all to install a Supervisory board 
or an Accountability body.  
To gain better insight into, and to conduct data triangulation about the decision-
making process concerning coverage ratios in the studied organization, the 
following documents were used during the desk research phase: 
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• Organization chart (Participating organization # 4, 2008i). 
• Two annual reports 2008 and 2009 (Participating organization # 4, 2008d, 
2009a). 
• Actuarial and Operating Memorandum (Participating organization # 4, 
2008a). 
• Two agendas of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 
4, 2008b, 2008c). 
• Four minutes of pension fund board meetings (Participating organization # 
4, 2008e, 2008f, 2008g, 2009b). 
• Minutes of the extraordinary meeting of participants (Participating 
organization # 4, 2008h). 
• Summary of the report of the Review Committee (Participating organization 
# 4, 2009d). 
• Summary of the report of the Accountability body (Participating organization 
# 4, 2009c). 
• Letter with additional information about governance bodies (Participating 
organization # 4, 2010a). 
Besides the aforementioned documents one member of the board completed a 
questionnaire (Participating organization # 4, 2010b).  He was the only board 
member who was also a board member during the research period. Documents 
containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy and the decision-making 
process(es) were missing. To verify the findings one interview was conducted 
(Participating organization # 4, 2012). This took place on the July 12, 2012. 
Bearing in mind, that only one member of the board was willing to complete the 
questionnaire it is impossible to complete all tables shown in the previous 
sections of this chapter. However, there is richness in the data of the 
questionnaire, which should be presented.  
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5.4.2 Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
5.4.2.1 Information about Coverage Ratio 
 
Information about the assets was available. This is in line with what has been 
described in the AOM. The questionnaire shows amounts for the requested 
period. The questionnaire does not show amounts of liabilities per requested 
period nor coverage ratio percentage. The question whether the interest risk 
was hedged was answered in the negative. This is not in line with reality and 
the AOM. In that document it is mentioned that the market value actuarial 
reserves are matched with 95% of the corresponding funds. During the 
interview the question was raised which of the two is correct. The information in 
the AOM is correct. 
Another answer which needs clarification is the answer to the question whether 
it was contractually arranged when and how the information about the assets 
and liabilities are delivered.  The answer was positive, although in the AOM it 
was not described that way. During the interview the respondent replied that 
only in the offer of the service provider was it mentioned that the information 
would be supplied. This is not confirmed in the contract or the service level 
agreement.  
 
5.4.2.2 Pension Fund Governance Principles 
 
As mentioned in section 5.4.1 the organization did not comply with the pension 
fund governance principles. The reason for this was that by its small size the 
fund was convinced that everything was well arranged. Due to the fact the fund 
is relatively small the costs to deploy as well as for the occupation are relatively 
high. The supervisor did not take any action to change the deviation of the 
pension fund governance principles. The interviewee was asked whether the 
supervisor informed why they did not took action. He answered that the 
supervisor did not informed him.  
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5.4.2.3 Default Settings 
 
The default settings are defined in the Statute of the Fund. It states, among 
other things: 
1. Fixed agenda topics. 
2. The advance dissemination of meeting documents. 
A checklist is not used for the preparation of the board meetings.  
Although coverage ratio is an important element in the decision-making 
process, it is not mentioned as a fixed agenda topic. 
The answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board meetings and 
interviews show whether the fund has fulfilled its legal obligations for controlled 
and sound operations as well as the internal agreements about preparing 
meetings or decisions and risk management. If the board fulfilled its obligations 
it was able to respond. No, the fund is not doing what it is supposed to do 
because the information about the coverage ratio or to calculate it is not 
available, therefore the board was not able to respond.  
A coverage ratio based on available or distributed facts could not be calculated 
nor checked by each individual board member because the information was not 
available. Taken the AS IS information into account it must be concluded that 
the board was not able to respond because the appropriate information was 
lacking. This was due to faulty governance, because they had no insight in the 
actual operation of the organisation which - they should have.   
 
5.4.3 Phase 2 Awareness 
 
The questionnaire shows the following: 
1. The board was responsible for putting the subject coverage ratio on the 
agenda.  
2. The respondent thought that the board would be informed as soon as they 
needed to do something. 
3. The subject coverage ratio was not recognized as an issue. 
  180 
The previous answers show a somewhat tolerant attitude, because: 
1. Discussions and decisions about indexation need to be based on the 
coverage ratio. 
2. With a decrease of the credit rating of the insurer, there might be a too low 
coverage ratio, which at that stage will be an issue because a recovery plan 
should be created immediately. 
 
On this premise the answers in the questionnaires, agendas, minutes of board 
meetings and interviews show whether the fund has fulfilled its obligations. The 
obligations are the organization of controlled and sound operations, 
outsourcing, business processes and business risks management and the 
internal agreements about risk management and preparing meetings or 
decisions. The answer to the question if the fund had fulfilled their obligations 
shows if the board was adaptive to the situation. 
Based on these facts, the following conclusion can be drawn: the board was 
very aloof, because it was of the opinion that risk was not present. The 
relationship between coverage ratio and indexation potency did not lead to a 
change of opinion. This means that, the board was NOT adaptive to the 
situation, as ascertained from researched documents. 
 
5.4.4 Phase 3: Analysis 
 
Neither the questionnaire nor the documents contain information that is of direct 
concern to the description of this case.  
 
5.4.5 Phase 4: Action 
 
Attention is needed for the way the decisions are recorded. This is due to 
information coming from the minutes and the questionnaire. The respondent 
answered that it was recorded who controls the implementation of decisions 
and who reports about it. In none of the minutes the elements are found. During 
the interview the respondent answered that this was not recorded in the 
minutes, but in an annex called decisions list. In terms of evaluation the 
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respondent answered that lessons were learned. During the interview it is 
recorded that the most important lesson was: how do you go interact with each 
other as board members?  
On this premise the answer shows whether the board takes action or not. The 
board did not act at all. With all the given answers, an opinion can be justified 
concerning the quality of the decision-making process regarding the coverage 
ratio and therefore the activity of control. The quality of the decision-making  
process needs improvement. 
 
5.4.6 Comparison of TO BE and AS IS Process of Decision-Making 
 
The following table shows the TO BE and AS IS situation of the fundament of 
the processes. 
 
Table 5-73: Overview of fundament of decision-making processes. 
 
5.4.6.1 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 1: Availability of Data 
 
Considering the phase of availability of data a clear and adequate division of 
roles and responsibilities should be organized. Appointments for receiving 
information considering assets, liabilities and developments are set out in the 
internal control rules and AOM. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. For phase 1: Availability of data the following is 
established. One should consider that the following pension fund governance  
Basis TO BE based on law and 
regulation 
AS IS  Pension fund governance 
function 
IOPS regulation & 
pension fund governance 
rules 
Mission, vision, strategy Not available Careful Management 
IOPS regulation & 




Not available Careful Management 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A clear and adequate 
organisational structure. 
An organization chart is 
available. 
Careful Management & 
Openness 
33 Pension Act: 
Controlled and sound 
operations. 
 
A description of 
responsibilities of the board 
(members).  
A short description of 
some responsibilities can 




Accountability & Expertise 
  182 
functions are involved: Careful management, accountability, internal 
supervision, expertise and openness. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. In the AOM two elements are mentioned. 
Once a month, a limited overview, and 
once every three months a comprehensive 
overview of committed portfolio 
transactions and investment results. The 
insurer should make this information 
available. 
 
1. Information about the assets was 
available. 
 
2. Information about the liabilities was not 
available. There is, however, nothing in 
the AOM or in contractual arrangements 
with the insurer on the value of the 
liabilities and reporting thereon. 
 
Table 5-74: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 1. 
 
5.4.6.2 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 2: Awareness 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
Table 5-75: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS phase 2. 
 
It seems as if the participating organization did not care about the level of the 
coverage ratio. This was due to the contract with the insurer. However, even 
with such a contract, the organization can reach the status to submit a recovery 
plan to the supervisor.   
Although the subject was not on the agenda or as such discussed in board 
meetings in some of the discussion, it was an associated subject. Decisions 
about indexation for former participants could only take place when the 
coverage ratio was above 110%. According to the minutes this subject was 
discussed in the board meeting of February 5, 2009 (Participating organization 
# 4, 2009b). In the minutes of the board meeting of September 11, 2008 
(Participating organization # 4, 2008f) it is recorded that the coverage ratio is 
TO BE process AS IS process 
1. No written information about how the 
process should go or proceed was found 
in the examined factional  documents. 
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114. This announcement was part of a discussion about indexation for former 
participants. In the minutes of the board meeting of the next board meeting 
(Participating organization # 4, 2008g) a decision is recorded about the  
indexation together with a breaking story36. Immediately after the meeting, the 
board decided via e-mail (Participating organization # 4, 2008g) that the higher 
percentage of indexation applies. As one can read the information about the 
coverage ratio should be available for making some of the board decisions with 
financial consequences.  
 
5.4.6.3 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 3: Analysis 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise 
and openness. From the process perspective, the following differences analysis 
is drafted. 
 
TO BE process AS IS process 
 1. The topic coverage ratio is not a fixed 
agenda issue for the board meeting. 
During the research period the topic never 
has been put on the agenda. Due to this 
fact the entire process did not occur in 
factional documents. 
 
Table 5-76: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 3. 
 
5.4.6.4 Comparison TO BE and AS IS Phase 4: Action 
 
One should consider that the following pension fund governance functions are 
involved: Careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
openness, and communication. From the process perspective, the following 
differences analysis is drafted. 
                                                
36 Translated by the researcher: “although the methodology in the memo is correct, there is a  
mistake in calculating the correct indexation percentage for former participants. It must be 
 higher.” PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATION # 4 (2008g) Minutes of pension fund board meeting 
 16-10-2008. 's-Gravenhage.  
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1. The board did not decide. 
  
Table 5-77: Comparison TO BE versus AS IS Phase 4. 
 
On request of the researcher the respondent answered on May 23, 2012 via e-
mail that the pension fund is liquidated. All the pension entitlements are 
transferred to an insurer in a direct insured contract as of January 1, 2012. 
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5.5 Cross-Case Comparison 
 
In the previous sections of this chapter the empirical data of the different cases 
were analysed. In this section the cases will be compared. 
 
5.5.1 Comparison of Differences in TO BE Decision-Making Processes 
 
It is established that all cases differ in terms of decision-making processes. 
They also differ in this research in terms of: number of participants, coverage 
ratio, board, organization, service providers, and supervision category. Prior to 
establishing the differences per phase of the research model each participating 
organization needs to have certain elements in place. This is due to regulation 
and pension fund governance principles. It is established that none of the 
participating organizations has an integral policy document in which the 
mission, vision, and strategy are described. Only participating organization # 3 
has some elements described in the Statute. By not having such a document an 
adequate measuring rod is missing.  
Another document which is required (International Organisation of Pension 
Supervisors, 2006) is a pre- or description of the decision-making process. 
Such a document has not been drafted by the participating organizations. Due 
to the fact that it is missing it is possible that the decision-making process 
consists of chance, subjective reviews and incident control. This is in conflict 
with regulation and pension fund governance principles. Stewardship should be 
the core. Hereafter an overview of the TO BE situation will be displayed. 
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Subject TO BE Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Phase 1.  






























Can the rules in 










There is only 
























Is a description 
of 
responsibilities 













can be found in 
the internal 
control rules. 




can be found in 
the internal 
control rules. 








Is the process 






NO, only in the 
internal control 
rules one can 




The number of 
meetings is 






Partly, in the 
internal control 










Partly, in the 
internal control 










Partly, in the 
internal control 












4 2 3 2 
Table 5-78: Elements influencing the decision-making process. 
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5.5.2 Comparison of Differences in AS IS Decision-Making Processes 
 
The next step is to look on an aggregate level at all cases in the AS IS situation, 
as displayed in Table 5-79. 
 
Subject AS IS Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Phase 1. Availability of data     
Did the organization receive 
information about assets? 
YES. YES, but not 




YES. YES, but not 
on time as 
described in 
AOM. 
Did the organization receive 
information about liabilities? 
NO. NO. YES. NO. 
Phase 2. Awareness     
Did the organization identify the 
situation as a crisis? 












NO. Due to 
the insurance 
contract 
Did time constraints or other 
biases play a role in identifying 
the situation as crises? 
YES NO YES NO 
Did politics play a role? NO NO NO NO 
Phase 3: Analysis     
Did the organization follow the 
agreed procedure/process 
considering setting up agenda, 
meeting preparation, recording 
decisions as described in the 
internal control rules? 
 
NO. NO. YES. NO. 
Phase 4: Action     
Did the board decide on the 
subject of the coverage ratio? 















Supervisory category. 4 2 3 2 
Table 5-79: AS IS situation of decision-making. 
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5.6 Overview of the Collected Facts 
 
The empirical data and the cross case comparison of the TO BE and AS IS 
situation show a number of elements that are crucial to drawing conclusions. 
The conceptual research model has made it possible to obtain structured 
insight in the decision-making process concerning the coverage ratio. By 
following the model a number of elements for improvement have come to light.   
To start with the numbers the majority, which is 75%, have an AS IS situation 
derived from the agendas, minutes, questionnaires, and interviews, which 
differs from the TO BE situation arising from theory and other documentation. 
The same percentage did not have information about the liabilities, unlike to 
what is described in the AOM. The same number did not translate the agreed 
rules in the AOM into contractual arrangements with the pension administrators. 
As a consequence no justifiable action could be taken towards the pension 
administrators (insurers) to receive the missing information in a timely manner. 
Again, 75% of the participating organizations could not calculate the coverage 
ratio at all, because information was either missing or incorrect. Taken the 
previous collected facts into account 75% of the participating organizations 
were therefore not ‘in control’ using the definition mentioned in section 
2.3.4.7.1. It is amazing to note that 50% of the participating organizations did 
not take any decision related to the information exchange regarding the 
coverage ratio. Because the decision-making process is not prescribed it is not 
surprising that each participating organization follows a different process to 
come to a decision on the coverage ratio. 
Agendas and minutes show that the subject of the coverage ratio was 
discussed by all participating organizations during the study period. However, 
the reasons for discussion were not related to the actual financial crisis and the 
consequences for the nominal pension entitlements. The reasons were very 
different, like: to check and decide whether there was money and/or the 
obligation to index, or the reports to the supervisor were apparently not correct, 
or the communication with the (former) participants in the newsletter of the fund 
was incorrect, or the subject has the attention of one or more board members. 
There are many differences between each case and a few similarities. The 
similarities are not connected to the supervisory category. 
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One of the similarities is that in the preparation of the meeting none of the 
participating organizations used a checklist to track – in a consistent way – what 
was necessary to obtain consistent data in relation to the subjects of the 
agenda. 
One of the differences is the way the outsourced tasks are governed. One of 
the outsourced activities was the government body. The majority of the 
participating organizations made use of an external government body. In one 
case the services were strictly regulated, but not controlled at all. In another 
case the body was involved in the set up of the agenda due to strict regulations, 
which were controlled. The specific government body contributed to the entire 
decision-making process in a positive way. In the third case the government 
body was used as supplier of workforce due to the limited time availability of the 
board members but not controlled at all. 
Reading the numbers 20 - 34% of the given answers in the questionnaires is 
not identical. One should realize that this number is composed of answers given 
to different type of questions. The answers given to questions about real figures 
to calculate the coverage ratio differ from 5% for case # 3 and 60% for case # 2. 
The other questions are related to the content of the process. Two out of four 
participating organization were liquidated. This liquidation was due to: 
1. Lack of money and instruments to continue existence in one case.  
2. Time available for board members. 
3. Increasing line drift from the Government and supervisor which makes 
continuation more complex.  
The study showed that the conceptual research model is a useful aid to analyze 
the decision-making process. And overview of the results is shown in Table 
5-80. 
 







Requirement Results of participating 
organizations 
   1 2 3 4 









 Pension fund 
governance 














Adaptive Awareness Compliancy & 
Pension fund 
governance 






Analysis Pension fund 
governance 
NO NO YES NO 
 
 
Action Action Pension fund 
governance 



















ratio > 105% 




ratio < 105% 





 Compliancy NO YES NO NO, due to 
its re-
insurance 





Ambachtsheer et al. (1996) showed that the excellence shortfall, among other 
causes, was caused by the poor decision processes (98%). Dean and 
Sharfman (1996) showed that the process of decision-making is important and 
related to the success of a decision. The possible relationships between the  
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implementation of pension fund governance principles, appropriate decision-
making processes and outcome brought the following propositions to be 
researched: 
 
Proposition P1: The implementation of pension fund governance principles 
leads to an appropriate decision-making process. 
 
Proposition P2: An appropriate decision-making process leads to a legally 
required minimum coverage ratio.  
 
Ambachtsheer et al. (1998a) discussed that the decision-making process is part 
of governance and that there is a correlation between good governance and 
pension fund excellence. Due to the small sample size of participating 
organizations in this study, it is impossible to calculate a Pearson’s correlation, 
which is statistically significant. However, when both tests seem to be true after 
a qualitative analysis it endorses the results of Ambachtsheer. 
  
5.7.1 Research Model  
 
The conceptual research model has made it possible to obtain structured 
insight in the TO BE and AS IS decision-making process concerning the 
coverage ratio of all participating organizations and therefore is as such a 
tested aid to analyze the decision-making processes. 
By following the model a number of points for improvement have come to light. 
The AS IS situation derived from the agendas, minutes, questionnaires, and 
interview differs from the TO BE situation arising from theory, legislation and 
other documentation. This counts for cases 1, 2, and 4. For case 3 the TO BE 
and AS IS situation does not differ. It can be concluded that the research model 
is an appropriate analysis aid. 
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5.7.2 Implementation of Pension Fund Governance Principles 
 
 
The first part of the proposition P1 is about the implementation of pension fund 
governance principles. Hereafter an overview is given about the way the 
separate cases dealt with the subject. 
 
Case 1: 
1. Principles of pension fund governance are not completely implemented and 
adhered to. 
2. An integral document containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy is missing. 
3. The board reports a different coverage ratio than is legally defined. 
4. There is a lack of openness and communication among board members and 
participants (Silence is golden). When unity and responsiveness are low, the 
information will tend to become compartmentalized and is not shared 
readily. This is obviously the case in participating organization # 1, because 
34% of the given answers of the verified facts are non-identical. In an open 
organization these facts would be shared, but due to the figure of the non-
identical answers this was certainly not the case in the studied organization. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that on the basis of a personal 
interest and coerced by not delivering service providers one of the board 
members maintained a shadow administration that was not shared with 
other board members. 
 
Case 2: 
1. Principles of pension fund governance are not completely implemented and 
adhered to. 
2. An integral document containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy is missing. 
3. The board reports a different coverage ratio than is legally defined. 
4. There is a lack of openness and communication among board members and 
participants (Silence is golden). When unity and responsiveness are low, the 
information will tend to become compartmentalized and is not shared 
readily. This is obviously the case in participating organization # 2, because 
24% of the given answers of the verified facts are non-identical. In an open  
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organization these facts would be shared, but due to the figure of the non-
identical answers this was certainly not the case in the studied organization. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that on the basis of a personal 
interest and coerced by not delivering service providers one of the board 
members maintained a shadow administration that was not shared with 
other board members. 
 
Case 3: 
1. Principles of pension fund governance are not completely implemented and 
adhered to. 
2. An integral document containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy is missing. 
However, elements are found in the Statute of the fund.  
3. The complaints committee should be fully independent and not part of the 
organization 
4. There is a lack of openness and communication among board members and 
participants (Silence is golden). When unity and responsiveness are low, the 
information will tend to become compartmentalized and is not shared 
readily. This is obviously the case in participating organization # 3, because 
20% of the given answers of the verified facts are non-identical.  
 
Case 4: 
1. Principles of pension fund governance are not completely implemented and 
adhered to. 
2. An integral document containing the Mission, Vision and Strategy is missing. 
However, elements are found in the Statute of the fund. 
3. Not all mandatory legal rules are implemented. 
 
5.7.3 Appropriate Decision-Making Process  
 
The second part of P1 is about appropriate decision-making process. Hereafter 
an overview is given about the way the separate cases dealt with the subject. 
To start with it must be noted that none of the participating organizations have a 
document containing a pre- or description or a combination of it of the decision-
making processes. 
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Case 1: 
1. During the research period the decision-makers were not able to respond. 
However, they were adaptive to the situation to a certain extent. The 
decisions made were based on personal views, and not on facts and agreed 
procedures.  
2. During the meeting of March 9, 2012 it is stressed that from 2010 onwards 
the entire process of decision-making was adjusted. So there are changes 
made to: 
a. Report formats, 
b. Recording of decisions. 
 
Case 2: 
1. During the research period the decision-makers were not able to respond. 
However, they were adaptive to the situation to a certain extent. The 
decisions made were based on personal views, and not on facts and agreed 
procedures.  
2. The difference between the AS IS and TO BE situation described delivers 
decisions regarding the coverage ratio, which are not based on verified facts 
and are therefore undesirable. 
 
Case 3: 
1. The facts show that the board was in control. This means: they were able to 
respond because the information was available, adaptive to the situation 
because coverage ratio was a regular agenda item for the board, ready to 
respond because they discussed the investment policy. 
2. Although there is no difference between the TO BE as described and AS IS 
situation, by putting the subject of coverage ratio under notices on the 
agenda of the board, the subject cannot be prepared and properly 
discussed.  
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Case 4: 
1. The fund was not able, adaptive and ready to respond the situation. 
2. Discussing a subject (coverage ratio) without having the correct information 
available can lead to incorrect decisions, which is what happened. The  
decision about the indexation needed correction. 
 
5.7.4 Conclusion Proposition 1 
 
The above given facts endorse the proposition that there is a positive 
relationship between good pension fund governance implementation and 
appropriate decision-making processes. Cases 1, 2, and 4 show that 
improvement of the implementation of pension fund governance principles and 
measures are necessary and that the decision-making processes are not 
appropriate. Case 3 is the positive confirmation of this proposition. The 
implementation of pension fund governance principles and measures is 
relatively well established and the decision-making process is appropriate. 
Taking this into account the conclusion is that proposition P1: The 
implementation of pension fund governance principles leads to an appropriate 
decision-making process is true.  
 
5.7.5 Coverage Ratio 
 
For an answer to the second proposition P2: An appropriate decision-making 
process leads to a legally required minimum coverage ratio the facts about the 




1. There is an excellence shortfall, because: 
a. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2007 is 144%. 
b. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2008 is 116%. 
c. The established excellence shortfall is 2,800 basis point per annum. 
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2. In the annual report 6 different coverage ratios are published. None of these 
corresponds to the legally prescribed calculation method. However, the 
auditor apparently approves this. The added value of the publication of the 
different calculated coverage ratios is neither explained in factional 
documents or year report. 
3. The participating organization needed to draw up a recovery plan (recovery 
within 15 years) because the fund it had a reserve deficit. (see 2.3.4.4.5) 
 
Case 2 
1. There is an excellence shortfall, because: 
a. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2007 is 131.1%. 
b. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2008 is 101.7%. 
c. The established excellence shortfall is 2,940 basis point per annum. 
2. In the annual report 3 different coverage ratios are published. None of these 
corresponds to the legally prescribed calculation method. However, the 
auditor apparently approves this. The added value of the publication of the 
different calculated coverage ratios is neither explained in factional  
documents or year report. 
3. It was needed to draw up a recovery plan because it did not meet the 
minimum required regulatory own funds (see 2.3.4.4.4). The fund had a so 
called funding shortfall 
 
Case 3 
1. There is an excellence shortfall, because: 
a. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2007 is 149.6%. 
b. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2008 is 127.6%. 
c. The established excellence shortfall is 2,200 basis point per annum. 
2. In the annual report 1 coverage ratio is published which corresponds to the 
legally prescribed calculation method. 
3. The coverage ratio is the highest one of the participating organizations. It is 
even beyond the legally required funds (No funding shortfall or reserve 
deficit. Due to the hedging strategy the risk was mitigated to a maximum 
which caused a lower required fund surplus. Therefore, although the fund 
did not reach the 130% a recovery plan was not needed.)  
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Case 4 
1. There is an excellence shortfall, because: 
a. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2007 is 112.8%. 
b. Coverage ratio according to the annual report 2008 is 102.1%.  
c. The established excellence shortfall is 1,070 basis point per annum. 
2. In the annual report 5 different coverage ratios are published. One of these 
corresponds to the legally prescribed calculation method. However, the 
auditor apparently approves this. The added value of the publication of the 
different calculated coverage ratios is neither explained in factional 
documents or year report. 
3. It was needed to draw up a recovery plan because it did not meet the 
minimum required regulatory own funds (see 2.3.4.4.4). The fund had a so 
called funding shortfall. However this call to draw up a recovery plan was 
adjusted because the fund was fully re-insured. Still the fund had the lowest 
coverage ratio of all participating funds. 
 
5.7.6 Conclusion Proposition 2 
 
Taking this into account the conclusion is that proposition P2: The 
implementation of pension fund governance principles leads to an appropriate 
decision-making process is true.  
The above given facts endorse the proposition that there is a positive 
relationship between appropriate decision-making processes and minimum 
required coverage ratio. Cases 1, 2, and 4 show that a recovery plan was 
required due to a funding shortfall or a reserve deficit. Case 3 again is the 
positive confirmation of this proposition. The fund had an appropriate decision-
making process and a recovery plan was not required. There were two 
variables influencing the coverage ratio. The first one is the appropriate 
decision-making process and the second one is the financial crisis. Knowing 
that an average fall of coverage ratio of 4,900 basis points took place (see 
section 1.1.1) the participating organizations had a fall of less basis points but 
still significant. The limitation of the fall could be caused by the hedging policy of 
the participating funds. Case 3, which exercised the decision of a 100% 
hedging strategy of the liabilities, had the highest coverage ratio of the 
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participating organizations during and after the research period. Case 3 also 
had an appropriate decision-making process. Therefore it can be assumed that 
an appropriate decision-making process leads to a minimum required coverage 
ratio. To research for generalisation of the second proposition a larger sample 
size is necessary. Such a sample size can possibly proof statistical significance 
of the relationship. However, then a very clear definition of excellence shortfall 
should be established. This study based on the qualitative analysis showed the 
positive relationship between the implementation of pension fund governance 
principles and an appropriate decision-making process. The other proposition 
that an appropriate decision-making processes leads to a minimum required 
coverage ratio is also endorsed.  
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At this point the research objective and the research question as mentioned in 
Chapter 1 should be answered. Consequently, this chapter will highlight the 
contributions of this research to management and academia. In addition, 
suggestions for future research will be given.  
 
The success of this research was the exceptional granting of access to four 
cases. Lack of such access could very well be the reason why research of this 
nature has not been previously achieved. The Dutch association of company 
pension funds was asked to help the project to succeed. They could do so by 
writing a letter of recommendation for their members. Finally they did not want 
to encourage funds to participate because the research project would focus on 
a ‘delicate’ matter. After an intensive exercise it was feasible to contact 22 
company pension funds. Despite these contacts, the question to cooperate in 
the research project was often answered negatively. Of the group of 22 pension 
funds, 10 pension funds immediately refused their cooperation. A group of eight 
pension funds, which were asked to participate and initially verbally agreed, 
refused in a later stage when asked to confirm their participation in writing. 
Ultimately, four company pension funds agreed to participate of which two 
needed to submit a legally required recovery plan to the supervisor. 
 
In 2012 and 2013 prof dr. H.M. Prast (2013) had the same difficulty of getting 
access to data. Prast and one of her students found that it was not easy to 
receive information from pension funds about the administrative burden of 
mandatory information. Quite a few funds did not want or could cooperate. The 
communicated reasons were that they had the numbers not available, or 
because they had to give priority to other issues. Prast gave this information 
during a radio interview. 
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6.2 Conclusion 
 
This study revealed that, based on a small sample, in empirical terms there are 
no differences between participating Dutch Company pension funds regarding 
their desire to decide. Decision-making seems to be the core business for 
participating organizations, although during the research period: 
1. Three out of four did not follow the agreed procedures.  
2. Three out of four pension funds did not have the proper information available 
to decide. 
3. The cognition was not distributed. Between 20-34% of given answers were 
non-identical. 
4. The boards did not have a document containing the mission, vision and 
strategy leaving a proper measuring rod missing.  
5. None of the participating organizations had a document containing a 
description of the decision-making processes. 
The study established that three out of four participating organizations did not 
implement and live up to good pension fund governance principles. To achieve 
that goal professional boards and processes are necessary. The behaviour of 
board members is comparable, regardless of whether there is accurate 
information available. It looks like there is a widespread passion to decide. 
Although large sums of money (€ 30 million - € 1,440 million: median € 251 
million and mean € 493 million) are managed by each participating fund, it 
seems as if the management of the funds, and also the government bodies are 
lost in very well-meaning measures, but a professionally arbitrary approach. 
This is a serious matter, which is also acknowledged37 by the supervisor in their 
report (2012c). 
The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment intends to adapt the Pension 
Act, as the current situation will otherwise continue with all the negative 
consequences. The recommendations can help to minimize the consequences  
                                                
37 Translated by researcher: “pension fund governance in 2012 is almost a day’s work. The 
legislator, the supervisors, and the (former) participants all set high demands on pension fund 
governance.” DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK (2012d: 8) Eindrapport themaonderzoek goed  
Pensioenfondsbestuur  2011. Amsterdam. 
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of this “decision-making desire”.  It is necessary to conduct further research on 
decision-making in Dutch company pension funds because pensions as a topic 
has the strong interest of participants who pay pension premium, former 
participants who have paid premium and retirees who receive pension. Also 
there are a number of developments like the possible introduction of Solvency 
II, which may have implications for the administrators of the money: the pension 
funds and insurers. Currently Solvency II set the standard for the solvency 
buffer of insurers in the same way as Basel III does for banks. Solvency II 
requires a security standard of 99.5%for insures. When Solvency II or an 
equivalent is implemented for pension funds the solvency buffers need to be 
changed. At present in the Netherlands the security standard is 97.5% for 
pension funds. This possible new security standard of 99.5% means 3 billion 
Euro additional pension premium according to the Dutch Government. 
To conclude, it appears that analyzing decision-making processes by using the 
(tailor-made) conceptual research model and taking action on the found 
mismatches could lead to an appropriate decision-making process which could 
lead to good pension fund governance and better performance. 
 
6.2.1 Conclusion Proposition 1 
 
The facts (see 5.7) endorse the proposition that there is a positive relationship 
between good pension fund governance implementation and appropriate 
decision-making processes. Cases 1, 2, and 4 show that improvement of the 
implementation of pension fund governance principles and measures are 
necessary and that the decision-making processes are not appropriate. Case 3 
is the positive confirmation of this proposition. The implementation of pension 
fund governance principles and measures is relatively well established and the 
decision-making process is appropriate. Taking this into account the conclusion 
is that proposition P1: The implementation of pension fund governance 
principles leads to an appropriate decision-making process is true.  
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6.2.2 Conclusion Proposition 2 
 
The facts (see 5.7) endorse the proposition that there is a positive relationship 
between appropriate decision-making processes and minimum required 
coverage ratio. Cases 1, 2, and 4 show that a recovery plan was required due 
to a funding shortfall or a reserve deficit. Case 3 again is the positive 
confirmation of this proposition. The fund had an appropriate decision-making 
process and a recovery plan was not required. Obviously there were two 
variables influencing the coverage ratio. The first one is the appropriate 
decision-making process and the second one is the financial crisis. Knowing 
that an average fall of coverage ratio of 4,900 basis points took place (see 
section 1.1.1) the participating organizations had a fall of less basis points but 
still significant. The limitation of the fall could be caused by the hedging policy of 
the participating funds. Case 3, which exercised the decision of a 100% 
hedging strategy of the liabilities, had the highest coverage ratio of the 
participating organizations during and after the research period. Case 3 also 
had an appropriate decision-making process. To research for generalization of 
the second proposition a larger sample size is necessary. Such a sample size 
can possibly proof statistical significance of the relationship. This study based 
on the qualitative analysis showed the positive relationship between the 
implementation of pension fund governance principles and an appropriate 
decision-making process. The other proposition that an appropriate decision-





The research objective - development of a decision-making process model for 
appropriate decision-making within pension funds - has been established. The 
development clearly had the characteristics of a division in two stages. It started 
with general decision-making literature, which was then completed with sector–
specific aspects. The conditions were taken from research (Ambachtsheer et 
al., 1996, 2006, 2007, Capelle et al., 2008, Stewart and Yermo, 2008) law 
(Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2006), factional documents 
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(e.g. Statute, AOM), and pension fund governance principles (Vereniging van 
Bedrijfstakpensioenfondsen, 2006, Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005).  
In line with the objective and the propositions of the study quantitative and 
qualitative methodologies were used and are presented in Chapter 4. The 
findings, which emerged, prepared the grounds for the conclusion and 
recommendations in this chapter. The recommendations are based on the 
confrontation between the conceptual research model and the obtained 
empirical information.  
The proposition that the implementation of pension fund governance principles 
leads to an appropriate decision-making process is confirmed in the conducted 
case studies. The second proposition that an appropriate decision-making 
process and minimum required coverage ratio, appears to hold as well. 
 
6.4 Discussion of the Research Model 
 
It must be noted that the objective of the study was met. The model has proved 
its value as a screening/analyzing instrument, and it revealed that: 
1. The received data was useful and showed the internal process and 
discussion. 
2. There were no positive or negative differences in the received data, which 
attracted special attention. Respondents did not made any written comments 
regarding the questionnaires. 
3. The model is an aid to analyze the decision-making process. By doing so, it 
shed a light on shortcomings in the implementation of pension fund  
governance principles. Pension fund governance principles are key for the 
success of decisions. The model tests all pension fund governance functions 
like careful management, accountability, internal supervision, expertise, 
openness, and communication. Shortcomings like proper risk management, 
openness, and communication can then get the necessary attention. If the 
decision-making process according to the research model is all set, the 
reviewed pension fund governance functions are all set as well due to the 
proven relationship. As a consequence the board will be ‘in control’ and  
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therefore it is very likely that there will be a greater change to achieve a 
sufficient coverage ratio.   
4. The research showed that the research model enabled the researcher to 
create a view on the decision-making process. The model certainly indicates 
the issues, which are vital for the decision-making process. To this end it 
has proved to be a good and useable analysis aid.  
 
However the model could be enhanced. When improving the conceptual 
research model to become a heuristic model to assess the quality of decision-
making in pension funds it should be enhanced. This can be achieved by the 
following topics.  
1. A missing issue is politics in the decision-making process.  During the 
research, politics was not included in the questionnaire and the model. The 
reason for this was that the situation was not seen as a crisis by the 
participating organizations. A study by Papadakis and Lioukas (1996) 
claimed that crisis situations seem to affect the decision-making process 
differently than pressure situations. Crisis situations trigger internal political 
activities during the decision-making process.  Decisions posing pressure 
seem to be subjected to the formal rules. The struggle for power and the use 
of politics is more applicable in day-to-day decision-making processes. 
Therefore it might be recommendable to insert the issue. 
2. Another possible improvement would be the use of a digital version. During 
the research it became clear that using the model and filling out the 
questionnaires takes time. The respondents do not see immediately the 
results of their given answers and the possible conflicts with answers given 
by other board members. When this could be the case it can introduce the  
necessity to consult the other board members and so to learn from each 
other. However, this improvement also needs a different way of organizing, 
because it is feasible that such a version stifles participation. Conflicts will 
become very obvious 
3. A top end solution would be a digital version with a dashboard, which shows 
in the specific decision-making process, whether the information that is 
given as an answer by the respondent is in line with law and the factional 
documents.  
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Due to the fact that the conceptual research model makes it feasible to shed 
light on the implementation of good pension fund governance principles and 
decision-making process, this is a contribution to the current gap in research.  
The conceptual research model together with its questionnaire can also be 
used in other countries as well to shed light on possible mismatches. Obviously 
the implementation of pension fund governance and decision-making processes 
are a worldwide issue. This study and the conceptual research model make it 
feasible for other pension funds in the Netherlands and elsewhere to analyze 
their decision-making process. However, it should be tailored to the applicable 




The recommendations of the research are grouped under managerial and 
theoretical implications.  
 
6.5.1 Theoretical Contribution  
 
Using the developed conceptual research model elements came to light in a  
structured way. The research conducted in this study was limited for several 
reasons. Those limitations warrant attention. These limitations also provide 
fertile ground for future research. This study adds to a growing body of research  
(Tuggle et al., 2010, Westphal and Khanna, 2003) on the inner working of 
boards and decision-making processes. There was no empirical research on 
decision-making processes within Dutch company pension funds or into the 
manner in which pension funds arrive at appropriate decisions. This is in part 
due to difficulties in garnering access to boards and collecting data on decision-
making processes within pension fund boards.  
 
1. Longitudinal research “decision-making need”. 
The constructed validity in this research could not be enhanced therefore new 
research should be undertaken. This new research should use a larger sample 
and test (both qualitatively and quantitatively) the conceptual research model.  
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The external validity makes it possible to generalize the study’s findings and 
should incorporate a longitudinal design.  
 
2. Research into careless management. 
At present there are four different variables showing, that there could be 
something wrong in the process of decision-making by board of pension funds 
that seems to cause careless management. Careless management is the 
opposite of careful management which is one of The four 'Principles for good 
pension fund governance' (Stichting van de Arbeid, 2005). 
1. Collected facts for this thesis showing that 75% of the participating 
organizations did not implement 'Principles for good pension fund 
governance' lived by those principles and acted when and if necessary.   
2. In a national newspaper an article (Pijpker, 2012) with an intriguing headline 
appeared38. After a year research carried out by a forensic accountancy 
agency they established, that: 
a. Reports of meetings and decisions were often incomplete, or incorrect, or 
even lacked. 
b. Money was moved around in the balance sheet or even disappeared. 
3. After examining decision-making process of six pension funds the supervisor 
reported in the final report management effectiveness (De Nederlandsche  
Bank, 2012b) that some funds have gotten a command to improve the 
decision-making process. 
4. Webpage of a pension magazine (Preesman, 2012)  that states that the 
Dutch supervisor has concluded a specific pension fund was insufficiently in 
control.  
 
The four mentioned indicators could possibly be enough for suggesting a sector 
wide research project. It seems possible that more funds acted carelessly. This 
may have played a role in the decision of pension funds (afterwards) not to 
participate in this research. 
 
                                                
38 Translated by researcher: Pension fund CBR careless managed. PIJPKER, J. (2012: 1) 
‘Pensioenfonds CBR onzorgvuldig geleid’. Volkskrant. 
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3. Develop templates for ideal board composition. 
An appraisal of the professional capabilities, experience and behaviour of the 
board members of Dutch company pension funds should be conducted to 
evaluate the training needs and requirements of the board members. Although 
research within Dutch pension fund boards (Veltrop et al., 2012) has shown that 
reflection has a positive contribution on board functioning, reflection alone is not  
enough. It is possible that board members will not confirm that they are not 
experienced or lacking professional capabilities on a board level. Since 2012 
the supervisor monitors the appointment of board members (De Nederlandsche 
Bank and Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten, 2012). If the proposed board 
member does not meet the unknown criteria of the supervisor the appointment 
should not be approved. Since the beginning of 2013 25% of the re-
appointments did not go through because the supervisor considered they did 
not meet the requirements of suitability and/or expertise. If templates are 
developed and integrated into the actual selection process it could reduce or 
even eliminate the current practice of rejection by the supervisor. 
 
6.5.2 Managerial Contribution  
 
6.5.2.1 1st Level: Participating organizations 
 
Based on the fact that the majority of participating funds did not act on the 
issues which were in their sphere of influence, they should consider acting in 
the future when and if necessary. If they do, then they could get ‘in control’ 
(Pensioenfederatie, 2010). This can be achieved by dividing the actions in 
process and content actions. After conducting, well informed and confirmed  
decisions, action becomes a core line in business. The proposed process 
actions are: 
1. Check the decision-making processes. 
To determine whether a board is infected with the passion to decide the fund or 
supervisor can make use of the research model, which can provide an overview 
of the TO BE and AS IS situation. The check shed a light on the implementation  
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of the pension fund governance principles. Improvements can be made in line 
with the model and the established deviations.  
 
2. Create a description of the decision-making process as it is. 
Obviously pension fund board members change over time. Therefore it is a 
translation of good pension fund governance principle and focused primarily on 
careful-management to have a process description available. This makes the 
decision-making process predictable and is also known what to do in times of 
crisis.  
 
3. Make use of checklists as an aid for the AS-IS description. 
One of the improvements is the use of decision-making checklists to prevent 
accidents from happing by decisions that are based on non-traceable 
information. 
 
4. Pay attention to outsourcing. 
In the TO BE and AS-IS situation the participating funds should pay adequate 
attention to the outsourcing of services to third parties. Apparently, however, 
funds establish rules, but do not check their own compliancy with these rules. 
Perhaps there is something to gain in changing policy, from control in terms of 
ticking the boxes to becoming a director in the process of information exchange. 
 
5. Change the staffing of the current (internal) supervisory function. 
The Review Committee or the Accountability body should have observed that 
decisions regarding the coverage ratio were not based on proper information. 
However, nothing in the empirical data proves that the Review Committee or 
the Accountability body recognized this problem. It would be beneficial to 
encourage the supervisory committees to do their work. This calls for fully 
independent and newly staffed Review Committees, which would review the 
board and Accountability body’s work yearly. One should bear in mind, based 
on the empirical data in this study that the monitor and supervisory role seem to 
be not strongly developed by those who exercise this today. The minutes of the 
review committees of the participating organizations showed that none of the 
committees reviewed the decision-making processes or established that  
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decisions were taken without the proper information available. After 
implementing these measures, it is feasible that the funds will have achieved 
process control. The next phase for the participating organizations should be 
focussed on enhancing the governance, by focussing on the content.  
 
6. Mission, vision, strategy note. 
It is established that it is impossible to check whether the consequences of the 
decisions meet the standards, because there are none. A document in which 
the mission, vision, and strategy are recorded is therefore a big step forward. 
Without such a document it is difficult – if not impossible - to manage or to judge 
the decision. The ‘need to decide’ could be traced back to that document. It is 
important that given the avalanche of activities of which the execution is 
compulsory or not, the fund can set priorities. The often-missing policy 
document can have an added value in the process of setting priorities. Another 
added value of such a document is that decisions around terms such as risk,  
risk perception, and scenarios could be then traced back and related to the 
targets mentioned in such a document. Therefore it is recommended for the 
participating organizations to draw up a document with the mission, vision, and 
strategy of the pension fund.  
 
7. Professionalization of the board. 
Due to the limited time available for board members to act as such and 
increasing complexity it is recommended to appoint one or more professional 
managers as member of the board.  
 
6.5.2.2 2nd Level: Outside world 
 
A number of funds refused to cooperate. It appears that, there is an unfounded 
fear for openness. Indeed, some boards perform better than others. This fact 
emphasizes the pension fund sector’s need to share ‘best practices’, stimulate 
an attitude of openness and share achieved successes. This can be 
established by breaking up the ‘closed attitude’ and reticence of pension funds, 
in order to make it possible for them to learn, develop and take responsibility.  
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This can be achieved by means of roundtable conversations led by independent 
third parties, because they can act as independent moderator.  
If the participating organizations agree (British Sociological Association, 2002), 
there is the intention to organize a meeting to disclose the limited research 
results so that the lessons to be learned can be shared.  
 
6.5.2.3 3rd Level: Dutch supervisor DNB 
 
It is recommended for the supervisor to go back to supervision. That is: 
supervision at arm’s length. It is established that Government and the 
supervisor - based on the dissatisfying situation and other triggers - with a very 
high frequency distributed new regulations and tightened supervision. This 
increasing load of attention and mandatory actions is for the participating 
organizations seen as unwanted meddling. With the current avalanche of 
requirements to be met by pension funds, the supervisor is involved in the  
decision-making process. This involvement increases complexity. When 
complexity increases people are tending to avoid risks and therefore tick the 
boxes. Research (Gigenrenzer and Kurzenhäuser, 2005) has proven this. To 
avoid the risks and tick the boxes instead people are focused on the fine print at  
the expense of the bigger picture. All the interviews show that pension funds 
and their board members do not want to be in the spotlight of the supervisor. 
They conduct whatever is required. They tick the boxes. However, the 
supervisor should not get involved in the decision-making process but should 
stay at a distance monitoring. In short, place the responsibility and 
accountability where it belongs and act accordingly. This complies with the spirit 
of the Pension Act, which is liberal of intent. Much freedom is given to the 
performers themselves to translate legislation to the “own” local situation. 
However, due to the previous mentioned measures and timescales, at present 
freedom is increasingly curtailed freedom. 
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Ambachtsheer et al. (1996) reported the following causes for excellence 
shortfall: poor decision-making process (98%); inadequate resources (48%) and 
lack of focus or mission clarity (42%). Ambachtsheer et al. (1998) found that 
there is a correlation between good governance and fund excellence. This 
study researched two propositions in which the relationship between the 
implementation of good pension fund governance and appropriate decision-
making process and between appropriate decision-making process and 
coverage ratio. Both propositions were endorsed. This research covered a 
period of approximately four years ago. As a consequence, quite some time has 
passed between the time of data collection and the time of the publication of 
this research. Therefore, it is good to highlight the present situation and 
determine whether the research model still can be used as an analysis aid. So 
the questions are: 
1. Is the coverage ratio still an issue for pension funds? In this context the 
minimum coverage ratio can be seen as the definition of pension fund 
excellence. 
2. Is the lack of focus or clarity of mission still an issue? 
 
7.2 Are Measures Taken? 
 
7.2.1 Position Dutch Supervisor  
 
The Dutch supervisor (DNB) plays a very active role in trying to maintain and 
adapt a supervisory framework that is crisis resistant. The process of direct 
response and continuously interactive formulation of new policies by the 
supervisor has caused the supervisor and its measures to become part of ‘risk 
management’ and the corresponding decision-making process. Additionally, 
even if a document in which the mission, vision and strategy would be 
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available, pension fund boards would not be able to keep up with the 
continuous changing ‘regulation’. Another consequence is that the supervisor 
also loses his position of ‘supervising at arm’s length’ strength, as it becomes 
part of the decision-making process. 
Stiglitz (1998) calls this process of Government or supervision becoming part of 
the process ‘Capture’. As a result of interactive, fast changing supervision, most 
pension fund boards have or see no other option than to ‘adapt to regulation 
only’, thus defining ‘minimum regulation risk parameters’ implicitly and 
unintentionally as their own ‘risk appetite’. As a result, these boards exhibit 
unintentional ‘herd behavior’ on supervisory compliancy instead of being 
independent, responsible (ownership), and accountable for their own actions.  
The research model can shed light on shortcomings of pension fund 
governance principles such as careful management.  
 
7.2.2 Is the Coverage Ratio Still an Issue for Pension Funds?  
 
This was the first question raised in section 7.1. To answer this question one 
should look at information made available by DNB (De Nederlandsche Bank, 
2012a). The following Tables 7-1 – 7-3 show the progress of the estimated 
coverage ratio during the study period and the 2nd quarter 2012 per supervisory 
category. The first table provides the information of the company pension funds 
of the supervisory category number two. Those pension funds have an actuarial 
reserve of more than € 10 million and less than € 100 million. Two participating 
organizations were in this category.  
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Coverage ratio 2008 Q 3 
nr                % 
2008 Q4 
nr                 % 
2009 Q1 
nr                 % 
2012 Q2 
nr                 % 
< 105% 
 
19 12% 113 73% 117 81% 57 85% 
105-130% 
 
118 73% 32 21% 20 14% 5 7,5% 
> 130% 
 
25 15% 9 6% 8 5% 5 7,5% 
TOTAL 162 100% 154 100% 145 100% 67 100% 
Average 
coverage ratio 
120% 102% 99% 101% 
Table 7-1: Coverage ratio supervisory category II (source: DNB: 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=nl&todo=Pen2; accessed September 14, 2012) 
 
Table 7-1 shows two things. Firstly, from the study period up to and including 
Q2 2012 the coverage ratio for the majority of company funds in this 
supervisory category has not been above the legally required 105%. The 
average did not reach the required 105%. Secondly the number of company 
pension funds in this category is reduced from 162 to 67, which is a reduction of 
95 pension funds, or 59%. Also the two cases in this study of this specific 
supervisory category do not exist any longer. Hence, the fall of the number 
cannot be researched any longer. However, DNB possesses data revealing the 
causes for the disappearance. During a congress (Dahmeijer, 2011) in August 
2011 a number of 376 remaining pension funds per June 2011 was called on 
behalf of DNB. Per June 2012 there are 317 pension funds. DNB has 
determined that for practical reasons usually reinsured funds that consolidate 
the same insurer remain. Acquisitions and offshoots of affiliated companies as 
well as typically determine the choice for liquidations at self-administering funds 
by limited financial possibilities. Clustering of affiliated companies drives merges 
between pension funds. Other reasons for the reduction of the number of 
company pension funds can be lack of knowledge, cost, and complexity. In a 
study (Bikker and de Dreu, 2006) the impact of scale, governance and plan 
design were researched. The study found that economies of scale dominate the 
strong dispersion in both administrative and investment costs across pension 
funds. These costs are important because they reduce the rate of return on the  
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investments of pension funds and consequently raise the cost of retirement 
security. However, the reasons are not fundamentally researched, but what is 
known is that the supervisor considers this category to actually have no raison 
d’être. 
 
In Table 7-2 one can see the result for supervisory category number three. 
Those funds have an actuarial reserve of € 100 million or more, but less than 
€ 1,000 million. 
 
Coverage ratio 2008 Q 3 
nr                % 
2008 Q4 
nr                 % 
2009 Q1 
nr                 % 
2012 Q2 
nr                 % 
< 105% 
 
25 15% 134 78% 148 87% 146 87% 
105-130% 
 
122 71% 36 21% 23 13% 22 13% 
> 130% 
 
24 14% 1 1% 0 0% 0 0 
TOTAL 171 100% 171 100% 171 100% 168 100% 
Average 
coverage ratio 
118% 98% 95% 95% 
Table 7-2: Coverage ratio supervisory category III (source: DNB: 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=nl&todo=Pen2; accessed September 14, 2012) 
 
Table 7-2 shows that from the end of the period of data collection in Q1 2009 
to Q1 2012 the coverage ratio for the majority of company pension funds in this 
supervisory category has not been above the legally required 105%, nor did the 
average coverage ratio reach the required percentage. One participating 
organization is part of this supervisory category and did fulfill the requirements 
regarding the coverage ratio. 
 
In Table 7-3 one can see the results for supervisory category number four. 
Those funds have an actuarial reserve of € 1,000 million or more but less than  
€ 5,000 million. 
 
 
  215 
 
Coverage ratio 2008 Q 3 
nr                % 
2008 Q4 
nr                 % 
2009 Q1 
nr                 % 
2012 Q2 
nr                 % 
< 105% 
 
3 8% 25 66% 29 74% 37 82% 
105-130% 
 
29 76% 12 31% 9 23% 8 18% 
> 130% 
 
6 16% 1 3% 1 3% 0 0% 
TOTAL 38 100% 38 100% 39 100% 45 100% 
Average 
coverage ratio 
125% 102% 99% 98% 
Table 7-3: Coverage ratio supervisory category IV (source: DNB: 
http://www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=nl&todo=Pen2; accessed September 14, 2012) 
 
Table 7-3 shows that from the end of the research period in Q1 2009, up to and 
including Q2 2012, the coverage ratio for the majority of company funds in this 
supervisory category has not been above the legally required 105%. The 
average coverage ratio in the period between the time in which the research 
was conducted, and the present, did not reach the required 
105%. To come to a conclusion, one can state that the 
coverage ratio is certainly a topic, which has become an 
issue, and should be addressed and handled carefully. This 
counts for every supervisory category, and every company 
pension fund. Therefore the conceptual research model can  
Figure 7-1: Coverage ratio 
 
of use  for researching the decision-making process regarding the coverage 
ratio to enhance the decision-making quality and achieve the required pension 
fund excellence. 
 
7.2.3 Mission, Vision and Strategy 
 
Ambachtsheer et al. (2005) established that 42% of the responders in his study 
indicated the lack of focus or clear mission as the cause of shortfall of 
excellence. This study has shown that only one participating organization in  
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their Statute had described some elements of a mission, vision, and strategy.  
This lack is confirmed through the report of DNB (De Nederlandsche Bank, 
2012d). In that report it is established that the majority of the funds do not work 
on the basis of a mission, vision, strategy document or policy note. For the TO 
BE situation every pension fund should have such a document. Here to plead 
for is based on different causes. To mention af few: If there is such a document, 
a number of topics should have gained attention, direction would have been 
given already, and actions can be derived from it. For instance determining the 
asset allocation strategy is the most important decision in the investment 
process. Setting the optimal allocation strategy involves two decisions (de Dreu 
and Bikker, 2012). First, the level of risk preference or the risk appetite must be 
determined in line with the funding ratio  
and preferences of pension scheme participants and the sponsoring company. 
Second, the allocation of investments to different asset classes should be 
chosen to maximize expected returns, given a fund’s liabilities and its risk 
appetite. The actions can also be translated into the governance measures, 
compliancy, and control. One problem is that as interest rates, volatility and 
returns currently are in extreme situations even embedded options may play a 
role. This may be thought to indexation priority for beneficiaries above former or 
active participants. If those situations exist these should be described in the 
AOM (Actuarial and Operating Memorandum). Then it will be part of the 
decision-making process. Without this structure, all the measures were and 
apparently are a number of chaotic actions. Direction by the board means 
anticipating and working in line with a mission, vision, and strategy of the fund.  
The research model can shed light on shortcomings of which the lack of a 
mission, vision, strategy is one. 
 
7.3 Other Elements Affecting Pension Fund Excellence 
 
There is still a stack of rules that must be met by funds. To mention a few: 
1. Law strengthening governance pension funds’ (Minister van Sociale Zaken 
en Werkgelegenheid, 2012b). The law encompass a number of provisions 
aimed at strengthening the expertise including the composition of the board 
and internal monitoring. 
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Temporary adjustment of the interest rate. On February 3, 2012 DNB 
decided to apply a correction on the forward rate structure at the end of the 
year 2011. Although it is a provisional measure, by entering a three months 
average for the discount rate, supervision becomes part of the risk 
management and so of the decision-making process.  
2. Temporary maximizing pension entitlements discounts. A large number of 
pension funds announced a hefty pension discount in May 2012. Into 
consideration the macro-economic effects, DNB has, in consultation with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, decided that in principle pension 
funds may maximize discount to 7% per April 1, 2013. If a lower discount is 
necessary. 
3. Change of the current FTK. In May 2012 the Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2012a)  sent 
the main lines note of the revision of the Financial Assessment Framework 
(FTK) to parliament.  
4.  Risk management. In December 2011 (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2011a) 
DNB had the policy “Financial Crisis Plan” drawn up to oblige pension funds 
to draw up a financial crisis plan as part of the AOM. DNB assumes that by 
May 1, 2012 all funds have such a plan. 
5. New supervision approach. The DNB works with effect from 2012 with a 
renewed supervisory approach: FOCUS (De Nederlandsche Bank, 2012e). 
The focus of monitoring was formerly not only focused on individual 
institutions, but it also encompasses a (too) strong focus on quantitative 
criteria like solvency and liquidity. These criteria remain important, but 
effective supervision also requires attention to strategic and qualitative 
aspects. Risk analysis and mitigation are the pillars of the renewed 
oversight. 
 
However, when the failure of the funds to establish a sufficient coverage ratio is 
treated with addressing the core and get to the bottom of this it would reflect 
more understanding of the issues the funds are facing. The focus should be on 
implementing good pension fund governance. Using the research model could 
help checking the actual implementation. By the wide variety in size of the 
funds, numbers of participants, age of participants, pension scheme and so on,  
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customization is needed. If funds check according to the conceptual research 
model what the shortcomings are, the implementation of good pension fund 
governance principles could be customized. As a consequence the decision-
making processes would be adjusted leading to an improved process with 
qualitative better decisions. Higher quality decisions can contribute to bring or 
maintain the level of the coverage ratio at a sufficient level.  
 
7.4 What is Missing? 
 
Although there are measures taken, the question remains open what is 
missing? Apparently, the legislator and supervisor are fully focused on 
complementing existing rules with all sorts of new rules. The current status of 
the law, which is principle based instead of rule based, is obviously not 
delivering what it should do. The freedom of the funds is comprised more and 
more. Nevertheless, there is one element that cannot be solved by legislation or 
regulation solely. That element is: Openness. 
Pension funds as separate entities and as sector are very closed (Silence is 
golden).  To obtain the feasibility to learn more, openness should be very 
welcome. Therefore new mainline supervisory measures should facilitate and 
force the breaking up of this ‘closed attitude’ and reticence, in order to make it 
possible for pension fund boards to learn, develop, and take responsibility. Of 
course, some boards perform better than others. This fact emphasizes the 
pension fund sector’s need to share ‘best practices’, stimulate an attitude of 
openness, and share achieved successes. 
 
I trust this research will contribute to a more appropriate decision-making 
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Appendix B. Profiles of National Pension Systems  
 (source: OECD (2011) Pension at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and 
G20 Countries. ) 
 
Pension systems in 2008. 
 
Australia 
Australia’s retirement income system has three components: a means tested 
Age Pension funded through general taxation revenue; the superannuation 
guarantee, a compulsory employer contribution to private superannuation 
savings; and voluntary superannuation contributions and other private savings, 
which are encouraged to support self provision in retirement. 
 
Austria 
The pension system consists of a defined-benefit public scheme with an 
income-tested top-up for low-income pensioners. 
 
Belgium 
The pension system has two compo- nents: an earnings-related public scheme 
with a minimum pension and a means- tested safety net. 
 
Canada 
The pension system offers a universal flat-rate benefit, which can be topped up 
with an income-tested benefit, and earnings-related public schemes. 
 
Chile 
The pension system has three compo- nents: a redistributive first tier, a second 
tier of mandatory individual accounts and a voluntary third tier. The individual 
accounts, introduced in 1981, are of the defined-contribution type. The 
redistribu- tive first tier was substantially extended in a pension reform in 2008. 
 
Czech Republic 
The public pension scheme has a basic element and an earnings-related part 
calculated according to a progressive formula. 
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Denmark 
There is a public basic scheme. A means-tested supplementary pension benefit 
is paid to the financially most disadvantaged pensioners. There is also a 
scheme based on individuals’ contribu- tion records, viz. the ATP. In addition, 
compulsory occupational schemes nego- tiated as part of collective agreements 
cover about 90% of full-time employees. 
 
Estonia 
The system combines an earnings- related public scheme with mandatory 
contributions to funded pensions. There is also a flat-rate, basic element and a 
safety- net, national pension. 
 
Finland 
There is a basic state pension (national pension), which is income-tested, and a 
range of statutory earnings-related schemes, with very similar rules for different 
groups. The schemes for private-sector employees are partially pre-funded 
while the public-sector schemes are pay-as-you-go financed (with buffer funds 
to even out future increases in pension contributions). 
 
France 
In the private sector, the pension system has two tiers: an earnings-related 
public pension and mandatory occupa- tional schemes, based on a points 
system. The public scheme also has a without means test minimum contributory 
pen- sion (minimum contributif). In addition there is a targeted minimum income 
for the elderly (minimum vieillesse). 
 
Germany 
The statutory public pension system has a single tier and is an earnings-related 
PAYG system. Calculation of pensions is based on pension points. There is a 
social- assistance safety net for low-income pensioners. 
 
Greece 
Pensions are provided through an earnings-related public scheme with two 
components plus a series of minimum pensions/social safety nets. 
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Hungary 
The new system combines an earnings- related public pension with mandatory 
fully funded defined-contribution schemes. This applies to new labour- market 
entrants and people aged 4 or under at the time of reform. Older workers could 
choose between this mixed system or a pure pay-as-you-go, public pension. 
The modelling assumes that workers are covered by the mixed system. 
 
Iceland 
The public pension has three compo- nents, including a basic and two income- 
tested schemes. There are also manda- tory occupational pensions with a 
hybrid (albeit mainly defined-benefit) formula. 
 
Ireland 
The public pension is a basic scheme paying a flat rate to all who meet the 
contribution conditions. There is also a means-tested pension to provide a 
safety net for the low-income elderly. Voluntary occupational pension schemes 
have broad coverage: over half of employees. 
 
Israel 
The state pension comprises a univer- sal insurance pension combined with 
means-tested income support. Until 2008 second-pillar pensions were common, 
but voluntary. As of January 2008 mandatory contributions to defined- 
contribution pension funds have been introduced. 
 
Italy 
The new Italian pension system is based on notional accounts. Contributions 
earn a rate of return related to GDP growth. At retirement, the accumulated 
notional capital is converted into an annuity taking account of average life 




The public pension system has two tiers: a basic, flat-rate scheme and an 
earnings- related plan (employees’ pension scheme). 
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Korea 
The Korean public pension scheme was introduced relatively recently. It is an 
earnings-related scheme with a progressive formula, since benefits are based 
on both individual earnings and the average earnings of the insured as a whole. 
 
Luxembourg 
The public pension scheme has two components: a flat-rate part depending on 




Old-age pensions are covered under a defined-contribution scheme mandatory 
for private sector workers, privately managed and funded. The contributions are 
made by workers, employers and government. There is a minimum pension for 
those who listed at least 24 years. 
 
Netherlands 
The pension system has two main tiers, consisting of a flat-rate public scheme 
and earnings-related occupational plans. Although there is no statutory 
obligation for employers to offer a pension scheme to their employees, 
industrial-relations agreements mean that 91% of employees are covered. 
These schemes are therefore best thought of as quasi-mandatory. 
 
New Zealand 
The public pension is flat rate based on a residency test. The KiwiSaver, an 
auto- enrolment defined-contribution private retirement savings scheme with 
capped public subsidies was introduced in 2007. Employed KiwiSaver members 
were estimated to be over 30% of the workforce by the end of 2008. 
 
Norway 
The new public pension system, beginning in 2011, will consist of an income 
pension, and a guarantee pension for people with no or only a small income 
pension. The guarantee pension is income-tested against the income pension.  
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The scheme is based on a system of notional accounts. People under 30 (born 
in 1969 and after) at the time of the reform must also participate in the funded 
scheme; people aged 30-50 (born between 1949 and 1968) could choose the 
funded option. However, the choice had to be made in 1999 and it was 
irrevocable, with the exception of those who could retire early. 
 
Portugal 




The earnings-related, public scheme is similar to a points system, with benefits 
that depend on individual earnings relative to the average. Low-income workers 
are protected by a minimum amount of earnings on which pension is calculated. 
All pensioners are eligible for social assistance benefits. Defined- contribution 
plans were introduced at the beginning of 2005. 
 
Slovenia 
There is an earnings-related pension with a minimum pension. There is a 
social-assistance scheme for low-income pensioners. 
 
Spain 
The Spanish public pension system consists of a single, earnings-related 
benefit in the contribution level, with a means-tested minimum pension. There is 
also a non-contribution means-tested level, which replaces the previous special 
social assistance scheme. 
 
Sweden 
The earnings-related part is based on notional accounts and there is a small 
mandatory contribution to individual, defined-contribution funded pensions.  
  240 
There is also a pension-income-tested top-up. Occupational pension plans – 
with defined-benefit and defined-contribution elements – have broad coverage. 
 
Switzerland 
The Swiss pension system has three main parts. The public scheme is earnings 
related, but has a progressive formula. There is also a system of mandatory 
occupational pensions and an income-tested supplementary benefit. 
 
Turkey 
An earnings-related public scheme with an income-tested safety net and a flat-
rate supplementary pension. 
 
United Kingdom 
The public scheme has two tiers, (a flat- rate basic pension and an earnings- 
related additional pension), which are complemented by a large voluntary 
private pension sector. Most employee contributors “contract out” of the state 
second tier into private pensions of different sorts. An income-related benefit 
(pension credit) targets extra spending on the poorest pensioners. 
 
United States 
The publicly provided pension benefit, known as social security, has a 
progressive benefit formula. There is also a means- tested top-up payment 
available for low-income pensioners. 
 
Argentina 
The pension system has two main components: a basic component and an 
additional social insurance component. For those aged 70 and above there is 




The Regime Geral de Previdência Social (RGPS), covers the private sector 
workforce. It is financed through payroll taxes, shared by the employer and the 
employee, revenues from sales taxes and federal transfers that cover shortfalls  
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of the system. It is a mandatory, pay-as- you-go financed single-pillar scheme, 
which is operated by the National Social Security Institute. 
 
China 
China has a two-tier pension system, consisting of a basic pension and a 
mandatory employee contribution to a second-tier plan. This system, which was 
introduced in 1998, was significantly revised in 2006. It covers urban workers 




Workers are covered under the earnings- related employee pension scheme 
and defined-contribution employee provident fund administered by the 




Employees in private sectors are covered by a defined-contribution plan. 
 
Russian Federation 
The pension system has different components: labour pensions, state pensions, 
and voluntary pension savings at non-state (private) pension funds. 
 
Saudi Arabia 
Employees in the public and private sectors. Voluntary coverage for persons 
who are self-employed, are working abroad, or no longer satisfy the conditions 
for compulsory coverage. 
 
South Africa 
The public pension is flat rate based on a residency test. There are also 
voluntary occupational schemes but coverage for these is not high. 
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Appendix C. Translated Questionnaire 
 Explanation questionnaire.  
 
1. The questionnaire consists of three pages. 
2. The general questions are asked to determine who participated. This information will not be 
traceable used in the report. 
3. For all questions and answers the reference date is July 1st, 2008, unless otherwise 
indicated 
4. The Yes/No questions need to be answered by ticking one choice.  
5. The open questions should be answered as completely as possible. If space is insufficient 




a. Answered by:  
b. Function:  
c. Name of pension fund  
d. Date:  
 
Process phase: Availability of data 
 
1. Variable: Information about coverage ratio 
Indicator Answer (When unknown please complete with 0) 
a. What was the value of the assets per 1 July 2008 € 
b. What was the value of the assets per 1 Oct. 2008 € 
c. What was the value of the assets per 1 Jan. 2009 € 
d. What was the value of the assets per 1 April 2008 € 
e. When 0, why was it unknown?  
 
Indicator Answer (When unknown please complete with 0) 
a. What was the value of the liabilities per 1 July 2008 € 
b. What was the value of the liabilities per 1 Oct. 2008 € 
c. What was the value of the liabilities per 1 Jan. 2009 € 
d. What was the value of the liabilities per 1 April 2008 € 
e. When 0, why was it unknown?  
 
Indicator Answer (When unknown please complete with 0) 
a. What was the coverage ratio per 1 July 2008                                     % 
b. What was the coverage ratio per 1 Oct. 2008                                      % 
c. What was the coverage ratio per 1 Jan. 2009                                      % 
d. What was the coverage ratio per 1 April 2008                                      %              
e. When 0, why was it unknown?  
 
f. Was the interest rate risk hedged? YES                                                        NO   
g. Why?  
h. How was the interest rate risk hedged?  
i. For how long was the interest rate risk hedged?  
j. Was contracted when and how the information about 
the assets and liabilities are disclosed? 
YES                                                        NO   
k. Who is responsible for the subject liabilities, assets 
and coverage ratio? (indicate the function) 
 
l. Where is this documented?  
m. Why was it structured that way?  
n. Since when was it structured that way?  
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2. Variable: Pension fund governance 
Indicator Answer  
a. Were board committees installed? YES                                                        NO   
b. If YES, which committees?  
c. Was an accountability body installed? YES                                                        NO   
d. Was a review committee installed? YES                                                        NO   
e. Was a members’ council installed? YES                                                        NO   
f. Was a supervisory board installed? YES                                                        NO   
g. Was a complaints committee installed? YES                                                        NO   
h. Was the government support in- or external? INTERNAL                                EXTERNAL   
i. Which officer is responsible for day to day 
management? 
 
j. Did the fund made use of external asset managers? YES                                                        NO   





3. Variable: Default settings 
Indicator Answer  
a. Was there a compliance officer? YES                                                        NO   
b. Which officer was responsible for collecting the data 
for the board meetings? 
 
c. Did the decision-making process have default settings 
for: 
 
 Agenda topics? YES                                                        NO   
 Meeting frequency? YES                                                        NO   
 Advance dissemination of meeting documents? YES                                                        NO   
 Meeting quorum? YES                                                        NO   
 Decision-making quorum? YES                                                        NO   
 Communication with (former) participants? YES                                                        NO   
 Where is this documented  
d. Were all meeting topics prepared in writing? YES                                                        NO   
e. Was the topic ‘coverage ratio’ prepared in writing? YES                                                        NO   
f. Were checklists used for preparation of the meeting? YES                                                        NO   
 
 
Process phase: Awareness 
 
4. Variable: Actual situation 
Indicator Answer  
a. Which officer, director, board member or committee 
placed the topic coverage ratio on the agenda of the 
involved decision-making body? 
 





5. Variable: Context 
Indicator Answer  
Regarding the research period did you think:  
 Nothing can happen to us.  YES                                                        NO   
 We will be informed YES                                                        NO   
 Every risk is covered YES                                                        NO   
b. Did time pressure change:  
 The accuracy of the decision-making process? YES                                                        NO   
 The awareness that possibly a decision was needed? YES                                                        NO   
 The way the situation (financial crisis) was 
recognized? 
YES                                                        NO   
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6. Variable: Problem recognition 
Indicator Answer  
a. Was the coverage ratio due to the situation (financial 
crisis) recognized as a problem? 
YES                                                        NO   
b. Did every board member agreed? YES                                                        NO   
c. Was there a need for a recovery plan? YES                                                        NO   
 
 
Process phase: Analysis 
 
7. Variable: Meeting preparation 
Indicator Answer  
a. Who proposed the goal of every board meeting?  
b. Who proposed the agenda for the board meeting?  
c. Were alternatives gathered in preparation for the 
meeting? 
YES                                                        NO   
 
8. Variable: Meeting 
Indicator Answer  
a. Were during the meeting:  
 Goals set per agenda topic?  YES                                                        NO   
 Were alternatives explained? YES                                                        NO   
 Did this happen during the research period for the 
topic coverage ratio as well? 
YES                                                        NO   
 
 
Process phase: Action 
 
9. Variable: Decision-making 
Indicator Answer  
a. Were the decisions in writing? YES                                                        NO   
b. Were the decisions communicated to (former) 
participants? 
YES                                                        NO   
c. Did the (written) decision cover who should execute? YES                                                        NO   
d. If NO, why not?  
e. Did the (written) decision cover who should monitor 
the execution of the decision? 
YES                                                        NO   
f. If NO, why not?  
g. Did the (written) decision cover who should report? YES                                                        NO   
h. If No, why not?  
 
 
10. Variable: Evaluation 
Indicator Answer  
a. Looking back, are you satisfied about the decision-
making process? 
YES                                                        NO   
b. Are there lessons learned? YES                                                        NO   
c. If lessons were learned did they lead to the adjustment of:  
 Modes of information gathering YES                                                        NO   
 Implemented pension fund governance principles/rules YES                                                        NO   
 Asset management policy YES                                                        NO   
 Hedging the interest risk YES                                                        NO   
 Communication with (former) participants YES                                                        NO   
 Meeting structure YES                                                        NO   
 Meeting frequency YES                                                        NO   
 Meeting process YES                                                        NO   
 Outsourcing of services YES                                                        NO   
d. Are checklists currently used for preparing board 
meetings? 
YES                                                        NO   
 
 
Thank you for taking the trouble and time it took to complete this questionnaire. 
With kind regards, Arie Slottje 
  245 
Appendix D. Definitions of Terms 
Action phase: the part of the conceptual research model concerning the 
decision-making process in which the selection of a course of action among 
several alternatives is carried out. The output is called the decision. 
 
Actuarial interest rate: It is the interest rate (yield) where pension funds can 
count up with if they make calculations for the future. The actuarial rate is the 
yield that the invested pensions are deemed to deliver as a minimum in the 
future. The actuarial rate is therefore a fictional yield that pension funds used. In 
2012 the Ultimate forward rate is used as mandatory standard.  
 
AFM: Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets. The AFM supervises the 
financial markets. 
 
Analysis phase: the part of the conceptual research model concerning the 
decision-making process in which the decision-maker(s) should consider what 
the required achievement is. To establish it the decision-maker(s) should gather 
information, compare and evaluate possible options. 
 
AOM: Actuarial and operating memorandum. Pension funds should have a note 
on the basis of the Pension Act. In the memorandum the following topics should 
be covered: 
1. Internal control system. 
2. Administrative organization and internal control. 
3. Procedures and criteria for joining the Fund. 
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4. Entitlements of participants. 
5. Risks. 
6. Financial design. 
7. Financial management resources. 
 
Availability of data phase: the part of the conceptual research model 
concerning the decision-making process in which data is collected and 
processed in accordance with the applicable pension fund governance rules 
and internally agreed procedures and checklists. 
 
Awareness phase: the part of the conceptual research model concerning the 
decision-making process in which the facts, which are translated into an actual 
situation are confronted with the context and the tendency to acknowledge a 
problem. 
 
Control: The aim of control is to identify deviations, which might require 
corrective action.  
 
Coverage ratio: is the ratio between the assets of the pension fund and the 
discounted pension liabilities. Other terms are used as well. Examples are: 
Solvency level and funding ratio 
 
Decision: The product of an interaction between individual’s preferences and 
those of others. 
 
Decision-making: is the process of sufficiently reducing uncertainty and doubt
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about alternatives to allow a reasonable choice to be made from among them. 
 
Dissonance: is a tendency for individuals to seek consistency among their 
cognitions (i.e., beliefs, opinions).  When there is an inconsistency between 
attitudes or behaviors (dissonance), something must change to eliminate the 
dissonance.  Dissonance theory applies to all situations involving attitude 
formation and change. It is especially relevant to decision making and problem 
solving (Festinger, 1957).  
 
DNB: Dutch Central Bank. (De Nederlandsche Bank) DNB supervises the 
financial soundness of financial institutions, including pension funds. 
 
FTK: Financial assessment framework. The FTK is the financial supervisory 
regime and is part of the Pension Act. The FTK is applicable to the financial 
position and the financial policy of pension funds and is in force from January 1, 
2007 
 
Funding shortfall: A fund whose own funds have fallen below the minimum 
regulatory own funds has a funding shortfall. It must draw up a short-term 
recovery plan within two months, outlining how it will eliminate the funding 
shortfall within three years. 
 
Labour Foundation: Consultative body of employers and employees in the 
Netherlands. 
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Mission: Defines the fundamental purpose of an organization succinctly  
describing why it exists and what it does to achieve its vision. 
 
Problem: is an opportunity for improvement or growth.  It is the difference 
between the current state and the goal state.  It can result from new knowledge 
or thinking.  A problem results from the recognition of a present imperfect and 
the belief in the possibility of a better future (Harris, 1998).   
 
Problem recognition: is “…a process in which, interactively, we name the 
things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to 
them” (Weick, 1995). 
 
Process: a set of linked activities that take an input and transform it to create 
an output (Johansson et al., 1993).  
 
Reserve deficit: situation in which a pension fund has fallen below the 
regulatory own funds but is still above the minimum regulatory own funds 
(105%). Pension funds, which are in a situation of reserve deficit, must draw up 
a long-term recovery plan within three months, outlining how it will eliminate the 
reserve deficit within fifteen years with a steady recovery. 
 
Strategy: a combination of the ends (goals) for which the organization is 
striving and the means by which it is seeking to get there. 
 
Vision: outlines what the organization wants to be, or how it wants the world in 
which it operates to be.   
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Appendix E. Interview Ad Verbatim 
 
I: Dit is het interview dat gehouden wordt op 22 februari met een respondent 
van de deelnemende organisatie # 1. Ik heb een aantal vragen voorgelegd en 
we zullen aan de hand daarvan de beantwoording helder trachten te krijgen wat 
de status is en wat we daarmee gaan doen. Beste respondent, om te beginnen, 
de juistheid van de bevindingen. Ik heb u een lijst met bevindingen toegestuurd, 
ik ben begonnen met de onderzoeksvraag, en vervolgens de 
onderzoeksdoelstelling, en de gebruikte documenten, de gebruikte documenten 
die heb ik van u gekregen. En het procesmodel, dat is als het ware de basis 
waarlangs de questionnaire ook is opgesteld. En, wat ik nu dus doe is eigenlijk 
per fase in het procesmodel nagaan wat zijn de feiten die ik heb vastgesteld 
aan de hand van de questionnaires en alle documentatie, en dan kijken: 
herkent u zich daarin, ja of nee. De bevindingen, of de beschikbaarheid van de 
gegevens, dit is het eerste deel van het procesmodel. In het procesmodel 
komen drie elementen aan de orde. Dat is informatie over de dekkingsgraad, 
pension funds government, regels,  en over de default settings, met andere 
woorden: zijn er vaste procedurele afspraken over hoe wij omgaan met agenda 
onderwerpen die tijdens een bestuursvergadering behandeld dienen te worden. 
Als ik kijk over het eerste deel, de informatie over de dekkingsgraad. Uit de 
questionnaires is mij gebleken dat vijftig procent van de 44 gegeven 
antwoorden (er waren 22 vragen, dus als twee mensen antwoorden heb ik er 
44 vragen gesteld), niet gelijkluidend zijn beantwoord.  
 
R: Dus dit gaat over de kwestie die eerst bij ons behandeld is? 
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I: Ja. Klopt. Die zijn niet gelijkluidend beantwoord. Dus dat betekent dat 
eigenlijk de data waarop u uiteindelijk iets moet gaan besluiten, dus de feiten, 
over de liquiditeiten, de feiten over de verplichtingen, eigenlijk verschillend zijn 
beantwoord.  
 
R: Dat verbaast me wel. 
 
I: Het verbaast u. Kunt u een reden misschien verzinnen, van nou het zou 
misschien daardoor kunnen komen? Want mij is duidelijk geworden dat in een 
van de questionnaires stond: het onderwerp dekkingsgraad is eigenlijk geen 
onderwerp dat op de agenda komt omdat het nou ja, wij hebben dat vanaf 2006 
niet meer op de agenda gehad, als onderwerp. Ja en dan is daarmee ook het 
onderwerp wat is de waarde van de verplichtingen en wat staat er tegenover als 
waarde van zeg maar de assets. Ja dat is dan eigenlijk informatie waarnaar we 
dan eigenlijk niet echt op zoek zijn gegaan.  
 
R: Dat begrijp ik niet helemaal. Je zegt: vijftig procent van de antwoorden zijn 
niet anders, dus mijn antwoorden zijn anders als die andere , dat zeg je 
eigenlijk, he? 
 
I: Klopt.  
  
R: Dat moeten we even kijken welke antwoorden dat dan zijn, want dan kunnen 
we even kijken wat het kan zijn, want op zich vind ik dat wel apart.  
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I: Ik leg hier voor de twee questionnaires die ik heb. Ik geef vervolgens aan de 
bedragen die erin staan.  
 
R: Oh wacht even je bent hier, daar.  
 
I: Ziet u? (wijst verschillen en gelijkenissen aan) U ziet bijvoorbeeld bij deze 
vraag, ja of nee. U ziet, dit zijn gewoon verschillen die ik dus aantref, wat 
betekent dat voor mij is dit eigenlijk een verschil in de feiten. Want het moet 
eigenlijk aanduidbaar zijn: dit is het. En wanneer twee bestuursleden twee 
verschillende cijfers hebben, dan kun je ook zeggen: ja, heeft de één een 
andere bron dan de ander. Begrijpt u? 
 
R: Ja.  
 
I: Nou, en aangezien ABTN voorschrijft wat de bron moet zijn, denk ik, nou ja, 
bijzonder. Dus dat is wat ik heb vastgesteld.  
 
R: Nou daar moeten we gewoon even naar kijken wat daar in zit. Kijk als ik naar 
de percentages kijk, die cijfers die kloppen voor mij allemaal wel. De 
dekkingsgraad vind ik apart, daar ga ik nu even meteen naar kijken. 
 
I: Maar goed, dit is dus de basis op grond waarvan ik dus gezegd heb,  
 
R: De andere Respondent  is al een tijdje bestuurslid, ik ben nu manager 
pensioenfonds, en in die periode ben ik ziek geweest, dus ik heb misschien ook 
niet alle informatie in die tijd... Ik heb ook met name gekeken naar hoe het er nu 
een beetje uit ziet, dus daar kunnen wel verschillen in zitten. Dus daar zal  
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verschil in zitten, en nou ja de cijfers die moeten kloppen dus daar wil ik nog 
even naar kijken. Want ik ga er van uit dat we dezelfde informatie gekregen 
hebben.  
 
I: Dan, op grond van de ABTN zou de beleggingscommissie elke maand een 
asset management report ontvangen, dat was op dat moment nog niet 
geoperationaliseerd. Er staat in bestuursverslagen dat er, ik geloof dat Diederik 
de opdracht had gekregen, samen met hoe heet hij van asset management, de 
inhoud van het rapport te gaan bepalen. Dus dat was op 1 juli, nog niet 
geoperationaliseerd.  
 
R: Dat weet ik niet, daar moet ik nog even naar kijken. Wat we wel gedaan 
hebben, volgens mij hebben we altijd een maand rapportage gehad. Daar 
waren we niet altijd tevreden over, dus we hebben dat gewoon verbeterd.  
 
I: U heeft dus wel een maandrapportage ontvangen, alleen de inhoud vroeg om 
verbetering.  
 
R: Zo zijn we continu aan het verbeteren geweest. 
 
I: Zo van, kijk, wat is nou de beste vorm waarin we dit kunnen presenteren, 
zodat we met zijn allen over dezelfde informatie beschikken. Uitstekend. 
 
R: Wacht even. De informatie is altijd hetzelfde geweest, iedere keer hadden 
we dezelfde informatie, alleen we waren niet altijd tevreden over de inhoud van 
de rapportage zelf. Over de analyse en zo, daar hebben we verbeteringen in 
aangebracht. De cijfers die in de rapportage waren die waren eenduidig. 
 
I: Vervolgens heb ik gekeken, en er waren geen contractuele afspraken met de 
verzekeraar, om de som van de verzekerde verplichtingen, maandelijks op te 
leveren. 
R: Ja, dat kan.  
 
I: Nou dan pension funds governance, dat was het tweede onderdeeltje, dat  
  253 
was deze.  
 
R: Wat je nu wel ziet, we hebben een behoorlijke professionele slag. In het 
verleden ben ik bestuurder geweest, nou, ik ben in de periode eind 2008 was ik 
er niet, want ik was geopereerd, dat heb ik allemaal niet helemaal meegemaakt. 
Daarvoor ben ik manager geworden, en twee jaar geleden ben ik begonnen 
met verbeteringsslag, professionalisering. En dat is natuurlijk nu redelijk goed 
gelukt, dat zie je nu gebeuren. Dat wil overigens niet zeggen dat we op dat 
moment risico’s liepen, want als je kijkt naar de kennis en de kunde van het 
bestuur dan is het dermate dat je ... laat ik het zo zeggen: we hebben wel het 
gevoel gehad dat we onder een kantoor zaten.  
 
I: Ja kijk, het is natuurlijk de core business van het bedrijf. 
 
R: Ja maar wat je nu wel ziet is dat de Nederlandse bank die gaat veel meer 
eisen stellen, en daar hebben we ook heel snel op geanticipeerd. En daarom 
zie je misschien dat er in de beantwoording, dat daar misschien wel verschillen 
instaan.  
 
I: Oke. Kijk, ik denk dat met een .. 
 
R: Kijk dat is dan ook het lastige van het onderzoek, dat had ik me niet 
gerealiseerd, dat het over een periode ging van twee jaar geleden. Ik heb het 
ingevuld zoals het er nu een beetje eruit ziet.  
 
I: Ja, ja, oke. Nou goed, kijk, ik denk dat kijkend naar wat ik heb aangetroffen, 
en ook kijkend naar wat ik ook in de andere documentatie heb aangetroffen, 
was bijvoorbeeld de ABTN, daaruit zijn wel een aantal dingen te concluderen. 
Maar de conclusies die ik aan het einde van de rit kan trekken, die zijn zeg 
maar op geen enkele wijze een aanval op de kwaliteit en de prestatie die heb 
pensioenfonds heeft gedaan. Integendeel, ik denk dat het pensioenfonds naar 
het beste kunnen en ook naar het beste weten, de kennis van dat moment ook 
in aanmerking nemend, want niemand had een dergelijke val van en de rente 
en de aandelenbeurzen eerder meegemaakt. Dus met de kennis van toen,  
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moet ik zeggen dat er heel erg goed gereageerd is Daarbij komt, en dat is het 
derde punt, dat het matchen van het renterisico, met de matchingsportefeuille 
tot 90%, dan denk ik gewoon een hele goede keuze geweest is van het fonds. 
 
r: In 2006 hebben ze dat in gang gezet. 
 
I: Ja. En nou ik merk dat het matchen van het renterisico, wanneer meer 
fondsen dat gedaan zouden hebben, en dat hoeft niet tot de 100 procent maar 
als je maar ergens in de bandbreedte tussen de 90 of misschien 95, 100 zou 
zitten, prima. Dan had je niet de ellende gehad die je op dit moment hebt. 
 
R: Nee. Maar dat hebben we ook zelf wel geconstateerd.  
 
I: Kijk, en dat het matchen geld kost, prima. Dat is dan maar zo.  
 
r: Ja, wacht even. Wat ik daar nog wel bij wil zeggen is, we zijn als eerste 
begonnen, stel dat iedereen dat tegelijkertijd gedaan had, dan was het heel 
anders geweest, misschien veel duurder. Dan had je dat misschien niet zo 
kunnen doen. Zo moet je het ook wel weer een beetje zien.  
 
I: Ja.  
 
R: Kijk, het feit dat wij als eerste zijn geweest, daar hebben we heel veel profijt 
van gehad. Maar van de andere kant denk ik, stel dat iedereen dat gedaan had, 
dan hadden we dat niet voor elkaar gekregen, om alles voor 90 procent te 
matchen.  
 
I: Nee, dat denk ik ook niet.  
 
R: Nee maar sterker nog, volgens mij heb je dan niet voldoende onderpand om 
dat te doen. Ja, dat kan ook een conclusie zijn, he? 
 
I: Ja, maar nogmaals, ik denk dus dat het matchen dat gewoon heel erg goed is 
geweest. 
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R: Ja, voor ons is dat perfect geweest. Dat zeggen we ook naar mekaar, dat we 
daar ook heel gelukkig mee zijn geweest. En dat zie je dan ook toch terug in je 
huidige dekkingsgraad, kijk wat er is gebeurd: onze dekkingsgraad is omlaag 
gegaan in de afgelopen twee, drie jaar. Maar dat is met name veroorzaakt door 
het lang leven risico, dat heeft tien procent gescheeld. En de beleggingen zijn 
wat omlaag gegaan, dat is zelf al vijf procent. Maar qua rente hebben we daar 
misschien een paar procent op verloren, niet meer dan dat, de afgelopen drie 
jaar.  
 
I: Nou kijk, maar daarom zeg ik, terugkijkende naar ook de conclusies die ik 
uiteindelijk zou willen trekken, betekent het dat, en ik kijk er dan gewoon fase 
gewijze naar, vanuit het proces model, dat ik zeg van nou in de eerste fase 
daar had het beter kunnen gaan wanneer er op zeg maar gelijkwaardige feiten 
besluitvorming tot stand was gekomen.  
 
R: Nee wacht even, even twee dingen. Kijk wat we nu gedaan hebben, ik heb 
het ingevuld op basis van dingen drie jaar geleden, dus dat er nu wat andere 
data is gepreseteerd, dat wil ik wel uitzoeken. Ik bedoel, op dat moment, toen 
de besluitvorming tot stand kwam, toen is wel op basis van dezelfde informatie 
... Dat wil ik wel even aangeven. 
 
I: Ja, ja, precies.  
 
R: Want het zijn wel twee hele verschillende dingen die we nu proberen te 
concluderen. 
 
I: Ik ben het met u eens wanneer u zegt, toen wij in 2006 een besluit namen 
toen hebben we dat genomen zeer weloverwogen en gebaseerd op de echte 
feiten. Dat wil ik heel graag meenemen. 
 
R: Nee, maar dat is ook zo.  
 
I: Het tweede is, ik kijk nu naar de verschillen die ik nu aantref in de 
questionnaires, en dan kan ik alleen maar feitelijk vaststellen dat er verschillen  
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zitten in de antwoorden. Ik kijk dus niet naar de reden van het waarom dat ik die 
verschillen zie, maar ik kijk naar de verschillen. En die verschillen die heb ik 
gewoon geconstateerd.  
 
R: Nee, dat kan. Maar die conclusie is dat het dan op basis van verschillende 
informatie. 
 
I: Nee, maar dat hoor je mij ook niet zeggen. 
 
R: Nee, dat vind ik wel belangrijk. 
 
I: Als ik kijk naar pension funds governance, de verschillende lichamen die door 
pension funds governance regels van ons worden gevraagd, die waren er. 
Verantwoording, visitatie, dat soort commissies allemaal. Alleen ze hadden nog 
niet gewerkt, of het idee was er en de mensen waren al benoemd, maar dan is 
de volgende fase aan de orde. 
 
R: Nee maar kijk dat is heel simpel, volgens mij is de Pensioenwet in 2007 pas 
tot stand gekomen. Op basis daarvan zijn we inderdaad begonnen met een 
governance structuur neer te leggen. Toen hebben we ook een 
deelnemersraad geïnstalleerd. Dat werkte voor geen ene meter. Dat kan je 
gerust zeggen, de deelnemersraad zegt dat ook. Dat heeft ook met de 
communicatie te maken van de mensen die daar... En inmiddels is dat 
gemoderniseerd, sterker nog, nu vindt ook de deelnemersraad van nou 
jongens, ik denk dat we goed bij mekaar dingen doen. Dus ook daar is een 
evaluatie.. kijk op een gegeven moment krijg je de Pensioenwet, vervolgens is 
gezegd van nou jongens wat moeten we daarmee, en toen zijn wat dingen 
verzonnen, om de Nederlandse bank een beetje te pleasen. Of tenminste, 
uiteindelijk ook voor onszelf natuurlijk. En vervolgens ben je gaan kijken van 
hoe werkt dat nu, nou op dat moment met de deelnemersraad dat ging voor 
geen meter. Zelfs ruzie is er ontstaan, uiteindelijk. Toen is de deelnemersraad 
afgetreden, ook, en vervolgens is er een nieuwe deelnemersraad ontstaan. En 
een van de dingen die ik opgepakt heb is normalisatie met de deelnemersraad, 
en dat is gewoon heel goed gelukt. De voorzitter van de deelnemersraad die is  
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inmiddels net afgetreden, die was de laatste twee jaar..  en zo moet het ook 
werken. Dan zie je gewoon ook dat, als je kijkt naar de visitatie commissie, die 
hadden we ook helemaal niet. Die heb ik in 2009 operationeel gekregen, en in 
2010 is de eerste visitatie commissie geweest. 
 
I: Nou, ik ben me er heel goed van bewust dat in januari 2007 de Pensioenwet 
van start ging, dat alles wat in de regelgeving staat, niet op stel en sprong 
gerealiseerd is. Daar heeft de wetgever ook een aantal overgangstermijnen 
voor gegeven, voor het pensioenfonds en ook voor herverzekerde contracten. 
Dat begrijp ik, dat weet ik. Het enige wat ik nu dus vaststel is, en dat heb ik 
hierin gedaan, de bodies, de lichamen die vereist werden door de wet, en de 
pension funds governance rules, die waren er, alleen doordat ze er pas waren 
hebben ze zich het bestaan nog niet kunnen waarmaken en weet je ook niet 
hoe het in de praktijk heeft gewerkt. 
 
R: Nee, maar dat is een conclusie. 
 




I: Dan kijk ik naar de default settings, de default settings dat is waaraan we een 
aantal dingen vast hebben kunnen leggen, nou de vergaderfrequentie, het van 
te voren distribueren van de vergaderstukken en het besluitvormingsforum, dat 
zijn de default settings die door de respondenten zijn herkend. Vervolgens is 
ook vastgesteld dat er geen checklist in gebruik is wat betreft het 
besluitvormingsproces. Een checklist zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen zijn, agenda, 
punt genoteerd, stukken gedistribueerd, ook alternatieven aangeleverd, kortom: 
een checklist van afvinken, zit alles erbij? Prima, dan gaan we dus beslagen te 
ijs de discussie in. En dat is eigenlijk, zeg maar, de doelstelling van een 
checklist in deze fase. Dat je gewoon weet van nou is iedereen op de zelfde 
wijze geïnformeerd zodat we ook op dezelfde wijze met elkaar in discussie 
kunnen gaan over dezelfde data. 
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R: Dat gebeurd dus in principe want we hebben gewoon een. alle 
bestuursstukken die worden genummerd, en ieder bestuurslid krijgt dezelfde 
stukken, eigenlijk.  
 
I: De vraag is alleen, dat wanneer een besluit aan de orde is, of dat dan alle 
informatie die bij een dergelijk te nemen besluit hoort te bestaan, bijvoorbeeld: 
ik moet weten wat de waarde van de beleggingen is, om het even hiernaar 
terug te halen, is dat er dan bijgevoegd. Nou dat is eigenlijk zeg maar de 
waarde van een checklist in dat stadium. 
 
R: Ja, maar dan ga je even te ver, kijk een checklist die is natuurlijk heel lastig. 
Je moet uiteindelijk als je  kijkt wat je wel ziet is je krijgt wat discussie en op een 
gegeven moment dan zie je dat sommige stukken terug ingebracht moeten 
worden, voor het feit dat we gewoon de informatie niet altijd volledig voor 
handen was. Dus daar wordt wel degelijk over gecommuniceerd. We hebben 
een visitatiecommissie gehad, en daar stond onder andere dat met name de 
besluitvorming was niet altijd honderd procent goed genotuleerd of .. nou daar 
hebben we ons aan aangepast. We hebben nu een checklist voor hoe je 
besluitvorming vastlegt in de notulen. Dat hebben we inmiddels ook geregeld.  
 
I: De besluitvorming vastleggen in de notulen, dat is een actiepunt dat u heeft 
gedaan onder begeleiding van het verslag van de visitatie. En wat is daar 
anders aan dan wat er was?  
 
R: Dat heeft vooral met het professionaliseringsverslag te maken, van het 
besluitvormingsproces van het bestuur. De totstandkoming van het beleid: Om 
het besluit het beter vast te leggen gaat het MT de volgende activiteiten 
opvolgen,  de besluiten in de notulen van de specifieke vast te leggen en te 
accenturen, de besluiten op nemen van elk te nemen besluit met de gewone 
informatie, besluit bewegingen gevolgen. En zo hebben we dat gedaan. Dat 
heeft ook te maken met het professionaliseringsslag. 
 
I: Zou ik hier een kopie van mogen hebben van je? 
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R: Dat mag je hebben, ja.  
 
I: Oh, dank u wel, zeg. Dat is echt fantastisch. Nou, kijk, dit is dus.. 
 
R: Op die manier zijn we dus.. Kijk, u ziet dus, de reden dat ik nu hier ook zit, 
ondanks die handicap, is dat er ook een andere wind moest gaan waaien. We 
hebben de afgelopen twee jaar een behoorlijke slag gemaakt om ook dingen 
vast te leggen. Dat wil niet zeggen dat het in het verleden niet goed ging, laten 
we dat voorop stellen, maar die vraag die u nu stelt, die hebben we wat minder 
goed geregeld, en dat hebben we nu inmiddels wel gedaan.  
 
I: Nou, kijk, dat is wat ik uiteindelijk dus ook zal zeggen, ook met betrekking tot 
de case. Wat ik dus zie is dat er best wel, zo nu en dan, wat op en 
aanmerkingen zijn te maken, maar door de bank genomen, is het gewoon 
verdedigbaar, datgene wat er gebeurd is.  
 
R: Ja, maar dat is absoluut waar.  
 
I: Dat is het eerste, de besluitvorming is verdedigbaar. Het tweede, zit er ruimte 
voor, en dan noemt u het zelf professionalisering, en dat vind ik eigenlijk wel 
een goede duiding daarvoor: is er ruimte om verder te professionaliseren? En 
ja, er is ruimte om te professionaliseren, zeg ik op 1 april 2009, want dat is de 
data die ik beschikbaar heb. En dat is eigenlijk ook wat u constateert en ook 
zegt waar ik me de afgelopen twee jaar druk mee bezig gehouden hebt. En dat 
is dus eigenlijk de conclusie die ik dus trek over alle bevindingen die ik uit de 
questionnaires en alle documentatie heb kunnen halen is: ja, er is ruimte voor 
verbetering, twee, ja de besluitvorming is verdedigbaar, drie, is er ruimte voor 
die verbetering en hoe noemen we die dan. En op welke punten. En als u dan 
zelf aangeeft van nou kijk eens, zo hebben we dit bijvoorbeeld gedaan, dan zeg 
ik van, nou ja, petje af. Ik vind dat erg knap.  
 
R: Dat geeft ook inderdaad aan dat het bestuur bereid is om daar ook in te 
investeren en dat ook beter te maken.  
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I: Nou, dat is een ander aspect. Hoewel ik in het begin zei van nou ja, wat een 
heel erg open organisatie, dat weet ik niet, dat heb ik niet uit alle documentatie 
kunnen halen. Maar als je nu dan ziet dat het bestuur ook de bereidheid heeft 
die professionalisering slag door te maken en ook zich zelf een spiegel voor te 
houden, in tegenstelling tot het bestuur in de andere case waar ik dus tegen 
dingen aanloop waar er niet eens wordt gereflecteerd naar de externe 
adviseurs toe of het wel of niet goed is. Dan zei ik van ja, sorry, dan gaat het 
echt om gedrag van mensen, en welke regel dat je er ook voor op schrijft, doet 
niets af aan het gedrag van die mensen. En die mensen: je hebt ze zo ver, of 
zijn nooit zo ver. Nou en hier, bij dit fonds is het zo, dus het fonds waar we hier 
over praten, in deze case, dat die bereidheid er kennelijk wel is. En op het 
moment dat dit dan ook gebeurt, moet ik ook zeggen, petje af. Ik vind dat 
gewoon heel knap dat dat gebeurd. Want nogmaals, je moet niet vergeten te 
kijken naar de onderzoeksperiode die een hele tijd terug is. 
 
R: Maar we hebben toch ook een voorbeeldfunctie, we adviseren andere 
pensioenfondsen, dus we moeten ons zelf goed gedragen, zo heb ik het altijd 
zelf ook gepromoveerd... 
 
I: Je zet het neer voor de promotie, omdat je dus wilt dat: kijk eens, als ik een 
voorbeeld functie heb, kijk maar naar mij dan kun je daar misschien nog iets 
van leren. Nou en ik vind dat dus erg goed, en het tweede wat ik goed vind is 
dat je niet alleen de regelgeving leidend laat zijn voor je handelen maar dat je 
dus ook zoals een visitatie commissie zegt: van joh je moet iets doen om in de 
vastlegging , welke regelgeving dan ook staat het niet hoor, maar als je er dan 
toch toe over gaat, dan denk ik van dan ben je ook bezig met iets als 
gedragsverandering te realiseren. 
 
R: Daarom is de visitatiecommissie er ook. Als ze gewoon goede opmerkingen 
hadden, en dat hadden ze ook, dan moet je dat gewoon doen. Omdat ik dat zelf 
ook gewoon belangrijk vind, kijk dat is heel simpel: je kunt een heleboel 
besluiten met z’n allen, maar uiteindelijk gaat het er ook om waar de 
buitenwacht naar kijkt. En dat moeten we gewoon heel goed vastleggen. En dat 
vind ik ook als manager gewoon heel erg belangrijk, en ook als bestuurder.  
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I: Dan pak ik deze vast eventjes erbij. Dan kijk ik naar het volgende onderwerp. 
Als ik verderga naar die samenvatting van al die bevindingen. Het zou kunnen 
zijn dat er mogelijk vooroordelen zouden kunnen bestaan, dat zit in dit 
onderdeeltje. Als je hier dus weet van nou we zullen iets moeten doen met die 
dekkingsgraad, nou dan heb je hier de antwoorden als: is er sprake van een 
illusion of control. “Is er tijdens de onderzoeksperiode ooit gedacht, ons kan 
niets gebeuren?” Ja, nee. De ander: “zijn alle risico’s al gedekt?” De een zegt 
ja, de ander nee.  
 
R: Dit ben ik denk ik dan? Of niet? Dan ben ik wel zeer benieuwd want dat weet 
ik ook niet meer. 
 
I: Nee, dit bent u.  
 
R: Oke.  
 
I: “Ons kan niets gebeuren of alle risico’s zijn afgedekt.” En dit bedoel ik dan 
met een vooroordeel, het kan dus zijn dat als je dan denkt van: ons kan niets 
gebeuren.. 
 
R: Dan heb ik een black-out, want als ik dat zelf gezegd heb dan is dat.. dan 
klopt dat niet. Ja dat zou ik nu anders ingevuld hebben. En dat meen ik echt.  
 
I: Ja, u ziet het. Kijk wat ik gedaan heb, is nogmaals dat ik me heb beperkt tot 
de feiten.  
 
R: Nee, u heeft gelijk, maar dan heb ik dat zelf gewoon niet goed gedaan. Want 
we hebben al gezegd van als ‘de wereld omvalt’ , er kan best een hoop nog 
gebeuren. En we hebben niet alle risico’s afgedekt, we hebben de rente risico’s 
afgedekt, maar de aandelen risico’s  hebben we bijvoorbeeld niet afgedekt.  
 
I: Dus niet met opties? 
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R: Nee. Dus ja, dan heb ik denk ik een black-out gehad. Ik ben juist altijd heel 
voorzichtig, en ik zou niet zeggen dat ons niets kan gebeuren. 
 
I: Ja maar dat is dus ook de functie van dit gesprek, dat we gewoon even 
nalopen van nou, ja.. 
 
R: Nee, maar dat is dus niet zo. 
 
I: Prima, dan zal ik die commissie..  
 
R: Ja, die zou ik wel even doen, ja. 
 
I: Oke. Op basis van deze feiten had ik de conclusie getrokken, er kunnen dus 
vooroordelen bestaan, van nou ja, ons kan niets gebeuren, terwijl een ander 
denkt, nou van alles kan ons gebeuren. Nou dan heb je een voordeel  want 
waar heb je het nou over. Dus dan, dat je tijdens de vergadering  er ook heel 
anders in zit.  
 
R: Nou, dat is bij ons niet echt het geval. Dat heb ik echt verkeerd ingevuld, dan 
weet ik niet wat er toen gebeurd is. 
 
I: Prima. Wat ik doe is, ik probeer hier de conclusie aan te passen in verband 
met incorrectheid van de gegeven antwoorden.  
 
R: Ja, want juist het bewust zijn, dat wordt ook in het bestuur besproken. En 
iedereen zit er altijd honderd procent hetzelfde in. Maar dat wordt wel 
besproken, en uiteindelijk kom je wel tot een eenduidig besluit.  
 
I: Ik leg het daarom ook maar gewoon zo op tafel, zo van, dit is wat ik gevonden 
heb. Ik ben dus verder gegaan vanuit die aanname dat er dus kennelijk 
vooroordelen zijn. En dan trek ik in de volgende fase de conclusie, van, ja, door 
die vooroordelen is het mogelijk dat de vergadering ineffectief en inefficiënt 
verloopt. Omdat de gevoelens die bij de mensen in het lijf zitten..  
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R: Maar inderdaad, bij ons het gevoel dat anders is, af en toe heb je dat wel. 
Maar niet in die mate. En we hebben eigenlijk nog nooit geconstateerd dat we 
daardoor niet uit de besluitvorming kwamen of dat het heel lang geduurd heeft. 
Omdat we eigenlijk op dezelfde lijn zitten. Kijk, wat je wel een beetje ziet is dat 
de een voorzichtiger is dan de ander. En wat je ook wel ziet is dat we het 
eigenlijk toch wel redelijk goed voor elkaar hebben, misschien moeten we 
sommige dingen toch wel wat aanscherpen, en dat hebben we uiteindelijk ook 
wel gedaan door wat maatregelen te nemen. Dus uiteindelijk kom je er wel 
achter. Dus we hebben er eigenlijk nooit echt een discussie over gehad, dat de 
een toch een heel andere perceptie had dan de ander. Nee. 
 
I: Oke. Heel goed. Ik zeg u hierbij toe dat ik de conclusie die ik gebaseerd heb 
op de voorliggende informatie, dat ik die zal herzien naar aanleiding van de 
wijziging van de informatie. Naar aanleiding van deze aanvulling. Want, ja, het 
moet wel goed zijn. Ik moet het wel kunnen verdedigen.  
 
R: Nee precies, maar dat moet je ook in je verslag maar even verbeteren.  
 
I: Nee, maar dat is wel wat ik dus ook zal doen. Wat ik ook constateer, en dat is 
eigenlijk ook wat de visitatie commissie constateerde in de besluitvorming, is 
dat de beschikbare informatie niet aantoont wie verantwoordelijk is voor de 
implementatie of de controle van de besluitvorming. En dat is wat eigenlijk het 
document wat u mij zojuist gaf, aangeeft. Wat is het besluit, wat zijn de 
beweegredenen, wat zijn de gevolgen voor? En ook, communicatie, en al dan 
niet adviesplicht. Dus dat betekent dat je dus als het ware meer vastlegt. Wie 
zijn er bij betrokken, wie gaan het doen, wat moet er gebeuren? Nou en dat is 
wat ik eigenlijk constateer op dit moment.  
 
R: Dat was minder goed vastgelegd ja, en dat hebben we nu inderdaad 
geregeld.  
 
I: Ik denk dat dat gewoon hartstikke goed is, want dat was als het ware de 
samenvatting van de conclusie die ik trok naar aanleiding van alle informatie die 
ik dus had. Ik trek eigenlijk een conclusie dat de organisatie geen lerende  
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organisatie is. En dat komt doordat er door de grote verscheidenheid in de 
antwoorden er dus niet gesproken wordt over de zaken waar men verschillende 
antwoorden over gegeven heeft. Dat betekent zoveel als: een lerende 
organisatie, dan deel je alles wat je hebt, en dan kan men het oneens zijn maar 
dan nog kan er een besluit genomen worden waarvan er de volgende keer 
gezegd wordt van oh ja, hoe hadden we het de vorige keer ook al weer gedaan.  
 
R: Maar die conclusie mag je ook niet trekken. 
 
I: Nee want omdat als je dit dus gaan veranderen.. 
 
R: Nee, maar wacht even. Wat er gewoon gebeurd is, dat er vragen zijn 
neergelegd, waarvan mensen vroegen van ja wat moeten we ermee. En 
vervolgens zijn die gewoon ingevuld, dat is ook niet afgestemd, normaal 
gesproken doen ze dat wel. Maar omdat het vrij lang geduurd heeft is dat nooit 
afgestemd, waardoor er verschillende antwoorden uit komen. Als we dat samen 
hadden kortgesloten, dan waren er hoogstwaarschijnlijk andere antwoorden 
uitgekomen. Maar als je nog een keer tijd hebt wil ik daar best nog wel een keer 
door heen fietsen, dan kan ik nog eens even aangeven hoe het kan dat de 
antwoorden verschillen. Enerzijds heeft het te maken met de tijdsgeest op dat 
moment, denk ik. En misschien zijn sommige vragen ook niet helemaal goed 
begrepen door mij. Met sommige vragen had ik best wat moeite, vooral om te 
begrijpen: wat bedoel je nou precies. Dit is ingevuld, maar als je kijkt naar 
mezelf, daar weet ik gewoon van dat alle informatie gewoon op tafel komt, en 
dat iedereen de zelfde informatie heeft, omdat ze maar een soort informatie 
hebben.  
 
I: Oke, dat is heel belangrijk. Ik ben deze gelijk aan het noteren. 
 
R: Ja, dit is een hele belangrijke. En daarom zeg ik van nou dan ligt het meer 
aan de beantwoording of.. dan wil ik daar wel even kritischer naar kijken.  
 
I: Wat ik graag wil doen zijn twee dingen. Dat is een, u ontzettend vriendelijke 
bedanken voor de tijd die u nu genomen heeft om dit gesprek aan te gaan. En  
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nummer twee is dat ik graag met u een andere afspraak wil maken om die 
vragen dan separaat door te nemen, maar dat graag op een ander tijdstip.  
 
R: Ja, dat wil ik wel doen. Dan kan ik even kijken van hoe dat.. Het is niet dat ik 
naar een antwoord wil toewerken, maar ik wil het wel analyseren en dan 
kunnen we het daar wel over hebben. Een ding wat ik wel wil zeggen is dat 
iedereen tijdens de besluitvorming dezelfde informatie heeft. En dat kan ik ook 
zien aan de informatie die ze aan ons geven, want die is ook vastgelegd.  
 
I: Nou dat is dus wel iets wat ik gewoon noteer, dat bij besluitvorming alle 
beschikbare informatie op tafel komt. En hiermee wil ik u nogmaals bedanken 
voor dit gesprek, en een einde aan dit interview maken. En in de tussentijd 
maken wij even een nieuwe afspraak. Als u dat wilt. 
 
R: Ja.  
 
